Last week began with revelations that Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang had carried out an affair with an alleged Chinese spy. It ended with Huang’s resignation and a cumulative loss of half a trillion dollars in market cap, bringing the total decline since October to $1.7 trillion.
Much has already been written, and there have been many great memes. But beyond the public fascination with Huang’s act (or three) of infidelity, most of the commentary has been around the implications for Nvidia and the tech sector it’s propped up through the continuous release of new hardware, its vast array of circular financing arrangements with unprofitable firms and Huang’s leather-jacket enthusiasm for a techno utopia where AI delivers all of the upsides with none of the downsides (which include, presumably, Thursday’s Outlook outage and Friday’s FAA ground stop).
Yet, just like his illicit relationships and the potential frailties of the Silicon Valley juggernaut, the broader geopolitical dimensions have been hiding in plain sight. Huang was also a prominent advocate for US engagement and trade with China, as well as its open-weight AI ecosystem. No doubt he was talking his book. Beyond any legitimate sales of older chips to Chinese hyperscalers, short-seller Culper earlier this year assessed that a whopping 20% of Nvidia’s revenues came from illicit Chinese end-users. But being a child of Taiwanese migrants, Huang was also making a point for peace. Can’t we all just get along, and enjoy each other’s intercourse?
And indeed, there are strong arguments for free trade and kumbaya. Beyond Huang’s claims that shutting out China would backfire – a similar contention to former Trump official David Sacks’ argument that the US should get China “addicted” to American technology (shades of the opium wars there) – there’s an enormous body of evidence that restrictions and embargoes seldom work for desired and profitable goods (opium wars again). From 1920s prohibition to today’s surge in US cocaine consumption, even the US military can’t stop it. Will any future chip wars be any different?
Yet Jensen doesn’t make the rules and, under current statute, it’s illegal to sell China high-end chips (which have also ended up in Russia). The AI industry’s nuclear arms race analogy may be specious (we much prefer the analogy of the Silk Road – the non-drugs kind), but laws are laws, and if Nvidia is shown to have broken them, whether through omission or commission, then it should involve more than the loss of a well-paid job and bonuses.
Indeed, if you think it’s important that China, the US’s chief strategic adversary, should not have access to cutting-edge American chips on which to train advanced AI models, then Huang’s alleged smuggling operation, the potential leaking of sensitive information, and the presumed sex-induced foreign influence is a bigger scandal than Kim Philby or Aldrich Ames, at least in raw economic terms. Maybe nobody has been killed, but if the US is indeed in an existential contest with China, then it won’t be hard to link the technological advantage it may have been given by Nvidia’s former boss to any future strategic and military losses, particularly should there ever be a war over Taiwan, the chip-manufacturing island that Huang wanted to see maintained as an unmolested commercial free-for-all.
But, including for business and investors, there may be an even more important geopolitical dimension to this saga than the alleged double-dealing of the man who once sat atop corporate America. And that dimension starts with the alleged involvement of several senior officials in the Trump administration.
The most consequential of these officials, so far, is Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, who is alleged to have not only turned a blind eye to the Nvidia chips that ended up in China, but to have blocked the blacklisting of Megaspeed, the Singapore-based entity that was run by Huang’s alleged honeytrap, despite Treasury, Pentagon and State Department misgivings. And as we wrote yesterday, the Trump administration’s China hawks seem out to get Lutnick not only for his alleged connivance, but the potential conflict of interest of his family’s Cantor Fitzgerald, a prominent tech investor with well-timed trades in Intel, Nvidia and others.
Yet the Lutnick clan’s potential misdeeds pale in comparison to those of the family Trump. And it goes well beyond tech. Even with Iran, it’s hard not to draw a connection between the billions being blatantly made on the revolving Brent and WTI “TACO” trade and the utterances that would only be known to Trump. Likewise, crypto, Russia and Venezuela. Via the TikTok U-turn, China as well. Maybe soon Cuba too. I once posited to a friend at the Wall Street Journal that America under Trump was like Suharto’s Indonesia. She countered that this was absurd. I now agree. Poor Suharto would have never been able to pull off rackets like these.
Kleptocracy is a common feature in political history. Power corrupts, and state coffers are often bigger and less well-protected than any accumulation a private individual would otherwise manage. Yet kleptocracy that involves you selling out your country to a foreign power is an altogether different kind of larceny. Like Suharto, Ferdinand Marcos, Mobutu Sese Seko, Alberto Fujimori and Slobodan Milosevic all stole from the state, but they were all still arguably patriots. You might say this of Vladimir Putin as well. A little commingling of their own assets and their country’s was probably rationalised away.
Yet the alleged corruption we’re seeing in the US – which is still, by the way, the linchpin of what’s left of the global rules-based order – may come to have more in common with the regimes of Viktor Yanukovych, Pierre Laval or Ashraf Ghani. These men, respectively, immiserated Ukraine, Vichy France and Afghanistan to the ultimate advantage of Russia, Nazi Germany, and the Taliban. A special strategic corruption layer in Dante’s Inferno may not exist, but if il Sommo Poeta lived today, he would have written it in.
Yet this is not what worries me. Trump will be booted out in 2028 if he survives the next two years of a Democrat-led Congress. As was said last week of Huang, graveyards are filled with indispensable men. It’s the deluge after him that is concerning. Particularly if it means not only a crackdown on US capitalism in the name of anti-corruption, but a crackdown on trade that may not be as chaotic as Trump’s Liberation Day tariffs (perhaps yet another bezzle to fund his family’s business interests, or at least the White House ballroom) but will be more permanent and ultimately more damaging. As in Xi Jinping’s China, a similar “tigers and flies“ anti-graft campaign could be a cure worse than the disease.
The roaring 1920s, with its Teapot Dome scandals and figures like Gaston Means, was followed by the Depression-era 1930s, with its protectionism, retributive justice, anti-trust regulations, and, at least in Europe, rising political extremism. That period, like our own, sat within a broader geopolitical interregnum, between 1914 and 1945, where the world order shifted, making such shifts not only of domestic and commercial interest, but of interest to the evolution of world order.
I can imagine a scenario when, in 2028, the avenging angel of Jon Ossoff is joined by a turbocharged attorney general in Lina Khan to bring to heel not only crony capitalism but the remaining sinews of US-China trade. After all, an anti-free trade foreign policy didn’t end with Trump 1.0, but continued, with softer gloves, under Joe Biden. And, after all, the “small yard, high fence“ framework of Jake Sullivan would seem to have been vindicated by the Nvidia scandal. But while good fences may make good neighbours, they can also make stronger enemies.
As much as the era of globalization has been filled with its rakes, scandals, and inequities, it has been the best guarantee of pluralism, peace and prosperity since the last great globalized era, that between Napoleon and World War I. Not a world completely without war, but one where great power war was absent, and where trading was more profitable than fighting. And with the more recent globalized era now at a close, with the AI fruits that Nvidia has helped bring about, can we afford another period of conflict, populism and revenge, with yet more new weapons of mass destruction? That leather jacket could be replaced by a hair shirt, or a field greatcoat.
Former diplomat Michael Feller is chief strategist at Geopolitical Strategy and author of Geopolitical Dispatch, from which this article is republished with kind permission.
