In this photo released by Russian Foreign Ministry Press Service on Oct. 4, 2024, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, right, and Acting Foreign Minister of Afghanistan’s Taliban movement Amir Khan Muttaqi pose for a photo prior to their talks in Moscow, Russia. Photo: Russian Foreign Ministry Press Service

When Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk arrived in Kabul on November 12 for trade and investment talks, he brought a number meant to impress.

An Afghan government statement quoted him saying bilateral trade topped US$349 million in the first eight months of 2026, more than double the level a year earlier. The sum is small, but the signal is not.

Afghanistan remains largely isolated. Only Russia has formally recognized the Taliban government, doing so in July 2025, and it is still the only one.

But Kabul is assembling something other than the international reconciliation once expected after the Western withdrawal: a web of transactional relationships with neighbors whose economic interests and security fears now outweigh their discomfort with the Taliban. Each partner wants something different, which is why the pattern matters for Pakistan.

Moscow wants influence in Central Asia, security cooperation and a role in new transport links. India, which pulled out its diplomats in 2021, upgraded its Kabul technical mission to an embassy in October 2025. It has not recognized the Taliban government. It is protecting its ties to the Afghan population and its seat in regional diplomacy.

China keeps talking to Kabul about minerals, infrastructure and connectivity, but cautiously. Beijing’s worries about militancy on its western edge and the safety of its investments limit how far it will go.

None of this adds up to a bloc. But they add up to options, and options are what the Taliban has until now lacked.

Pakistan once held most of the cards. Geography, trade routes, refugee flows and decades of contact gave Islamabad unmatched influence over Afghan affairs. Today, relations are among the worst in years.

Islamabad says the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan has found sanctuary in Afghanistan and wants verifiable action to suppress the group known as the Pakistan Taliban. Kabul denies the allegation. Pakistan has carried out airstrikes inside Afghanistan, which it says target militant hideouts, including as recently as early October.

The Moscow Format meeting on October 5 showed how deep the gap runs. Pakistan’s envoy put terrorism at the center of his case, while the Taliban’s foreign minister accused Islamabad of relying on military pressure instead of diplomacy.

For the first time since the forum began in 2017, it ended without a joint statement. Russia’s envoy said the Afghan side objected to a draft that mentioned Afghanistan too often in a terrorism context. A bigger table did not produce consensus on who is responsible for what.

It would be a mistake, though, to read Kabul’s successful outreach purely as a defeat for Islamabad. The Taliban are seeking trade and legitimacy without depending on any single neighbor, and Pakistan’s own policies have accelerated the trend.

Prolonged closures of the Torkham and Chaman crossings since October 2025 pushed Afghan traders toward Iran and Central Asia. They have also hurt Pakistan. In July, Pakistan and Uzbekistan agreed in principle to route some of their transit trade through China, because routes through Afghanistan had stalled and those through Iran had become unreliable.

Geography still sets hard limits. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the United Arab Emirates signed a memorandum on September 30 to advance a Trans-Afghan railway to Pakistan’s ports.

Pakistan remains the shortest route to the sea, and Iran’s corridors carry their own risks. But a railway is not a policy and a transport hub needs predictable borders, security and investor confidence. None of those can be declared into existence by diplomatic communiqués.

So the question is whether overlapping economic interests can evolve into political cooperation. That depends on all sides. Islamabad has legitimate security concerns and demands.

It should pursue them in ways that win partners rather than lose them. A standing channel with Kabul, a credible, checkable counterterrorism arrangement and reliable commercial access would deliver more than recurring confrontation.

Kabul, for its part, cannot treat new partners as a substitute for addressing its neighbors’ concerns. Russia and China, now closer to the Taliban than any other major powers, hold leverage they have so far used sparingly. They both know investment announcements will not stop cross-border militancy.

Nor can Afghanistan’s domestic situation be ignored. An estimated 2.4 million girls remain excluded from secondary education, and the Taliban have restricted women’s employment and travel without a male guardian. Political parties are outright banned.

In June, the UN Security Council unanimously called on the Taliban to reverse their crackdown on women and to act against militant groups that Pakistan accuses of cross-border attacks.

Governments may prefer pragmatism, but normalization that ignores these conditions separates economic engagement from the welfare of ordinary Afghans and weakens the stability everyone claims they want.

The region faces a stark choice. Afghanistan’s expanding partnerships can deepen existing mistrust among rivals, or they can become the basis for inclusive cooperation built on verifiable security commitments, protected trade corridors, humanitarian access and projects whose benefits reach beyond the elite.

Kabul’s tentative new partnerships are not the same as stability or legitimacy. The test of Kabul’s new diplomacy is whether it actually improves regional security and the lives of Afghans. For Islamabad, the test is whether it can remain relevant in Kabul without relying solely on leverage.

Mansoor Qaisar is an independent writer based in Islamabad, writing on foreign and public policy and social issues shaping Pakistan and the region. He can be reached at mansoor.qaisar@gmail.com and followed on X at @MansorQaisar.

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