On October 23, 2026, in Baku, Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and held talks with his counterpart, Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov.
It was the first bilateral visit by an Indian foreign minister since 2018. Seven weeks earlier, at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Bishkek, Aliyev and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had met in person for the first time.
The talks had a practical basis in long-term Indian investment in Azerbaijani oil production and the two governments’ cooperation in bringing Indian citizens home from Iran in early 2026.
Jaishankar and Bayramov discussed further energy investment and agreed to coordinate more closely on north–south freight transport. India already has a stake in the production and shipment of Azerbaijani oil. Azerbaijan, in turn, has an interest in attracting Indian cargo to its railways and ports.
Baku, New Delhi and their partners
For New Delhi, relations with Baku have developed alongside a longstanding partnership with Armenia, with which its defense ties have grown.
Likewise, Baku’s relations with India have developed alongside a partnership with Pakistan. The October talks gave the two governments an occasion to reconsider how far those relationships should constrain their dealings with each other.
Armenia took delivery of four Indian Swathi artillery-locating radars in 2021 and six Indian-made 155-millimeter towed howitzers in 2023. By October 2024, the Armenian army had put the guns through operational trials at several locations in the country. That September, Azerbaijan had publicly displayed its JF-17C fighters, developed jointly by Pakistan and China.
The fighting between India and Pakistan in May 2025 had repercussions for civilian travel. After Baku expressed solidarity with Pakistan, Indian travel companies reported a surge in cancellations, and some suspended promotions.
Between May and August, Indian visits to Azerbaijan fell by 56% compared with the same four months of 2024. Direct flights had helped Azerbaijan develop a substantial Indian tourist market.
When Iranian airspace closed during the fighting in March 2026, Indian nationals, many of them students, crossed by road into Azerbaijan or Armenia for onward travel to India.
By April 2, India’s embassy in Tehran had helped 1,200 Indian citizens, including 845 students, leave Iran through the two land borders. When Jaishankar visited Baku in October, he thanked the Azerbaijani government for its assistance.
On April 3, senior foreign ministry officials from India and Azerbaijan met in Baku for bilateral consultations. The agenda included trade, energy, and tourism. By the time Aliyev and Modi met in Bishkek, their foreign ministries had already brought sensitive security issues arising from the India–Pakistan conflict into the same discussions as their commercial interests.
In October, Bayramov acknowledged that disagreements had affected both bilateral relations and the two countries’ dealings in international organizations. Jaishankar observed that each government formed its own judgments on international questions.
The understanding reached in Baku gives each government room to deal with the other on bilateral questions. Baku intends to develop its ties with India while preserving its security relationship with Pakistan.
The oil trade recovered before Bishkek
India’s ONGC Videsh acquired stakes in the Azeri–Chirag–Gunashli oil fields and the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline in 2013 and increased both holdings in 2024. Azerbaijani crude bound for India typically travels west by pipeline through Georgia to Ceyhan on Turkey’s Mediterranean coast, where tankers load it for the voyage to India.
Indian imports from Azerbaijan, consisting predominantly of crude oil, dropped from $734 million in 2024 to $175 million in 2025. Trade in the other direction held steady at about $225 million.
Azerbaijani crude shipments to India had stopped in October 2024, several months before the fighting between India and Pakistan, reportedly due to a pricing disagreement. They resumed in August 2025 after that disagreement was settled. ONGC Videsh retained its stake in Azerbaijani production throughout the interruption in Indian purchases.
The recovery in oil sales was already well underway when Aliyev and Modi met in Bishkek on September 1. By the end of August, Azerbaijani customs had recorded some 524,000 metric tons of crude exports to India.
From January through September 2026, Azerbaijan’s crude exports to India were worth $399 million, about two-thirds of the $600 million in bilateral trade Bayramov reported for that period.
In October, the discussion turned to where Indian companies might invest next. Bayramov singled out pharmaceuticals, a sector in which Indian manufacturers already sell products in Azerbaijan.
The ministers agreed to exchange business delegations. For Indian manufacturers already selling in Azerbaijan, this would provide an occasion to discuss local investment with prospective partners.
North–south trade on either side of the Caspian
India, Iran and Russia signed the founding agreement for the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) in St. Petersburg on September 12, 2000. Azerbaijan joined in 2005.
For India, the corridor offers a combination of sea and overland routes to Russia and markets farther north. For Azerbaijan, it brings freight from the Indian Ocean within reach of a transport network that also runs west through the South Caucasus.
Between Iran and Russia, the corridor has two overland branches, one on either side of the Caspian Sea. The western branch passes through Azerbaijan, the eastern through Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.
A third option carries freight by ship between Iranian and Russian ports on the Caspian itself. A shipper can therefore approach Russia through Azerbaijan, through Central Asia, or by loading maritime cargo at an Iranian port.
Indian freight forwarders examined two of these options in a trial begun in 2014. Both itineraries started at Nhava Sheva near Mumbai and crossed by sea to Bandar Abbas in Iran. One continued overland to Baku; the other went to the Iranian port of Bandar Anzali for trans-Caspian shipment to Astrakhan in Russia.
At the October talks, the Azerbaijani side also drew attention to the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway. For goods reaching Azerbaijan from Iran, that railway opens a further possibility of carriage west through Georgia to Turkey, or even beyond.
Of the routes discussed in Baku, Jaishankar and Bayramov agreed to coordinate more closely on the INSTC. Azerbaijan has an operating railway between its Iranian and Russian borders. On the Iranian side, the unfinished section between Rasht and Astara still interrupts through rail service on the western branch.
Earlier in October, a senior Russian Railways executive said that construction was expected to begin in 2027. Operators offering service along the western route must therefore allow for the transfer between road and rail.
Increasing room for bilateral cooperation
The Indian public-sector energy corporation ONGC Videsh bought a 2.36% share in the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline company from the American company Hess in 2013.
Its purchase of a further 0.737% from Norway’s Equinor in 2024 brought its holding to 3.097%. Indian participation in the pipeline already gives ONGC Videsh a share in the business of transporting Azerbaijani oil. Azerbaijani carriers would earn transit revenue from Indian freight once shippers begin booking regular consignments.
Practical bilateral meetings could help increase trade via the INSTC. A favorable rail rate through Azerbaijan may count for little if the Indian exporter cannot establish in advance the handling charges at the transfer point or the time required for clearance.
Azerbaijani carriers seeking that business have reason to agree with operators on the Iranian side about transfer charges and schedules, so that an Indian customer can obtain a quotation for the journey before committing the cargo.
The October talks give Baku and New Delhi a basis for pursuing these interests even where their regional policies diverge. The two governments can now take up an Indian company’s interest in a further energy investment, or an Azerbaijani carrier’s proposal for a freight service, on the merits of the proposal itself.
How far the October talks have widened commercial opportunities will become clearer when companies in both countries decide which projects to pursue.
Robert M Cutler is director and senior research fellow, Energy Security Program, NATO Association of Canada, and senior fellow in geoeconomics and strategic negotiations at Strategy International. He was previously for many years a senior researcher at the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University.

Azerbaijan and Pakistan traditionally have good relations. It seem that the big nosed guy in Azeri is making the wrong enemies. On the wrong side with Armenia, Pakistan, Russia, Iran and Turkey.
Another fool who fell for the Western playbook, he will be ditched like a used toy when they are done with him.