For nine years, Myanmar’s generals told the world the same story. In 2017, they said, their soldiers were fighting terrorists in northern Rakhine State. On November 19, that defense failed at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
By nine votes to six, the court found Myanmar responsible for genocide against the Rohingya, the first such finding against a state in its history.
The judges accepted that the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) had attacked security posts. But the killing of thousands of civilians, widespread rape, violence against children and the systematic destruction of Rohingya villages could not reasonably be explained as counterinsurgency alone.
The court ordered Myanmar to facilitate the safe, voluntary and dignified return of displaced Rohingya, restore or replace their lost property, and compensate victims for losses that cannot be remedied through restitution.
Min Aung Hlaing commanded the military during those atrocities. Now installed as president, he leads a government whose spokesperson called the verdict “not fair” because six judges dissented. Its foreign ministry still described Rohingya pejoratively as “Bengalis.”
The generals want the world to count the dissenting judges while refusing to acknowledge the identity of the people they persecuted. But the judgment raises another question. Who can put the court’s orders into practice in the territory where Rohingya families once lived?
One answer lies with the Arakan Army (AA), a predominantly ethnic Rakhine armed group whose political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA), now governs most of Rakhine State.
Rohingya return is hardly a new idea for its leader, Twan Mrat Naing. As early as 2022, he said he did not oppose refugees going home. In 2024, he supported safe and voluntary repatriation in principle. As recently as May 2026, he spoke of creating conditions for their return.
Yet the harder questions of security, property restitution and equal rights remain unanswered. The ICJ judgment gives the AA an opportunity to show whether it can deliver on those words.
The old playbook
Myanmar’s military has long exploited distrust between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims. It portrayed an entire community as a security threat, then presented attacks on civilians as the defence of race, religion and motherland. Militant attacks became the justification, and whole villages paid.
The ICJ considered decades of discriminatory laws and anti-Rohingya hate speech when assessing evidence of genocidal intent.
That old playbook survived the coup. The military forcibly recruited Rohingya men to fight the AA. Meanwhile, Rohingya armed groups, including ARSA and the Rohingya Solidarity Organization, have fought the AA, deepening mistrust between communities already scarred by years of violence.
Ordinary Rohingya and Rakhine civilians continue to pay the price.
Yet the military no longer controls most of the territory where the 2017 atrocities occurred. The AA holds 14 of Rakhine’s 17 townships, including Maungdaw and Buthidaung, and controls the border with Bangladesh.
The ICJ judgment binds Myanmar as a state, not the AA. But the return of displaced Rohingya and restitution of their property in territory the military no longer controls will require cooperation from those governing it.
The AA is a relative newcomer to governing such a large and diverse population. It did not conduct the military’s 2017 clearance operations. That gives it a chance to learn from the generals’ record, but no immunity for its own actions.
After the verdict, AA spokesperson Khaing Thukha told Burmese media that the group stood for “truth and justice” and would act in Rakhine’s interests. His response offered no new concrete steps on repatriation or accountability.
There have been some encouraging developments. The ULA/AA administration has brought Muslim residents into local administrative and advisory roles, and a historic mosque in Maungdaw reopened in September 2025 after years of closure.
But such steps do not amount to equal rights.
The UN Human Rights Office has reported serious abuses against Rohingya under AA control, including arbitrary detention, forced recruitment, sexual violence and seizure of property. Rights organizations have also accused AA forces of attacks on Rohingya civilians. The AA has denied allegations against its forces.
If the AA rejects those accusations, it should welcome credible, independent investigations. Denial alone will not satisfy the Rohingya or the international community.
There is another test. The AA has generally preferred to call Rohingya “Muslims,” while some of its leaders have also used “Bengali,” rather than consistently recognizing the community’s chosen identity.
Acknowledging the Rohingya name would not settle the citizenship question. But refusing it repeats an exclusionary practice that helped make this crisis so entrenched.
The AA wants recognition as Rakhine’s legitimate governing authority. Military victories alone cannot secure that recognition. It must demonstrate that Rakhine Buddhists, Rohingya and other minorities can live under its administration without discrimination or fear.
What would work
The international community should stop treating Naypyitaw as the only authority capable of addressing the Rohingya crisis.
Bangladesh has confirmed contacts with both the military-backed government and the AA over repatriation. On November 20, a Bangladeshi state minister told Reuters that Dhaka hoped to secure a path to return within 12 to 18 months.
But a political timetable is no substitute for conditions on the ground.
No one can reasonably expect a wartime administration under air attack, struggling with poverty and a devastated economy, to receive more than a million refugees tomorrow.
Nor should refugees be pushed into a pilot return while fighting, landmines, hunger and restrictions on movement persist. The United Nations says conditions are not yet conducive to safe, voluntary and sustainable repatriation. A failed pilot could destroy what little trust remains.
The AA can nevertheless begin now. It can demonstrate respect for Rohingya rights, protect homes and property, allow independent humanitarian monitoring, and welcome credible investigations into allegations against its forces.
Bangladesh, Rohingya representatives, the United Nations and other international partners could work with the AA on preparations for eventual return. Rohingya communities must be involved from the beginning, not presented with agreements negotiated by others.
The AA cannot grant Myanmar citizenship on its own. Nor does territorial control erase the Myanmar state’s legal obligations. But it can recognize Rohingya identity, respect their rights and demonstrate its willingness to protect them.
International engagement would not automatically confer formal recognition. It could, however, allow the AA to earn political credibility through verifiable action. This is the AA’s real latecomer’s advantage. It does not have to inherit the military’s methods.
The generals used the Rohingya to divide Rakhine. Twan Mrat Naing has already said he supports their return. Now the AA has a chance to show that it can govern differently.
Its claim to legitimacy should begin not with another promise to bring refugees home, but with how it treats the Rohingya who never left.
Nyein Chan Aye is a Washington, DC-based journalist writing on Myanmar, China, the US and regional affairs.
