CPEC 2.0 aims to move past the infrastructure-heavy first phase toward industry, agriculture, mining, technology, green development and business-to-business investment. That shift could deepen economic ties between Pakistan and China, but it also changes the nature of the security challenge.
Big infrastructure projects can be guarded behind fixed perimeters. Industrial zones, mines, private businesses and scattered commercial activity cannot.
If CPEC 2.0 is to draw Chinese companies and investors beyond the major state-backed projects, security will have to become broader, more reliant on intelligence and more tightly woven into local governance.
Having worked on CPEC coordination in government, I see this as one of the second phase’s central tests. Pakistan has already committed considerable resources to protecting Chinese personnel and projects. The military, police and specialized units have set up dedicated security arrangements, and movement protocols govern travel in sensitive areas.
Yet repeated attacks show that physical protection alone cannot eliminate the threat.
In March 2024, a suicide attack near Besham, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, killed five Chinese nationals working on the Dasu hydropower project, along with their Pakistani driver. That October, two Chinese nationals died in an attack near Karachi airport. Earlier attacks had targeted Chinese interests in Balochistan, Karachi and elsewhere.
The attacks took place in different settings and cannot all be pinned on one group or one motive. That diversity is what makes the problem so hard.
Different threats, different geography
Balochistan is perhaps the hardest case. The province is central to CPEC for its port at Gwadar, its mineral wealth and its location.
It is also home to a long-running separatist insurgency. The Baloch Liberation Army and other militant groups have attacked security forces, infrastructure and Chinese interests.
For these groups, attacking Chinese nationals is more than a tactic. China is tied to the most visible projects and investments, making its citizens and interests symbolic targets.
Security policy must therefore distinguish between guarding a particular road, port or project and addressing the political and economic conditions in which militants find recruits and support.
Gwadar shows why. Its strategic value is immense, but its security cannot be separated from the expectations of the people who live around it. Water, electricity, jobs, fishing rights, freedom of movement and access to economic opportunity shape how locals view large development projects.
None of this justifies violence. But it does mean development and security policy cannot be run separately.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa poses a different problem. The Dasu attack exposed how vulnerable personnel are on long road corridors through rugged terrain. The militancy there, tied to Pakistan’s western border regions, differs from the separatist insurgency in Balochistan.
Karachi is another matter. Pakistan’s largest commercial center sees millions of movements every day. Chinese engineers, managers and businesspeople working outside traditional CPEC compounds cannot realistically live and work permanently inside fortified zones.
CPEC 2.0 therefore needs several security models, not one.
Security begins before the convoy moves
After attacks, Pakistan has often added guards, vehicles, checkpoints and escorts. Those measures remain necessary, especially in high-risk areas. But more personnel cannot replace intelligence.
The decisive work increasingly happens before a convoy leaves its compound.
Who knows the route? Has it been varied? Has anything unusual been spotted? Are local police, intelligence agencies and project security teams sharing information? Do contractors and private companies follow the same standards as state-backed projects?
These questions grow more urgent as CPEC moves toward private-sector cooperation.
Movement protocols must also be followed consistently. Security is a shared operational responsibility. Pakistani authorities must provide effective protection, but Chinese companies and personnel in high-risk areas must also follow agreed movement and security procedures.
Even a sophisticated system can fail if people travel without coordination or treat established protocols as bureaucratic nuisances.
Both sides need stronger institutional accountability.
Beijing’s concerns are real
The attacks have inevitably raised Chinese perceptions of risk.
Chinese leaders have publicly called for stronger protection of their nationals and projects. After the 2024 Karachi airport attack, reports surfaced of discussions about a deeper Chinese role in security coordination.
Pakistan has legitimate reasons to keep sovereign responsibility for security operations on its soil. But that need not stand in the way of far closer cooperation with China on intelligence, surveillance, threat assessment, technology and prevention.
The goal should not be parallel security systems but an integrated one in which information moves faster than the attackers. CPEC 2.0 raises the economic stakes.
A large state-owned enterprise can absorb heavy security costs. A midsize Chinese manufacturer weighing a factory, farm venture or technology partnership will do the math differently. Its executives will weigh insurance, employee safety, mobility and business continuity before committing capital.
Security is now part of Pakistan’s investment climate, not just a law-and-order issue.
The western frontier
Pakistan’s internal security cannot be wholly separated from what happens across its borders.
For decades, mobile militants, weapons flows and sanctuaries along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border have complicated counterterrorism. Balochistan’s long frontiers with Afghanistan and Iran add to the difficulty.
Pakistan cannot secure CPEC at project gates alone while instability flows across a far larger region.
Better border management, intelligence cooperation and sustained engagement with neighboring states must accompany domestic measures. Pakistan and China also share an interest in keeping instability in Afghanistan from threatening regional connectivity.
But outside factors should not become an alibi for failings at home. Intelligence lapses, poor coordination, weak local policing and disregard for security procedures should be identified candidly when they occur.
From protecting projects to protecting commerce
The first phase taught Pakistan to protect major infrastructure. The second requires it to protect a broader economy.
That means pairing professional security with better governance, intelligence coordination and local participation. Communities around major projects should see real economic benefits: jobs, skills training, local procurement and infrastructure.
Local inclusion is no substitute for counterterrorism, and development will not by itself persuade committed militants to lay down arms.
But an economically excluded community offers hostile narratives more room than one that sees itself as a stakeholder.
CPEC 2.0’s focus on livelihoods, industry and business-to-business cooperation offers a chance to fix this weakness.
Pakistan should therefore judge CPEC security not only by the number of guards deployed or attacks foiled, but also by how quickly intelligence is acted on, how closely movement protocols are followed, how well federal and provincial institutions coordinate, how many local people are employed and whether Chinese businesses can operate without extraordinary restrictions.
China, for its part, should recognize that lasting security cannot come from harder perimeters alone. Local partnerships and sensitivity to community concerns can improve the environment in which Chinese companies work.
Both governments have repeatedly shown the political will to press on with CPEC despite attacks. The question now is whether security can evolve as fast as the corridor itself.
CPEC 2.0 will succeed only if Chinese investors believe they can work safely, Pakistani communities believe they share in the benefits, and militants are denied both the operational space and the grievances they seek to exploit.
Qazi Zaheer Ahmad is a former senior joint secretary, BPS-21, to the Government of Pakistan and served as project director of CPEC (additional charge) from 2020 to 2023. His approximately 37 years of federal service included assignments in planning, development, internal security and foreign affairs.
