On June 29, France thought it had found its way back into the Strait of Hormuz. Hours after French President Emmanuel Macron and Oman’s Sultan Haitham bin Tariq Al Said agreed in Paris to clear the strait’s mines and guarantee “free and unconditional” passage, Tehran killed the idea.
Iran would demine alone, its deputy foreign minister said, and France should stop meddling. Europe is in these waters and willing to act, yet it still can’t set the terms of its presence there.
The memorandum of understanding intended to freeze the Iran war for 60 days was barely a week old when the drones came. On June 25, one of them struck the bridge of a Singapore-flagged cargo ship as it left the Strait of Hormuz; the United Nations suspended its evacuation of stranded vessels; and within days, American aircraft were striking Iran while Iranian missiles again fell on Kuwait and Bahrain.
So much for the truce Washington and Tehran had signed to end the war.
The scaffolding Britain and France have been assembling since the spring — the Hormuz conferences, the promised naval mission and the warships already on station — is real, but it waits for a ceasefire that is just barely holding.
About 32 kilometers wide, the Strait of Hormuz carries nearly 20% of the world’s seaborne oil, including diesel for European trucks, crude for refineries from Rotterdam to the Mediterranean and gas stored for winter.
Any disturbance in the Strait affects European fuel supplies within hours. Britain has already increased its threat level to “substantial” in response. Germany, still recovering from the loss of inexpensive Russian energy, is vulnerable to a second disruption through the Gulf.
A settlement reached without Europe at the table, resting on the goodwill of a state that has just shown it has none, cannot guarantee dependable passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Europe will stay vulnerable until it builds something more solid of its own.
The model that just failed was mostly improvised. For years, Washington and the Gulf monarchies relied on informal security arrangements — US bases, logistics, deterrence. That worked well enough while the region stayed calm. The war exposed its limits fast.
Iranian missiles hit US bases in Bahrain and Kuwait, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps targeted commercial shipping. Over time, agreements became mostly bilateral — mainly between Washington and Tehran — leaving Gulf states, whose economies depend on those waterways, without a seat at the table.
Iran, weakened but still resistant, now claims the authority to police the Strait and impose tolls on ships. The old system, in other words, no longer protects anyone’s supply routes but Iran’s.
Europe, though, already has ships in these waters — it just doesn’t have a policy to match. France has run a European naval mission in the Strait, Operation Agenor, since 2020.
In the Red Sea last year, the European Union showed that, through its Aspides mission against Houthi attacks, it would send warships to guard shipping when it chose. Since the spring, Britain and France have gone further still, convening conferences to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and pledging a defensive mission once the fighting stops.
The capacity is there; now, so is the will. France’s rebuffed overture to Oman showed as much. It showed, too, that will, without an agreed-upon structure behind it, can be undone by a single sentence from Tehran.
What’s missing is a structure that unifies these efforts rather than repeating past mistakes. The tools for leadership are already available.
France has a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and a presence in the Strait. Britain also holds a seat, along with a naval base in Bahrain and minehunters operating in the Gulf. Italy and the Netherlands contribute frigates and expeditionary capabilities.
The maritime competition is already underway: a US-led coalition has widened a transit corridor along the Omani coast to counter Iran’s claimed dominance. The main question is whether this stays a mostly American initiative with European backing, or whether Europe takes on a bigger role.
Building another institution won’t fix this — Europe reaches for that fix too often, and it rarely works. What’s needed instead is a standing table: a small forum bringing together the US, the Gulf coastal states and Europe’s major naval powers to ensure safe passage, reduce tensions and enforce agreements — without trying to overreach or outlast its own purpose.
This forum would build on what Britain and France are already doing, but with the Gulf states as active participants rather than spectators. It also answers a common objection: that neither Washington nor the Gulf states see a reason for Europe to be at the table. In fact, both do.
The US has learned the limits of acting alone during this war and would welcome allies willing to share the job of policing a waterway that carries little American oil.
The Gulf states have just watched a deal get struck on their own doorstep without them in the room — a forum where they participate as key players is exactly what they’ve been asking for. “Europe” here means a small group of nations with real naval power: France and Britain, backed by Italy and the Netherlands.
The goal is a coalition of countries that can actually do the job, not a symbolic gesture from the whole Union.
Oman is the obvious first partner. The return lane runs through its waters; it has just hosted the Iran talks, and along with Qatar, it has kept the steadiest line to Tehran throughout the war.
Abu Dhabi belongs there too: no Gulf capital has pressed harder for reopening the strait without conditions, and the Emirates carry economic and naval weight that mediation can’t replace.
Riyadh and Doha have their own stakes and would expect a hearing — but a coalition needs a core, and Oman and Abu Dhabi are it. Both have learned firsthand what it costs to leave their security in someone else’s hands.
The Gulf states also want an American commitment that outlasts any single president, having watched US attention swing from confrontation to withdrawal and back.
A European role appeals for exactly that reason: it would serve as a second anchor, less hostage to Washington’s electoral swings. If Europe put forward a serious proposal, it would likely find plenty of takers.
Europe is already in these tumultuous waters; what it lacks is a policy. A standing framework with the Gulf inside it would keep the routes open and give the states that depend on them a reason to hold them. Without one, Europe is left trusting arrangements that just failed and can fail again.
Eric Alter is a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and a former UN civil servant.Â
