The absence of Iran’s supreme leader, doubts about his condition and internal power divisions are turning the country into a failing state — spreading chaos as far as China. What will Beijing do?
Iranian regime media have claimed the emerging Iran-Oman deal would let Iran maintain control of the Strait of Hormuz. Still, many in the US believe any agreement granting Iran control over the strait would harm US and global commercial interests.
International recognition of that control would give Iran a strategic tool — a way to use the strait as leverage during future political disputes.
The US may want to block that recognition, which would be a significant setback for US interests globally, before the midterm elections and amid complex discussions with China on multiple fronts.
But behind Iran’s apparent political victory may lie a deeper transformation within the regime — one that could signal a disintegration of internal power and impending chaos in the country.
On August 5, China’s official news agency, Xinhua, reported that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said communication with Iran’s supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has been difficult recently. Is Beijing signaling that it, too, is struggling to reach Tehran? And why would Pezeshkian say this?
In the past week, Gulf states — which are now under attack from Tehran and supply most of China’s oil — asked Beijing to intervene with Iran and reopen the strait, without result. China may be signaling that it has no one to talk to in Iran, and therefore cannot help the Gulf states.
According to Iranian media, Pezeshkian “was taken to a secret Tehran location and allowed only minutes in a dark, tinted-window car with a man presented as Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.”
It is not clear whether the younger Khamenei is in control of his own life, let alone his country. These reports — coming from Iran’s elected president — clearly indicate that national leadership is bitterly split, with the most radical elements of the Revolutionary Guards seizing ultimate power by using Mojtaba as a figurehead.
But this isolates both Mojtaba and the Revolutionary Guards, setting in motion new, disruptive dynamics within the country.
Moreover, to preempt US decapitation strikes, Iran’s command structures have been devolved to local levels, and it seems unlikely they will be recentralized anytime soon. Israel is rumored to have contacts with senior officials in Tehran who could stage a coup.
Those rumors may have fueled a campaign of pervasive mutual suspicion, under which anyone, for any reason, can be accused of being a traitor.
These elements make it impossible to sustain a clear, efficient decision-making process. Any compromise could be vetoed by radical factions refusing to accept what they call a “traitor’s surrender,” while the supreme leader remains a ghost, handled by other ghosts.
The country still retains manufacturing capacity for missiles and drones, along with apparently ample stockpiles.
This paints the picture of a country in deep disarticulation and disarray, on the verge of failing. But even a failed state can survive and remain dangerous. Myanmar has endured years of internal conflict without a clear winner, with its military junta still in ultimate control.
A failing Iran could expand a vast zone of instability stretching from Central Asia to the Mediterranean coast. The US has so far avoided being drawn into the Iranian quagmire.
But Iran’s disarticulation — even as it remains in de facto, if not de jure, control of Hormuz — may pose a different kind of threat to the region and the global oil supply.
Talking to Mojtaba Khamenei and guaranteeing his security, and that of other top Iranian leaders, in exchange for a step back on Hormuz could help stabilize the situation.
On the bright side, Iran’s failure is, for the first time, bringing together regional states once divided over how to cope with Iran and its threats. They are now converging on ideas to limit Tehran’s harmful influence, building new medium- and long-term pressure on the regime.
The region will likely hasten efforts to bypass Hormuz, and the strait will ultimately only constrain Iranian trade and further isolate the religious leadership.
In this situation, Beijing may welcome America’s setback, but its inability to intervene and mediate leaves China out of the region’s political dynamics, which are increasingly dominated by the US and Israel. Finding common ground with Washington and Israel could prove difficult for China, in part because Beijing may not see a clear upside in the collaboration.
However, the expansion of a political black hole along its borders may soon create new risks for China. The Iranian meltdown is occurring as Russia also struggles to hold its position in Ukraine. China could soon find itself surrounded by zones of instability — a situation Beijing may want to prevent.
This article was first published on Appia Institute and is republished with permission. Read the original here.
