The leaders of the United States and Iran have signed a 14-point memorandum of understanding to end the war between their countries, as well as Israel’s military assault on Hezbollah in Lebanon.
From the US point of view, the deal leaves a lot to be desired. Washington is giving up a lot for very little in return. President Donald Trump’s claims of success make this feel like an “emperor has no clothes” moment.
There is nothing positive for the US in the agreement that didn’t already exist before the war – including Iran’s very minimal nuclear concessions.
The US is also abandoning a number of partners – most prominently the Persian Gulf countries – but also Israel’s interests and obviously the Iranian people.
With this deal, the US is making promises it has no way of fulfilling, especially when it comes to sanctions relief and unfreezing Iranian assets.
Here is a point-by-point breakdown of some of the promises in the deal and the biggest problems I see with them.
Point 1: Israel’s bombing of Lebanon
The United States and Iran and their allies […] declare the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon.
A big problem here is the deal does not mention Israel or Hezbollah, who are the two parties to that conflict and clearly have not been consulted on this point.
Does “termination of military operations” mean Israel’s military withdrawal from southern Lebanon? This is not likely to happen. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will not be able to withdraw Israeli troops – for domestic political reasons. A large proportion of Israelis want to keep fighting Hezbollah and, at a minimum, stay in southern Lebanon.
I can see both sides respecting a ceasefire of sorts, but this conflict will definitely flare up again.
Point 5: An open Strait of Hormuz
Iran will make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge for 60 days only from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman.
This point is really striking – it basically concedes to the Iranian regime that if it just waits 60 days, it can essentially start charging a service fee for traffic going in and out of the strait.
This deal puts Persian Gulf countries and Oman in a really challenging position. They have been under direct attack from Iran, and this agreement does not have any mechanism to guarantee their security going forward.
So, the Gulf countries may well decide it’s worth it to pay Iran a service fee in exchange for their security. For them, it’s better if their oil, gas and fertilizer shipments can get out, even if they are more expensive.
Point 6: A redevelopment plan for Iran
The United States undertakes with regional partners to develop a definitive, mutually agreed plan with at least US$300 billion for the reconstruction and economic development of Iran.
The US itself is unlikely to put money into this fund. But this will be another leverage point for the Iranian regime vis-a-vis Gulf countries (which have been committed here as the “regional partners”). Iran will essentially say to them, You need to fund our reconstruction as per this agreement, otherwise we will block the Strait of Hormuz and attack you again.
The Gulf countries will come out of this war thinking first and foremost of their own territorial security and economic survival. They are likely to decide that the $300 billion reconstruction fund is a better prospect than the continued economic damage Iran can impart by threatening their security again.
The expectations on Gulf countries in this deal put them in a tricky position regarding the US.
On one hand, they need US military protection, so they are not going to overtly distance themselves from the US. But they are likely to try to diversify their partnerships and get closer to China, in particular.
Point 7 and 11: Lifting sanctions and releasing frozen assets
The United States undertakes to terminate all types of sanctions against Iran, including the United Nations Security Council resolutions, IAEA Board of Governors resolutions, and all unilateral US sanctions …. The United States undertakes to make fully available for use the frozen or restricted funds and assets of Iran upon the implementation of this MOU.
The first problematic thing here is that the only sanctions Washington can unilaterally terminate are US sanctions. In addition, it can only release frozen assets that are held in the US, which account for a very small proportion of Iran’s overall frozen assets.
The US has no mechanism to deliver on the rest of the promises here, such as canceling UN Security Council and IAEA sanctions resolutions.
The same goes for frozen assets. The only way for the US to deliver on this would be to pressure its allies through either coercive threats or incentives – and it does not seem there has been any consultation with them before signing this deal.
Point 8: The nuclear question
Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons. The United States and Iran have agreed to resolve the disposition of stockpiled, enriched material … with the minimum methodology to be down-blending on site under the supervision of the IAEA. The two parties also agreed to discuss the issue of enrichment and other mutually agreed matters related to Iran’s nuclear needs.
What is important here is that pursuing uranium enrichment is not specifically prohibited in this agreement. This implies it was a red line for the Iranian regime – Tehran was not going to give up uranium enrichment for civilian purposes. As a result, the US has not included it in this agreement.
Iran’s broad commitment not to develop a nuclear weapon is something that already existed before the war.
Basically, the only detailed point in this part of the agreement is that it requires the Iranian regime to dilute its existing enriched uranium to secure sanctions relief.
This is not an incredible deal for the US. The US wanted the Iranian regime to give up enriching uranium completely. The deal stipulates the two sides will merely “discuss the issue of enrichment.” And yet, the US is giving up a huge amount in sanctions relief in return.
It’s unlikely more specific details on the nuclear issue will be agreed upon in the next 60 days. If we ever do get to an agreement, which is by no means assured, it would take months at a minimum and is not likely before the end of this year.
Jessica Genauer is academic director of the Public Policy Institute, UNSW Sydney.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
