China’s pursuit of a sea-skimming hypersonic missile could redefine naval warfare in the Pacific — but only if it can overcome the immense technical and operational barriers standing in its way.
This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) has launched a low-altitude hypersonic flight research program to develop foundational technologies for a sea-skimming hypersonic missile, a move that could significantly challenge the US Navy’s air-defense networks.
The initiative, funded by a CAS basic research program for youth teams, is spearheaded by the Academy’s Institute of Mechanics, in partnership with the University of Science and Technology of China and the Ningbo Institute of Materials Technology and Engineering.
While China has already deployed high-altitude hypersonic weapons, flying just above the sea surface presents severe engineering hurdles, including extreme aerodynamic heating, intense drag, and complex shock-wave interactions.
To overcome these obstacles and maximize low-altitude engine thrust, the project focuses on detonation combustion technology, which utilizes supersonic shock waves rather than conventional subsonic flame propagation to drive propulsion.
By weaponizing speeds exceeding Mach 5 at ultra-low altitudes, the system aims to exploit the radar horizon. This capability would drastically reduce radar detection ranges, shorten defensive warning times, and improve the penetration capabilities of next-generation strike platforms against advanced maritime defenses.
While China is pursuing the development of a sea-skimming hypersonic missile to enhance its ability to penetrate advanced maritime defenses, significant engineering, cost, and operational challenges raise questions about the feasibility and effectiveness of such a weapon against US carrier strike groups.
China’s development of a hypersonic sea-skimming missile appears to build on its earlier philosophy of building supersonic cruise missiles, such as the YJ-12, which relies on high speed and maneuverability to evade shipborne missile defenses and minimize target reaction time.
It contrasts with the US’s approach of developing stealth anti-ship missiles, such as the AGM-158C LRASM (Long Range Anti-Ship Missile), which relies on information dominance and stealth features to fly through previously identified gaps in enemy air defenses at wavetop height and remain undetected until it is too late for the target.
Thus, a sea-skimming anti-ship hypersonic missile may be China’s attempt to combine the advantages of high speed and stealth in one weapon – thereby increasing its effectiveness against critical targets such as US carriers in the Pacific.
One possible use case is within China’s broader multilayered missile-swarm strategy. SCMP reported this month that China’s strategy utilizes a multi-layered, coordinated missile swarm to defeat the US Navy’s Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) operational concept.
According to the report, submerged submarines launch hypersonic anti-ship missiles to destroy forward-deployed Aegis destroyers, neutralizing the outer missile defense shield. It then mentions that an orchestrated firepower package floods enemy sensors: cheap decoy drones and low-cost cruise missiles exhaust interceptor stocks, allowing wave-skimming, subsonic-stealth cruise missiles and terminal hypersonic weapons to bypass the remaining defenses.
Finally, it states that a decentralized, smart leader-follower swarm tactic features a high-climbing scout missile relaying real-time targeting data directly to low-flying missiles, enabling autonomous adaptation to electronic jamming and the successful sinking of the target carrier group.
The concept underscores that hypersonic missiles are only as effective as the kill chains – the processes and assets required to guide missiles to their targets – that support them.
Yet turning that concept into a workable weapon may prove easier said than done. David Wright and Cameron Tracy note in a March 2024 article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that flying at low altitudes forces hypersonic weapons through dense atmospheric air, generating immense aerodynamic drag that severely degrades their performance.
Wright and Tracy point out that this friction slows the vehicles down, making them no faster—and potentially slower — to reach targets than traditional ballistic missiles.
They add that the high atmospheric density causes severe, sustained aerodynamic heating that scales with the cube of the velocity, noting that traveling at Mach 5 produces 100 times the heat of Mach 1, and that vehicles must endure these punishing temperatures for up to 30 minutes.
Beyond those engineering challenges, cost may also be a factor. Overall, China is estimated to have 600 hypersonic weapons, according to a leaked 2025 US military assessment reported by the Wall Street Journal this month.
China already fields multiple anti-ship hypersonic weapons, such as the YJ-19 submarine-launched hypersonic missile aboard its Type 039 Yuan-class submarines, and the YJ-20 aboard its Type 055 cruisers.
However, that number is rather small compared to other missile types in China’s inventory. In an April 2026 testimony to the US Congress, Lieutenant General James Adams stated that the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) has fielded approximately 3,450 missiles.
Adams states that this stockpile comprises 1,300 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), 900 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), 550 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and 300 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs).
An attack against US naval forces would consume substantial numbers of missiles in a short span of time, with hypersonic missiles reserved only for high-value targets such as carriers.
Even then, finding and targeting a carrier may be harder than building the missile itself. First, the attacker must find the warship within vast ocean expanses, a daunting task due to the carrier’s constant evasive movement. Second, they must establish a continuous, highly precise target track to account for real-time positioning.
Third, offensive weapons must successfully penetrate the carrier strike group’s incredibly dense, deeply integrated, layered air and undersea defenses. Finally, attackers must overcome heavy side armor and extensive compartmentation to inflict actual disabling structural damage upon the massive vessel.
Yet the greatest vulnerability may lie not in the missile itself, but in the kill chain behind it. Together, these kill chains form a broader kill web that enhances resilience and survivability.
Attacking critical nodes of the kill web could be akin to disabling an adversary’s nervous system. Space-based sensors, coastal radar stations and underwater cables may prove to be vulnerable to attack by kinetic and non-kinetic means.
Should those assets be disabled or destroyed, China may still be able to launch its hypersonic missiles, but its entire kill web ecosystem may operate in disjointed parts, giving operational and tactical opportunities for US forces.
If China fields a viable sea-skimming hypersonic missile, it could significantly complicate US naval operations in the Pacific. However, the future contest is likely to hinge less on missile performance alone and more on which side can better protect—or disrupt—the sensor and targeting networks that enable long-range precision strikes.
Done, done, and done. China already has the YKJ-1000 which flies at Mach 7, at the cost of $100,000 per copy.