The explosion that tore through the Ummul Qura International Madrasa in Keraniganj on December 26 last year followed a very familiar trajectory.
What initially appeared to be a possible accident — perhaps a gas leak — quickly shifted as investigators recovered improvised explosive devices (IEDs), chemical precursors, and other bomb-making materials from the debris.
Court proceedings later revealed that explosives had been prepared on-site overnight, pointing to an accidental detonation within an active militant operation rather than an external attack. Arrests followed under anti-terrorism laws, with the main accused remanded for interrogation. By then, the basic facts of the incident were no longer in serious dispute.
However, even as evidence accumulated and legal processes advanced, an alternative narrative gained traction. On social media and in political discussions, some dismissed the event as staged — a constructed drama serving political ends. Skepticism extended beyond questioning the investigation to doubting whether the incident itself was genuine.
Meanwhile, Bangladesh Police Headquarters issued a confidential directive last week to unit heads, warning that members of a banned extremist organization might target key national installations, including the Jatiya Sangsad Bhaban (National Parliament), police and military facilities, religious sites, entertainment areas and Shahbagh intersection.
The alert, based on intelligence inputs, referenced the arrest of a suspect named Istiaq Ahmed Sami and alleged links to dismissed military personnel, along with plans involving explosives and firearms.
In this connection, police made another arrest on Saturday, while the Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) unit said that its cyber intelligence team was actively investigating the matter and urged the public not to panic.
Whatever the case may be, this episode too faced immediate skepticism in public discourse. The listing of high-profile targets, such as parliament and urban intersections, fueled online debates questioning the alert’s timing and credibility, with some suggesting such communications are often exaggerated or selectively framed for political effect.
To be sure, such misgivings are not new. During the interim government, then-Dhaka Metropolitan Police (DMP) Commissioner Sheikh Md Sajjat Ali himself stated publicly that there were “no militants in the country.”
He went further, claiming that militant threats during the Awami League era had been staged “dramas” to justify actions against young people. His remarks intensified political debates over whether counterterrorism narratives were shaped — or exaggerated — for institutional or partisan purposes.
Developments during Sajjat Ali’s own tenure contradicted that assertion. On January 31 this year, Ahsan Zahir Khan, 50, was arrested from the Jatiya Sangsad Bhaban area on suspicion of militancy, leading to a case under the Anti-Terrorism Act.
The CTTC unit later detained four more individuals linked to the same network. Subsequently, on April 2, police took a minor into custody from Habiganj for alleged ties to the banned “New JMB” outfit. A DMP press release connected the child to Ahsan Zahir Khan’s group and alleged plans to attack Shia mosques, police checkpoints, and ISKCON temples.
Meanwhile, interim government Home Adviser Jahangir Alam Chowdhury also claimed in July last year that there was “no militant activity in Bangladesh,” after the arrest of dozens of Bangladeshi nationals in Malaysia on alleged militancy charges.
Notably, on March 7 last year, hundreds of activists from the banned Hizb ut-Tahrir attempted to march demanding the establishment of a “caliphate,” prompting police to use tear gas and sound grenades to disperse them.
Again in late September last year, then-Inspector General of Police Baharul Alam stated that some Bangladeshis who had sought to join the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) were under surveillance.
A Times of Bangladesh report on Sunday further revealed that a Bangladesh Air Force warrant officer, who went missing from a Chattogram base, has been traced to a TTP hideout, prompting an internal investigation into alleged extremist links within the force.
Security sources said more than 20 people, including serving BAF personnel and a base mosque imam, have been detained over suspected recruitment activities, foreign travel, and possible exposure of sensitive information.
These cases highlight the recurring paradox in Bangladesh’s security discourse: official statements oscillate between reassurance and alarm, while public responses swing between acceptance and outright disbelief. Claims that militancy has been overstated coexist with documented arrests, recovered materials, and intelligence warnings suggesting a persistent threat.
To understand this dynamic, it helps to revisit earlier phases of Bangladesh’s security history. Following the 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attack, analysts identified a pattern of “ostrich syndrome,” in which early warnings about rising extremist networks were downplayed despite mounting evidence.
Competing narratives—ranging from foreign conspiracies to accusations of political framing—persisted long after the facts were established. Also, a more politically charged layer emerged in the following years.
Specialized units such as the Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC), working alongside other security agencies, intensified arrests, raids, and intelligence operations. From a security standpoint, these efforts were often credited with success
But this period under Sheikh Hasina’s authoritarian regime also produced a parallel discourse of skepticism. Allegations of extrajudicial killings, concerns over due process and debates about “crossfire” incidents led some sections of society and rights organizations to question the methods used in counterterrorism operations and whether Hasina was looking to score some political points, stay in power indefinitely and appease the Western world and India.
While these concerns focused on accountability and legality, they also had a broader effect: they contributed to an environment where official security narratives were increasingly viewed through a lens of reservation.
Over time, this created a subtle but important shift. Counterterrorism itself became politically and morally contested, meaning that even legitimate intelligence alerts or documented threats were sometimes interpreted as instruments of narrative control rather than neutral security assessments. This is where institutional credibility and threat perception began to blur.
It is equally important to note that this pattern of skepticism long predates the post-2016 counterterrorism era. In the early 2000s, militant activity was often viewed as fragmented or exaggerated, despite growing signs of organized networks. Groups such as Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), active since the late 1990s, expanded through recruitment, fundraising, and low-level operations amid political ambiguity and institutional hesitation.
This perception changed sharply on August 17, 2005, when JMB carried out a coordinated series of bombings across much of the country. Within about 30 minutes, at least 459 time bombs exploded in 63 districts, targeting government offices, courts, and public spaces.
Although it killed only three people, the nationwide scale and coordination revealed the depth of the militant network and marked a turning point in how the threat was understood.
This lays bare a structural gap. It cannot be taken for granted that military networks in Bangladesh completely vanish; studies show they tend to fragment, go underground, and reorganize in more decentralized forms under pressure.
Still, public perception often moves inversely: periods of calm are interpreted as proof that the threat has disappeared entirely. When suspects do not fit familiar profiles—emerging from unexpected social, educational, or urban backgrounds—disbelief can serve as a cognitive shortcut to avoid uncomfortable realities.
Psychological, institutional, and technological factors reinforce this. Long-standing political polarization and fluctuating trust in state institutions shape how official statements are received. Social media accelerates the spread of alternative interpretations, allowing competing narratives to coexist in separate information ecosystems without resolution.
In this context, reactions to the Keraniganj explosion, the recent intelligence directive, and even the arrests under Sajjat Ali are not isolated. They form part of a broader continuum where security, politics, and trust remain deeply entangled. If Bangladesh is to effectively confront and ultimately reduce the threat of terrorism, breaking free from this state of denial is not optional—it is essential.
Persistent skepticism that instinctively labels every new incident—whether an explosion, an arrest, or an intelligence alert—as “staged” or politically motivated prevents a society that is already highly conservative from fully acknowledging the problem’s true scale.
Without a shared acceptance of verified evidence and intelligence, coordinated prevention becomes far more difficult, allowing fragmented militant networks the space to regroup and adapt.
In the long run, this reflexive denialism offers no sustainable solution. It may provide short-term political comfort or narrative control, but it undermines genuine counterterrorism efforts by eroding public vigilance and institutional credibility. History shows that ignoring or minimizing threats only delays the response and increases the eventual cost in lives and stability.
Moreover, such a pattern risks tarnishing Bangladesh’s image on the global stage. When explosions revealing bomb-making materials or arrests linked to banned outfits are repeatedly met with domestic dismissal rather than unified resolve, international observers— governments, investors, and media — may perceive the country as either unwilling or unable to address extremism transparently.
Rebuilding and maintaining a reputation as a stable, secure nation committed to countering terrorism requires moving beyond polarized disbelief toward evidence-based consensus. Only then can Bangladesh close the dangerous gap between perception and reality, and safeguard both its internal security and external standing.
Jannatul Naym Pieal is a Dhaka-based journalist, writer and researcher with over a decade of experience in professional journalism. He has worked across a range of topics, including politics, economics, society, climate change, gender and human rights. He is also the author of 10 published books and a researcher focusing on Bangladesh’s media industry and its intersections with broader social and academic fields.