South Korean arms to Ukraine as a three-course meal

After Moscow and Pyongyang inked a de facto Mutual Defence Treaty in June 2024, Seoul remarked that it would reconsider the issue of supplying military aid to Kyiv. This is significant because South Korea has held a long-standing policy prohibiting the supply and export of arms to active conflict zones.

The rethinking process of this policy could be accelerated due to evidence of North Korean armaments being used against both civilian and military Ukrainian targets, as well as the deployment of Korean People’s Army (KPA) soldiers on the frontlines in the ongoing 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War. Understandably, Moscow is prepared to prioritize its relations with Pyongyang over Seoul, with such favoritism likely to endure in the future.     

From the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) perspective, defense and military cooperation between a Russia desperate to win this war and a Kim Jong Un regime cognizant that it can press for a favorable deal exchanging the North’s arms and men for military technologies ranging from missiles to submarines and even nuclear weapons, greatly heighten the potential for destabilization of an already-fragile intra-Korean relationship and brinksmanship in the Korean peninsula.

Accordingly, a previous article made the case for the ROK to supply military aid to Kyiv, citing reasons such as i) upholding the United Nations (UN) norm of Ukraine’s right to legitimate self-defense, ii) communicating strong opposition to Moscow regarding any current or future military technology aid to the DPRK, iii) showcasing the efficacy of South Korean “K-arms” amidst a rapidly expanding market share, and iv) establishing the groundwork for the ROK to potentially take up the role of Ukraine’s future economic and military-industrial partner.

When Moscow finally crosses Seoul’s red line by providing missile and/or nuclear technology to Pyongyang, there should exist political will and security imperatives for the incumbent Yoon Suk Yeol administration to authorize arms shipments for Kyiv. This article offers a three-course culinary comparison to illustrate South Korea’s potential arms shipments for Ukraine in the ongoing war.

Appetizer armaments

An appetizer is a small dish served before the main course to whet the appetite. Similarly, “appetizer” armaments could undertake the form of limited quantities of selected weapons intended to assess suitability and demonstrate effectiveness, thereby whetting the interest of the Ukrainians for its inclusion as part of a future “main course” shipment, or to act as impetus and motivation for other countries to consider for future acquisitions.

Two such South Korean military “appetizers” are the AT-1K Raybolt anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) and the KP-SAM Chiron surface-to-air missile (SAM).

The Raybolt ATGM can either be operated by small teams of soldiers or mounted on light strike or armored vehicles, giving such units the ability to match and out-pace the striking range of tank-mounted armaments. Its infrared-imaging targeting system also increases strike accuracy and lethality, while being suitable for both day and night operations.

Lastly, its warhead is designed for maximum penetration and effectiveness against modern tanks and armored vehicles equipped with explosive reactive armor, which allows the asset to be utilized by Ukrainian soldiers in pushing back against the Russian ground offensive by destroying Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers.

A small initial consignment of Raybolt ATGMs would help supplement depleting Ukrainian stocks of West-supplied Javelin missiles, thereby helping to relieve any anti-tank missile scarcity in the ongoing struggle on land.

From the perspective of LIG Nex1 and Hanwha Vision, the manufacturers of AT-1K missiles and launchers respectively, the ability to benchmark the Raybolt’s performance against the Javelin (the premier asset of its weapon class) in an active warzone would be critical in data collection for future arms development projects, while also being a superb advertisement of sales if the asset generates significant wartime results for Ukraine’s territorial defense.

For the Chiron SAM, it, too, is infrared homing, deployable with smaller troop sections, systems-integrable onto various military vehicles, and suitable in different operating environments. It can shoot down low-flying aircraft and helicopters while maintaining relatively productive strike capabilities against aerial drones, which is critical for the ongoing land war.

Even if in limited quantities, KP-SAM’s allure for a Ukraine desperately in need of missile stocks to reinforce its short-ranged air defense is evident, and it could either be deployed to strengthen air defense protection for frontline troops to maintain their defensive formations, or be used for the holistic reinforcement of Ukraine’s Integrated Air Defence System (IADS), providing a missile umbrella to guard more Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure against Moscow’s suicide drones and cruise missiles.

Finally, considering that countries such as Romania have already chosen to purchase the Chiron, the KP-SAM’s high combat performance in warfighting scenarios could open the floodgates for potential buyers seeking a more cost-effective and deployable option than the Javelins. This would open the door for more defense exports into the European region and military aid for Ukraine in its defense against Russia.

Main course munitions

In Western cuisine, the main course is the most substantial and indispensable part of any meal. Correspondingly, metaphorically describing any armament type as a “main course” implies that such weapons are critical for the war’s conduct.

Ironically, the scale-tipping “asset” that anyone could provide for Ukraine at the current juncture would be ammunition (and not a specific arm), as it seeks to overcome issues of ammunition shortages that have led it to concede ground on multiple fronts in the primarily land-based war thus far.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s September 2024 visit to a munitions production factory in the US state of Pennsylvania is evidence of the prioritization placed on replenishing its ammunition stockpiles. Such “main courses” could include ammunition for rifles and machine guns, grenades, mortar bombs and artillery shells for howitzers, amongst others.

With global ammunition supply chains under significant strain owing to the Covid-19 pandemic and the eruption of multiple conflict flashpoints, Ukraine’s survival and territorial defense is, perhaps, contingent upon the expeditious and sustained provision of ammunition.

With South Korea’s developed military-industrial complex capable of quick shipment rollouts and remarkable speed in weapon supplies, akin to the carbohydrates of a main meal, ammunition for Ukrainian ground forces could be supplied in significant quantities as a ‘main course’, given the small, yet linear shift towards favorable political winds in the ROK’s parliament regarding the arming of Ukraine.

The ROK has already displayed its capacity to produce and supply munitions, with its supply of 550,000 155mm artillery shells to the US over the past year, which allowed Washington to free up corresponding munitions for Kyiv. Additionally, South Korea could also supply 105mm shells compatible with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) STANAG-compliant military assets, many of which are currently used by Ukraine.

Since the ROK has a stockpile of about 3.4 million 105mm shells and is relegating its 105mm artillery to reserve service as it transitions to 155mm artillery assets, it is well-placed to provide ammunition to assist in Ukraine’s defense of Russia.

Missiles for dessert

At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that both ammunition and SAM missiles can be classified as defense-oriented weapons with limited offensive range, making export political authorization more palatable for the ROK. However, if the current war is to be concluded on Kyiv’s terms, more politically contentious “dessert” weapons might be required to be presented onto the meal table.

While Ukraine could continue to resist Russia into 2025 and even 2026 using the above-mentioned “main course” and “appetizer” arms, the cumulative suffering inflicted upon the former is unconscionable. Hence, it would be morally preferable to expedite the end of this war in Ukraine’s favor. One of the means to this end is the supply of “dessert” weapons like the Hyunmoo series of ballistic missiles, specifically the Hyunmoo-1A and Hyunmoo-2A.

Both Hyunmoo versions are guided land-attack missiles with ranges of 180km and 300km, while carrying powerful 500kg and 1000kg warheads respectively. Furthermore, both are older variants of the series with the 1A already retired and the 2A having a 20-year service record.

Hence, South Korea’s military readiness should not be impacted if 1A stocks were exported to Ukraine. The development of the Hyunmoo-4 and 5 variants can accelerate the timeline for the stand-down of the 2A versions, opening up potential room for export to Ukraine.

Considering the unfortunate reality that Ukraine only possesses long-range attack drones with small warheads and insufficient stocks of Neptune cruise missiles, being gifted the Hyunmoo 1A and 2A would help decisively shift the momentum of this war in Kyiv’s favor.

Old though the 1A and 2A versions might be, their extensive ranges and heavy warheads would enable devastating strikes on Russian munition/fuel depots, troop/vehicle garrisons, command and control facilities, and other infrastructure critical to the Russian invasion, previously considered relatively safe by Moscow due to the lack of Ukrainian long-range strike capabilities.

As for any protests from Moscow should Seoul supply these pivotal “desserts” to Kyiv, such complaints ring hollow since it is public knowledge that Pyongyang and Tehran are already providing ballistic missiles for Russia’s unjust war. The export of such assets could prove to be a game-changer for Ukraine in its campaign thus far, bringing the three-course meal to a satisfying end.               

In closing, despite the saying, “The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing,” which was incorrectly attributed to Irish statesman Edmund Burke, that saying retains strong relevance in Ukraine’s ongoing defense against Russia’s illegal invasion, a blatant subversion of the overarching principle of state sovereignty in international law.

With its unique and unrivaled defense production capabilities, the ROK is well-positioned to act as a force for good in global affairs and take action by supplying a three-course meal military aid package to Kyiv, with significant reputational and economic gains extractable from such a move amidst President Yoon’s commitment to transform the ROK into one of the world’s top four arms suppliers by 2027.

Nah Liang Tuang (PhD) is a research fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (IDSS), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

Thomas Lim is a senior analyst with the Military Studies Program under RSIS. The viewpoints and arguments presented in this article are the authors’ own and do not represent any stand of IDSS or RSIS.