North and South Korea are bidding to upstage each other by building ever-larger missiles, with Seoul threatening to take out Pyongyang’s leadership while North Korea aims to shatter US extended deterrence guarantees for South Korea.
Last month, 38North reported that North Korea released a photo of Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un standing next to a new road-mobile missile launcher chassis with at least 12 axles, suggesting it is longer than the previous 11-axle Transporter-Erector Launcher (TEL) used for the Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).
38North notes that the development indicates North Korea’s ongoing commitment to road-mobile missile deployment. It notes that the new chassis could be associated with a longer ICBM or a space-launch vehicle (SLV), although the limited information does not confirm its authenticity or specific use.
However, the source says the vehicle’s layout and military paint job suggest it is intended for a new type of ballistic missile TEL, potentially enhancing North Korea’s missile capabilities. It notes that the development underscores North Korea’s ability to produce its TELs and its strategic focus on advancing its missile technology.
38North says that the new TEL’s purpose and deployment are still uncertain as more information and potential flight testing are needed, but it may support a larger payload, multiple warheads or decoys to improve the missile’s range and effectiveness.
The new TEL could be used as a launcher for a follow-on design for North Korea’s Hwasong-18 ICBM. 38North noted in December 2023 that the Hwasong-18’s solid-propellant design offers easier field operation, reduced support vehicle requirements and enhanced concealment, making it more reliable and survivable.
38North notes that the Hwasong-18’s potential range of up to 15,000 kilometers on a non-lofted trajectory could reach anywhere in the continental US, depending on payload weight. While the exact number of Hwasong-18 missiles and their production rate remains unknown, the missile is expected to augment, not replace, North Korea’s existing ICBM arsenal.
With the ability to hit the continental US, North Korea may be aiming to break the logic of extended deterrence underpinning the US-South Korea alliance, forcing concessions from the latter, such as a drawdown of its military presence in South Korea or the lifting of some sanctions.
Not to be outdone or cowed, South Korea unveiled its largest ballistic missile, the Hyunmoo-5, during its Armed Forces Day at Seoul Air Base in Seongnam Yonhap News Agency reported this month.
Yonhap mentions that the event, attended by President Yoon Suk Yeol, showcased the missile’s strategic importance amid rising tensions with North Korea.
Asia Times noted in July 2023 that the Hyunmoo-5, with an 8-ton warhead flying at ten times the speed of sound for up to 3,000 kilometers, may arm South Korea’s upcoming Joint Strike Ships. Based on the KDDX-class destroyer hull, they are envisioned to carry up to 100 missiles, including the Hyunmoo-5.
Konrad Ruminski mentions in a November 2023 Asia Research Center brief that South Korea has been developing several missile systems, such as the Hyunmoo-5, to strike North Korea for decades. Ruminski notes that military officers from North and South Korea have emphasized readiness to mount a strong counterstrike if the other is attacked.
However, he points out that while South Korea’s missile forces can strike North Korean targets, South Korea’s lack of nuclear weapons limits its ability to issue credible threats to the North.
Ruminski points out that the Hyunmoo-5 may be a step in changing that situation. It is reportedly capable of carrying the world’s largest conventional warheads that can cause tremors to collapse underground structures. The missile, launched from land or sea, can destroy targets across the Korean Peninsula buried up to 100 meters underground, he says.
However, Ruminski points out that North Korea’s expansion of its nuclear arsenal ensures that it still has the advantage, although South Korea has taken a significant step in closing the gap with the Hyunmoo-5.
Asia Times noted in August 2022 that such capabilities may be crucial to South Korea’s “decapitation strategy”, which involves pre-emptive and retaliatory strikes against North Korea to deter or end a conflict by killing its leadership.
The idea behind the strategy is that since North Korea is not discouraged by the possibility of a small-scale conflict and harm to critical military and economic sites, the best approach would be to threaten the Kim regime directly.
Further, Sungmin Cho mentions in a February 2024 article for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank that South Korea’s new aggressive military strategy, termed “PISU: Punish Immediately, Strongly, and Until the End,” indicates a more offensive posture, reflecting South Korea’s urgent need to counter an increasingly nuclear-capable North Korea.
Cho notes that the strategy’s automaticity and personalization of threats are designed to deter North Korea by signaling a firm resolve to retaliate without hesitation.
Given the upcoming US elections, North and South Korea’s upstaging each other by building ever-larger missiles may be seen in the context of the uncertainty surrounding the US-South Korea alliance. Both US presidential candidates have starkly different views on the alliance’s future.
In an article for The National Interest (TNI) this month, Darcie Draudt-Véjares discusses the uncertainty surrounding US-South Korea relations amid the upcoming change in US leadership.
Darcie Draudt-Vejares points out that historically, the US-South Korea alliance has been a focal point in presidential campaigns, with differing views on the alliance’s financial and strategic aspects.
She mentions that Donald Trump has criticized the alliance for its costs and is advocating for increased financial contributions from South Korea, reflecting his “America First” policy. In comparison, she says Kamala Harris emphasizes strengthening alliances in the Asia-Pacific, continuing the strategic approach from the Obama and Biden administrations.
According to Draudt-Vejares, the current election season focuses less on South Korea, with debates prioritizing other global conflicts. However, she underscores the importance of robust, institutionalized alliances that withstand domestic political changes.
She contrasts the Trump campaign’s transactional view of alliances with the Harris campaign’s multilateral approach, aiming to counter China’s influence through coalition-building.
She emphasizes the need for the next US administration to articulate a clear, multilateral strategy to address evolving global threats while reinforcing commitments to regional allies like South Korea.
Should South Korea perceive US non-commitment to their longstanding alliance, it may have to act unilaterally, bolstering its nuclear latency – the capability to field a working nuclear weapon under short notice to match North Korea’s brinksmanship, with the Hyunmoo-5 acting as a capable delivery system.