Pakistan is betting on Hangor-class submarines to sharpen its undersea edge as its deterrent increasingly rests on deepening military integration with China rather than any single platform.
Last month, multiple media sources announced the commissioning of Pakistan’s first Chinese-built Hangor-class submarine, PNS/M Hangor. The ceremony took place in Sanya and was attended by President Asif Ali Zardari and Navy Chief Admiral Naveed Ashraf, signaling an important advancement in Pakistan’s naval modernization efforts.
The induction forms part of a broader plan to acquire eight submarines—four built in China and four domestically under a technology-transfer program—aimed at strengthening maritime security and safeguarding vital sea lines of communication amid rising tensions and recent missile tests.
An export variant of China’s Yuan-class design, the Hangor-class submarines are equipped with air-independent propulsion, advanced sensors and modern weapons and are expected to strengthen Pakistan’s deterrence posture while improving its anti-access/area denial capabilities once the program is completed.
Officials described the program as a “historic milestone” to bolster fleet capabilities, though timelines have slipped from initial delivery targets, with the first vessel launched in 2024 and commissioned in 2026.
The move underscores the expansion of Pakistan-China defense cooperation following recent conflict dynamics with India and complements earlier Chinese arms transfers, including J-10C fighter jets.
The Hangor-class submarines’ tactical employment may focus on conventional torpedo and anti-ship missile operations, as the risk of escalation limits their practicality for sea-based nuclear deterrence.
Looking at the tactical capabilities of the Hangor-class submarines, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) notes in September 2024 that the class is equipped with 53-millimeter torpedo tubes, which enable the launch of heavy torpedoes such as the Chinese Yu-6, as well as anti-ship cruise missiles.
While Pakistan could opt to arm its new submarines with nuclear-tipped submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) to establish a sea-based nuclear deterrent, Betzalel Newman notes in an April 2025 Stimson Center article that Pakistan’s Babur-3 SLCM is suboptimal for such a role.
Newman points out that cruise missiles are less frequently employed for nuclear purposes, particularly at sea, because they have lighter payloads and shorter maximum ranges than ballistic missiles.
He also adds that Pakistan arming its submarines with SLCMs could create a problem of nuclear ambiguity, as it would be difficult for India to determine whether an incoming weapon is nuclear or conventionally armed, risking escalation. As such, Newman says Pakistan is likely to deploy its new submarines in more conventional roles.
From an operational perspective, however, their impact remains limited, with Namita Barthwal noting in a January 2026 report for the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) that Pakistan’s Hangor-class submarines represent an incremental capability gain rather than a decisive shift in the naval balance.
She suggests that they could progressively enhance Pakistan’s capacity to maintain an underwater presence, which would complicate crises, increase the need for anti-submarine efforts, influence merchant shipping advisories and increase the cost and difficulty for India in maritime reassurance and in managing escalations during rapid crises.
She notes that replacing older boats and increasing patrol frequency could allow Pakistan to monitor Indian ships more regularly during peacetime, keep India uncertain during crises, and threaten sea routes near Indian ports and naval bases.
This strategy would be especially effective if backed by Chinese training, spare parts, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and lifecycle support.
The operational role of the Hangor-class submarines is to enhance Pakistan’s underwater deterrence and support a sea-denial approach to offset India’s larger and more capable naval forces in the Indian Ocean.
Situating Pakistan’s submarines within the country’s broader operational strategy, Saad Riaz notes in a January 2026 article for the Center for Strategic and Contemporary Research (CSCR) that acquiring Hangor-class submarines is significant for deterring India’s expanding naval footprint and growing sub-surface capabilities in the Indian Ocean region.
Taken together, these assessments point to a strategy centered on offsetting structural naval disadvantages rather than achieving parity.
Looking at the military balance at sea between the two rivals, Rajeswari Rajagopalan and Linus Cohen note in a June 2025 report for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) that India has consistently had greater conventional military strength than Pakistan across major equipment categories.
They also indicate that India has two aircraft carriers and two nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), which Pakistan does not possess.
In that context, M. Usman Askari and Mudassar Ali Iqbal note in a June 2023 article in the peer-reviewed South Asian Studies journal that, as a navy with limited resources and a smaller fleet, Pakistan cannot match India’s superior conventional capabilities, necessitating a focus on alternative approaches.
Askari and Iqbal emphasize an asymmetric approach, using unconventional tactics and weapons — including submarines and coastal defense systems — to offset India’s larger fleet, alongside a “sea denial” doctrine aimed at restricting India’s use of surrounding waters and limiting its operational advantage.
The strategic significance of the Hangor-class program lies in its integration within a deepening Pakistan–China defense partnership, characterized by extensive arms transfers, interoperability and coordinated military alignment aimed at counterbalancing India.
Khalil Ahmad, in a January 2026 article in the peer-reviewed Advance Social Science Archive journal, notes that China has emerged as Pakistan’s primary arms supplier, providing advanced military systems that underpin its defense capabilities and reinforce bilateral military ties.
Supporting Ahmad’s points, data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) indicate that from 2021 to 2025, China was the fifth-largest arms exporter, accounting for 5.6% of the global arms trade during that period. The data also shows that Pakistan was its top client, accounting for 61% of Chinese arms sales.
Ahmad adds that this military cooperation is complemented by joint exercises, training exchanges and intelligence sharing, which strengthen interoperability and operational coordination, reflecting Pakistan’s growing reliance on Chinese military support within an increasingly entrenched strategic partnership.
Furthermore, Harsh Pant and Rahul Rawat state in a June 2025 article for The National Interest that China–Pakistan military cooperation poses a strategic threat to India by creating an emerging “two-front” challenge rooted in longstanding territorial disputes, including Kashmir and contested areas along the China-India border.
Pant and Rawat say both countries align to counterbalance India and contest its sovereignty claims, particularly following developments in Jammu and Kashmir since 2019. They describe the relationship as a “threshold alliance,” enabling capability pooling, joint planning and interoperability.
They highlight the use of Chinese military technology, ISR support and efforts to emulate multi-domain warfare, producing a functional military synergy that translates geopolitical alignment into a “real-time” threat to India’s national security.
Such territorial disputes could extend into the maritime domain. As Hangor-class submarines integrate with Chinese systems, their cumulative effect may not overturn the naval balance but intensify great-power rivalry in the Indian Ocean, sharpening undersea operations as a key arena for deterrence and strategic competition among Pakistan, India and China.