An amphibious assault ship unloading a hovercraft. Photo: YouTube

Aging ships, emerging threats, rigid mindsets and indecision about investing in numerous but small or a few large amphibious warfare ships – all those factors threaten US force projection and expeditionary warfare capabilities.

The Navy Times reported this month that the US Navy and US Marine Corps have started an urgent study to enhance the readiness of the US amphibious warship fleet. This study, signed off on by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Lisa Franchetti and Commandant of the Marine Corps General Eric Smith, underscores the immediate need to thoroughly examine ship readiness and requirements for the training and certification of ship groups and the Marines who embark on them.

A February 2024 US Congressional Research Service report states that Marine Corps officials have made public remarks about the number of in-service amphibious ships that are not operationally ready due to undergoing or needing maintenance and repair work. 

To illustrate these woes, Defense News reported in March 2023 that the US Navy proposed to decommission three Whidbey-class amphibious dock landing ships in its 2024 budget, citing their poor condition despite their having yet to reach the end of the planned 40-year lifespan. 

Defense News says that the three Whidbey-class ships did not receive enough resources for maintenance and that the $3 billion needed to keep the ships up and running could be better spent on other vessels. It also says that decommissioning these ships would free up sailors for different deployments and shipyards to work on more urgently needed ships. 

However, the brass could not just decommission the Whidbey-class ships without replacements, as the US Navy is mandated by law to maintain a fleet of 31 amphibious warfare ships

The CRS report also states that there have been instances which, even with the US having 31 amphibious warfare ships on hand, the navy has been unable to meet requests from US regional combat commanders to maintain forward presence or respond to contingencies – a concerning situation. 

Two such incidents were the February 2023 Turkey-Syria earthquake and the April 2023 noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) from South Sudan. The US could not respond adequately due to a lack of amphibious warfare ships. 

The perceived shortage of amphibious warfare ships has prompted the Marine Corps to utilize other ships not initially intended to transport Marine forces. 

In January 2024, Asia Times noted that the Corps had repurposed the Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB) and Expeditionary Fast Transport (EPF) to compensate for the lack of amphibious warfare ships. 

However, it’s important to note that the ESB and EPF are not explicitly designed for amphibious warfare operations. These spacious ships lack aviation support, ammunition storage and other capabilities associated with amphibious warfare ships. 

Tracing the amphibious warfare ship gap, Christopher Owens notes in a May 2023 Marine Corps Times article that while the USMC articulated a minimum of 31 amphibious warfare ships in 2022, the US Department of the Navy in past studies allowed for as few as 28 ships. 

Owens says that the shortage of amphibious warfare ships can be traced to the USMC’s 2019 Commandant’s Guidance, wherein the USMC’s Force Design 2030 would require different approaches considering the modern threats to massed naval armadas.

Jack Watling and Sidharth Kaushal extensively discuss those threats in a January 2019 Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) article. They mention that anti-ship missiles, long-range fires, smart mines, and pervasive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities make assaulting a hostile beach more challenging than ever. 

Watling and Kaushal estimate the firepower it would take to fend off an amphibious landing force. They state that in a Taiwan scenario, China would need just 50 anti-ship missiles to knock out a dozen amphibious warfare ships attempting to cross the Taiwan Strait or 4,500 to 9,000 kilograms of ordnance to destroy a 90-ship amphibious landing force in the littorals. 

They also note that China’s YJ-12 and Russia’s Kh-35 anti-ship missiles have an approximate 400-kilometer range, which makes it unlikely for an amphibious warfare ship to get within 20 kilometers of the beach to launch amphibious assault vehicles (AAV). Further, Watling and Kaushal say that anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), smart mines, and suicide drones could decimate AAVs as they made their way to the shore.

Owen notes that for those reasons, the USMC opted for Force Structure 2030, which focused on smaller units scattered in coastal areas, emphasizing dispersion to mitigate the risk posed by those new threats. 

In an April 2021 National Defense article, Yasmin Tajdeh notes that thinking led to the development of the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW), which is envisioned to carry smaller USMC units, hold a potential adversary at risk in various places, increase the distance between heavily-defended beaches and larger amphibious warships, and complicate enemy targeting. 

However, Tajdeh also points out that LAWs can only carry a few self-defense systems due to their small size and that arming them with such weapons may increase their cost, breaking the cost rationale of having numerous small ships. 

Also, Defense One reported in January 2023 that the US Navy put the LAW acquisition on hold until 2025 to determine whether it fits with the US Navy and USMC operating concepts and requirements, given its limitations. 

Apart from perceived vulnerability to modern weapons, Laura Heckman notes in an April 2023 National Defense Magazine article that the US Navy’s “divest-to-invest” mantra may be shortchanging the USMC’s amphibious warfare capabilities, noting that the US Navy sees amphibious warfare ships as “second class” combatants while focusing on destroyers as the epitome of combat ships. 

That mentality, alongside the perceived vulnerability of large amphibious warfare ships, may have led to a de-emphasis of amphibious warfare ships as priority acquisitions, jeopardizing US force projection and expeditionary warfare capabilities. 

While the US Navy’s 2025 budget request provides a deployable force of 31 amphibious warfare ships and one Landing Platform Dock (LPD) for the next four years, USNI News reported in August 2023 that the construction of new US amphibious warfare ships is on hold despite a minor business solicitation showing that the US Navy was preparing to enter a multi-year deal to build three San Antonio-class Flight II LPDs. 

In line with that, Naval News noted in October 2023 that the planned USS Philadelphia is the final San Antonio-class LPD to be built at the time of writing. But despite that pause, USNI reported in September 2023 that Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) laid the keel of the future USS Fallujah, the fourth America-class amphibious warfare ship. 

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  1. Rather than take care of the ships they have, the USN would rather scrimp on maintenance, wear them out, and purchase newer, more expensive hulls before the end of their projected service life.

    This results in more profits for the shareholders of the defense contractors who own and operate the shipyards. Many of the executives of these corporations are retired admirals.