In an ironic and game-changing twist, Beijing may be maintaining the missiles Taiwan relies upon to deter a potential China invasion and assault.
This week, South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that Taiwan had sent a critical component of its Hsiung Feng III supersonic anti-ship missile to Qingdao in China for repairs. The report identifies the component in question as a theodolite, a precision instrument used to measure angles in horizontal and vertical planes that play a crucial role in missile launches.
Taiwan’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) purchased theodolite in 2021 from Swiss company Leica and recently sent it back to the manufacturer for repairs. The source notes that the theodolite’s memory cards were removed and that NCSIST asked the agent involved to send the component to Switzerland.
However, the source notes that upon return it was discovered that the theodolite had been sent to Qingdao, with Leica saying that its maintenance center for Asia is in that city, hence the component was sent there for the requested repairs.
Concerned about a conflict of interests, NCSIST performed checks on the theodolite to ensure China had not installed any malware, the SCMP report said. It also stated that, in the aftermath of the incident, NCSIST is discussing measures to prevent sensitive equipment from being shipped to China for repairs and maintenance for national security concerns.
Missile Threat notes that the Hsiung Feng III supersonic anti-ship missile has a range of 120 to 150 kilometers and carries a 120-kilogram semi-armor piercing warhead with a smart fuse to direct most of the blast energy inside the target ship’s hull to maximize damage.
The Hsiung Feng III is part of Taiwan’s efforts to build an indigenous missile arsenal to better deter a China invasion of the self-governing island. Asia Times has previously reported on Taiwan’s other missile projects, such as the Yung Feng, a ramjet-powered supersonic cruise missile, the Hsiung Feng 2E land-attack cruise missile, and the Ba Dan ballistic missile.
However, Taiwan’s indigenous missile project is still beholden to and limited by the US. Washington has stalled the Ba Dan ballistic missile’s development, forced Taiwan to buy US parts for its missiles, and previously refused to sell its missile fuel to Taiwan. Additionally, Taiwan is seeking to buy 600 US-made laser ring gyroscopes and control panel components for its Hsiung Feng 2E missiles.
The theodolite repair incident and US pressure on Taiwan’s missile program underscore China’s grip on US and its allies’ military logistics supply chains. In the case of Taiwan’s Hsiung Feng III theodolite, China could have used its position as the hub of Leica’s Asia maintenance center to tamper with the sensitive component.
In addition, US dependency on China for critical military components and strategic materials could also impact US allies.
Asia Times has previously reported on the discovery of Made in China magnets for F-35 turbomachine pumps, despite an August 2022 ban forbidding specialty metals and alloys from China, North Korea and Russia in US military equipment.
Even with that ban, the US still relies on China and Russia for strategic materials. For example, in June 2022, Defense News reported that the US depends almost entirely on China and, to a lesser extent, Russia for antimony, a critical metal used in the production of everything from armor-piercing bullets, explosives, nuclear weapons and night vision goggles.
In June 2022, Real Clear Defense reported that US and European aerospace firms are highly reliant on Russian titanium, with Russia supplying 45% of all aerospace titanium parts such as engine components and landing gear forgings. This dependency has allowed Russia to export titanium parts without explicit restriction, making use of sanction loopholes and workarounds that appear to be purposely placed.
These instances come on the heels of a 2018 Pentagon report that revealed the US military’s dependence on foreign suppliers for critical military materials. It noted that China is the sole supplier or primary source of essential energetic materials used for munitions and missiles.
It also said that, in many cases, there are no drop-in replacements for those materials. In cases where those options exist, the time and cost to certify these alternatives can be prohibitive in terms of time and resources.
The National Interest reported in 2018 that most US solid-fuel rocket engines use a chemical called dechlorane, which has no domestic supplier. The only overseas source is Occidental Chemical in Belgium. The report said that dechlorane’s precursor chemicals come from China. However, it also mentioned that as the sole Chinese source can no longer produce the precursor, there is currently no dechlorane source worldwide.
Apart from rocket fuel, the same report noted the US military’s overwhelming dependence on Chinese semiconductors, as 90% of the world’s semiconductors are made in Asia. Of that number, 45% are made in China.
It also mentioned the possibility of Made in China parts finding their way to critical US military applications, with these parts potentially infected with computer viruses or physically altered to allow China to spy or disable US military equipment.
These fears may have already been realized. In 2018, Bloomberg reported how China managed to physically implant a discreet backdoor chip on Elemental server motherboards used by the US Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and aboard US Navy warships.
The Bloomberg report said that China may have managed to pull off the supply chain attack when Elemental outsourced its manufacturing to Supermicro in China, allowing it perhaps to tamper with the sensitive electronics.
Given the complexity, interdependence and lack of oversight in contemporary supply chains, it is entirely plausible that China may use the same tactic on sensitive electronics supplied to Taiwan, not least missile control components.