Last year started on a controversial note when General Bipin Rawat assumed command of the Indian Army, superseding two army commanders senior to him. Considerable discussion followed as, with some exceptions, the government has usually stayed on the straight and narrow path of seniority. While the government tried to give many excuses, there was considerable skepticism in military circles as well as the media.
As Army Day (the day an Indian general took command of independent India’s army) rolled by on January 15, 2017, the prime minister graciously tweeted: “We remember with great pride all the sacrifices made by our army. They put their lives at risk so that 125 crore [1.25 billion] Indians live peacefully.”
However, a couple of months later, his government swooped down on a peaceful gathering of protesting military veterans demanding removal of anomalies in the “One Rank, One Pension” (OROP) scheme – a long-standing demand that all military retirees of the same rank get the same pension, irrespective of their retirement dates. So, was it a genuine shabash (congratulations) or another jumla (fake promise)?
Rotating defense ministers
The present government seems to like juggling defense ministers. In three years India has had four, including one incumbent twice, but in name only, as his first charge was the Ministry of Finance. Manohar Parrikar, after taking over on November 9, 2014, remained in office for just about two years before returning to his home state. Arun Jaitley became a caretaker defense minister once again for about six months, thus wasting a year for such an important ministry.
Parrikar, despite being a lightweight in the Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP), tried his best to bring about urgently needed changes. But even he couldn’t rein in the well-entrenched bureaucracy. He failed to satisfy either the military veterans or the serving personnel as modernization plans were kept pending. He could not resolve anomalies in pay and allowances, either.
He fell into the bureaucratic trap of setting up a host of committees, whose recommendations are languishing. These include the Justice Reddy Committee for OROP anomalies, the Promotion Policy Committee and many others. Even the high-powered Shekatkar Committee’s recommendations have been only partially accepted, while the real hard-nosed ones have been quietly buried.
The current military leadership also seemed to be taking knee-jerk reactions in response to a hyperactive discourse on social media. To obviate grievances being aired by soldiers on social media, the army chief instructed all formations to have a grievance box. This move drew adverse reactions, as the army has always had a highly elaborate and fair system of dealing with grievances.
The end of a severe winter coincided with an upsurge in violence in the Kashmir Valley. The Jammu and Kashmir state government was visibly helpless and was more concerned with the upcoming elections in Srinagar and Anantnag. The police and Central Armed Police Forces had constraints and, therefore, failed to take strong action. It was left to the army to contain the local violence as well as neutralize insurgents.
It was also another wasted year for joint endeavors by the three services, despite the army pushing for it. The air force continues to be highly obdurate, without any cogent reasons; the bureaucracy is loath to give up its current role of being the virtual joint headquarters; and the political leadership is blasé, as it has only elections and vote banks on its mind. Consequently, a Chief of Defense Staff and joint structures continue to be a major weakness at all levels.
What is worrying is that instead of a reduction of operational tasks, the army keeps getting deeper into the morass of counterinsurgency operations as well as border defense at the same time. Although Indian Army soldiers are well trained, well led, and physically and mentally tough, these repetitive tasks take their toll and affect morale adversely.
The political leadership seems to have no plans to change this situation by other means, although the strength of all types of police forces, administrators, and subordinate staff keeps increasing, as do their pay and allowances, while the army plods on with antiquated equipment, reduced emoluments and ever-increasing tasks.
Lack of modernization
Despite its high numerical strength, the Indian Army continues to be a hollow army. Consequently, its ability to undertake various types of military operations on the modern battlefield stands greatly reduced.
There are three major reasons for this state of affairs.
The first is the abysmally low defense budget, which has been dwindling every year and now stands at just 1.5% of gross domestic product. The second is complicated procurement procedures. Despite eight Defense Procurement Plans having been issued in nine years, there is no change in the situation.
The third reason is that while the prime minister’s “Make in India” policy resonates in discussions, media reports, committees, election speeches and the like, precious little action is visible on ground. The government manufacturers carry on in their lethargic ways and the Defense Research and Development Organization has produced little, despite huge time delays and cost overruns.
The coming of the new defense minister, the fourth in three years, has also been marked by controversy. The army was ordered to clear garbage left by tourists in the mountains. While the army hierarchy meekly accepted it, there was a furor among the veterans. Why are local civil-government institutions and officials shirking their responsibilities?
A month or so later, the defense minister again tasked the army to construct four footbridges across local train lines in Mumbai. It was a political move to bail out both the railways and the BJP-led government in Maharashtra, which were twiddling their thumbs after an accident on a pedestrian bridge.
It is a mystery why the army accepted this task. The bottom line is that no real change has taken place in the Indian Army in 2017.
The big question is and definite moral degradation of the spirit of solsiery is that Gen Bipit Rawat accepted this propmotion. He should have declined in favour of the senior generals. As was done inthe case of our first chief after the independance. That would have shaken the bureaucracy as weel the political leadership and the honour of soldiery would have been enhanced.
Hallucinating and delusional Mr. Lam. China is now too big to be boxed in.It is at the center of global supply chain management of almost every product and also the biggest trading nation.The largest economy by PPP,If she goes down she will go down with everyone.
Only a terrible military defeat by China can wake India up.
General Oberoi has been regularly commenting, very clearly and in a straight forward manner, on matters affecting the armed forces. What is surprising is that the Govt has not felt the need to interact with the veteran cogniscenti on a wider scale with the intention of resolution. Ordering clueless committees is meaningless. In any case, the reports only gather dust, no action is taken on them. The loss of face of the Govt and the (apparently) deliberate ‘putting down’ of the forces – CSD, Rations, OROP and so on, reflect a lack of concern for the HR aspect. As has been stated often, that man behind the weapon is far more important than any weapon he may handle. Also, the camarederie between the serving and the retired, the bond of blood between the soldier and the offr, cannot be shrugged off. To give credence to a few disgruntled, off the mark ESM of varied ranks, as being representative of the majority, is downright silly. The bureaucratic ignorance and continued interference in a derogatory way, with the armed forces ‘in house’ activities including attempting to break traditions will result in negatively bending the morale curve in more than one way. The inability of the PM to heed the grave signals emanating from the veterans and in some measure from the serving soldiers, via the social media, is not boding well. Regretfully, it would seem, the current senior officers too are unable to break the slide that is occurring. Uniformed representation in all committees affecting the armed forces is a must.
The aspect of downsizing needs reflection. The concept is correct but it’s implementation needs more consideration. The idea of winding up base workshops or replace the uniformed with civilian staff and other such set-ups needs a little more thought. Civilians holding sway would form normal worker groups who would go on strike at opportune moments. Examples exist. For an Army which is continuously in a ‘Warlike stance’ this is downright dangerous.
Lastly, it is imperative to have a suitable strategy to handle the J&K situation in a definitive manner. All soldiers who have served there know that no politician has any worthwhile following there. Bureaucrats only hide. Corruption is rampant. The bureaucrats need to be sent in alongwith their political masters to deal directly, face down and do well by the locals there. The local politician should face a stone throwing crowd/mob, first.The large No of casualties, mostly officers, is unacceptable. Let the civilian officials and politicians suffer a few, if it does happen, to realise it’s bitter taste. The problem is that every such civilian who gets hit is awarded a very high ‘bravery’ award (presumably for being present). Let them get the award if it helps resolve the issues.
2017 is just one year and it has been well summarised. Let 2018 not be a repeat.
How True! The General has summed up all the ills of our Armed Forces in an unambiguous manner. I really hope the Prime Minister and Defence Minister have adequate advisors to understand the pathetic situation of the Armed Forces. While the Armed Forces are nostrum to all ailments that our country suffers but there is no one to look after them.
It makes one wonder, who is responsible for the defence of the country? The Armed Forces have no power and the Minister of Defence has no advisors other than the Defence Secretary, whose knowledge on defence matters can be written on a post card. The National Security Advisor is a cop with focus on intelligence that too is not forthcoming.
I just want an answer from the PM as to: Who is responsible for the defence of India?