Much has been said about the importance of the West Philippine Sea for Manila’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and resource access. However, there is a gap between those goals and the means to achieve them.
The West Philippine Sea is Manila’s term for the portion of the South China Sea within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) — waters also claimed, in whole or in part, by China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan.
Of these overlapping claims, the rivalry between Manila and Beijing has proven the most volatile, marked by recurring standoffs at sea, water-cannon incidents and diplomatic protests.
In any assessment of the effectiveness of the Philippines’ sea strategy, the metrics should be clear. Is it able to develop its Kalayaan outposts beyond Thitu Island (Pag-asa), as China did and Vietnam is doing with their Spratly possessions?
Is the Philippines able to extract offshore petroleum from Recto Bank or other promising fields to replace the aging Malampaya, the way Malaysia is doing? Is it able to increase its wild fisheries catch or expand mariculture in its EEZ?
Is it able to reduce untoward incidents and political-security risks to attract more economic activity in the area? Manila should go for tangibles and enduring results, not simply settle for sound bites and optics.
The Philippines should not confine itself to counting the number of ships or aircraft from other claimants entering its EEZ or the airspace above it. Manila should not be satisfied with conducting more maritime exercises with other allies and partners in choppy waters.
While that may be good for posturing, it risks fostering reliance on external support, even for routine measures such as resupply and patrol sorties in the face of interference. And such foreign support is contingent on an ally’s evolving domestic political calculations.
Knowing what is going on out there and getting more partners invested in freedom of navigation and peaceful resolution of disputes are important. Passing relevant municipal laws is also a sovereign act that bolsters one’s case in a flashpoint.
But these do not necessarily translate into improvements in structures in the country’s administered reefs, tapping indigenous hydrocarbons to lessen dependence on imported fuel, or increasing food security by catching more fish in rough waters.
Disputes had not been an impediment to other claimants, such as fellow ASEAN neighbors Malaysia and Vietnam, in achieving their objectives in the semi-enclosed sea. Countries modernize their militaries and coast guards, undertake drills with partners and file diplomatic protests for intrusions and incidents.
These are regular, done professionally and discreetly, with no fanfare. With satellite, aerial reconnaissance and ship tracking technology, nothing significant – whether reclamation or suspicious ship movements – goes unnoticed.
Broadcasting them is a decision parties consider. Exposure for exposure’s sake and engaging in wars of words to score political points can be done. The question is whether they advance the country’s interests and, if so, to what extent?
The Philippines is a pioneer in occupying and administering some of the largest land features in the Spratly Islands. However, this first-mover advantage has been eroded by decades of neglect, a focus on counterinsurgency at home and reliance on external support, not least US security guarantees outlined in the two sides’ mutual defense treaty.
The Sampaguita well, drilled by a consortium of firms led by US company Amoco, confirmed the presence of petroleum in Recto Bank as early as 1976. However, this discovery did not proceed to development, and Malampaya, farther east, would not begin commercial operations until 2002.
Filipino fishers had been operating in the Scarborough Shoal and Spratly Islands for generations, but no major fish port or fish processing facility had been put in western Palawan facing the West Philippine Sea.
Likewise, despite the obvious geographic advantage, there is no major coast guard or naval base in western Palawan, a handicap that has only recently been addressed by upgrading minor stations and detachments in the area.
These lost opportunities are already water under the bridge, but the lesson should not be lost – assigning blame to external factors cannot excuse domestic lapses.
The South China Sea dispute is a multiparty row. Each claimant has its own security calculation and a strategy to pursue it. Most have clear priorities and redlines. It can be oil and gas works for Malaysia, developing infrastructure in the Spratlys for Vietnam or responding to perceived US containment for China.
Differences and incidents aside, other disputants still get what they want in contested waters. In 2024, Malaysia opened its new Kasawari gas field, which is poised to be one of the world’s largest offshore carbon capture and sequestration projects.
Vietnam is completing its second Spratlys airfield in Barque Canada Reef and expanding facilities in its other outposts in the contested chain. After a decade-long hiatus, China is embarking on a major reclamation project – this time at Antelope Reef in the Paracel Islands, where it has overlapping claims with Vietnam.
Any map of offshore oil and gas blocks in the South China Sea shows which countries are most active in extracting petroleum from the semi-enclosed sea. Regrettably, the Philippines is a laggard in this regard, declaring force majeure and being unable to attract major investors.
Multinationals Shell and Chevron have already left Malampaya. No wonder the Philippines is one of the most exposed in the region to the global oil shock caused by the Iran war and blockade of Hormuz.
Unlike China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), Malaysia’s Petronas, Indonesia’s Pertamina or PetroVietnam, the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) relies more on foreign partners for most upstream works.
Aerial photos reveal how other littoral states have fortified their occupied features, while Manila’s remain the most environmentally exposed. Some of the country’s strategic shoals in the so-called Dangerous Grounds are being lost not to rival claimants but to the elements, with waves chipping away at their shores.
Obviously, the real test of whether a strategy works is whether it delivers. Whether it is quiet or loud is secondary to whether it gets the job done. The Philippines should not settle for the legal or moral high ground, joint military drills or aggressive transparency.
The Philippines’ sea strategy should have clear goals and yardsticks, and a better-calibrated mix of defense and diplomatic tools to achieve them.
Lucio Blanco Pitlo III is president of the Philippine Association for Chinese Studies and research fellow at the Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress Foundation. The views expressed here are his own.
