The logical case for admitting Bangladesh into ASEAN

For decades, Bangladesh’s foreign policy operated on a predictable, singular axis. Under the sixteen-year tenure of ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, Dhaka’s strategic and economic relations were deeply tethered to New Delhi.

A flurry of bilateral agreements spanning digital connectivity, transit rights, and maritime security signaled a tight, almost exclusive alignment with Indian interests. But the youth-led democratic uprising that ousted Hasina’s autocratic regime altered the scenario.

First under the erstwhile interim administration led by the Nobel laureate and economist Muhammad Yunus, and then under the newly elected Prime Minister Tarique Rahman Bangladesh is quietly but confidently recalibrating its geopolitical posture.

The most significant manifestation of this shift is a strategic pivot eastward toward the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Dhaka’s diplomatic overtures to the eleven-member bloc are born of necessity rather than mere sentiment. While full membership remains a distant prospect, the country’s formal request to become a sectoral dialogue partner represents a conscious effort to diversify its diplomatic and economic portfolio.

Sectoral partnerships, which allow for targeted cooperation in trade, climate policy, and regional security, offer a pragmatic backdoor. They lay the institutional groundwork for deeper integration and eventual accession, signaling that Bangladesh no longer views itself merely as the eastern bookend of South Asia, but as a vital bridge to Southeast Asia.

The economic rationale for this reorientation is compelling. Once dismissed by Western diplomats as an economic basket case in the 1970s, Bangladesh has maintained consistent GDP growth rates above 6% for the past two decades.

It has emerged as the world’s second-largest exporter of ready-made garments and a formidable hub of affordable manufacturing. For ASEAN, an economic bloc increasingly preoccupied with supply-chain resilience and decoupling from over-concentrated manufacturing hubs, Bangladesh offers a highly competitive alternative.

As traditional Southeast Asian manufacturing powerhouses like Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam grapple with rapidly aging demographics and shrinking domestic labor pools, Bangladesh presents a massive, underutilized demographic dividend characterized by a young workforce and a rising consumer class.

Crucially, this labor pool is evolving. Bangladesh is no longer merely a source of low-cost, low-skilled migrant labor, though its workers already form the backbone of the construction and agricultural sectors across Malaysia and Singapore.

The country produces thousands of graduates in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics every year who face limited opportunities at home. For ASEAN states currently pouring billions into high-tech industries and semiconductor manufacturing, Dhaka represents a ready reservoir of technical talent.

Formalizing these human capital flows through structured regional mechanisms would allow ASEAN to climb the value chain while offering Bangladesh a path to modernize its labor export model.

Geography further strengthens Dhaka’s hand. Bangladesh commands the busiest port infrastructure in the Bay of Bengal. Chattogram and the deep-sea developments at Matarbari are not merely national infrastructure projects; they are critical nodes for Indo-Pacific maritime trade.

Positioned just off the primary shipping lanes connecting China, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, Bangladesh controls the maritime gateway to landlocked South Asian markets.

For ASEAN, looking to expand its strategic horizon beyond the Mekong and the heavily contested South China Sea, deep integration with Bangladesh offers direct functional access to the broader Indian Ocean littoral.

Yet the current state of commercial engagement highlights how much potential remains untapped. Trade with ASEAN currently accounts for a meager 10% of Bangladesh’s total trade volume, a stark contrast to the 42% conducted with non-ASEAN Asian nations and the 31% bound for Europe.

This asymmetry underlines a glaring structural disconnect. Greater integration would not only rectify this imbalance but also insulate both sides from the volatilities of a global trading system increasingly fractured by protectionism and geopolitical rivalry.

For Dhaka, closer alignment with ASEAN promises eventual entry into comprehensive trade architectures such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), thereby embedding its industries in global production networks.

However, the institutional hurdles to formal accession are formidable. Article 6 of the ASEAN Charter sets out strict criteria for new members, chief among them is location within the recognized geographical boundaries of Southeast Asia.

While strategic geography argues that Bangladesh’s shared border with Myanmar and its historical maritime ties to the Malay world make it functionally Southeast Asian, conventional maps place it squarely in South Asia.

This distinction matters deeply within an organization that operates strictly on consensus and treats its regional identity with protective deference. The recent expansion to include Timor-Leste offers a sobering lesson: despite being unequivocally Southeast Asian, Dili took more than a decade of institutional auditing and political cajoling to transition from applicant to full member.

Furthermore, ASEAN is currently beset by internal anxieties that limit its appetite for enlargement. The bloc is deeply divided over the post-coup paralysis in Myanmar, with maritime members advocating a hard line against the junta while continental neighbors favor quiet diplomacy.

Introducing Bangladesh, which shelters nearly one million Rohingya refugees driven out by the Myanmar military, risks importing an intractable, emotionally charged bilateral crisis into ASEAN’s delicate forums.

Some member states fear that Dhaka’s entry would drag the volatile geopolitics of South Asia—specifically the structural rivalries involving India, China, and Pakistan—into an organization that prides itself on maintaining neutrality and avoiding external entanglements.

To overcome these anxieties, Bangladesh must employ a strategy rooted in institutional utility rather than emotional appeals. The administration has already begun this slow work; in late 2024, Dr Yunus personally secured an encouraging nod of support from Malaysia, a key cultural partner that assumed the ASEAN chair.

Moreover, Dhaka’s successful, peaceful resolution of maritime boundary disputes with India and Myanmar through the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea demonstrates a sophisticated commitment to international law—a trait that ASEAN, constantly managing maritime frictions in its own backyard, should find highly valuable.

Ultimately, Bangladesh’s shift toward ASEAN represents an exercise in reimagining the regional map. If Dhaka receives a polite deferral of its membership ambitions, it should not be viewed as a diplomatic failure but as an invitation to build institutional credibility.

By focusing first on securing sectoral dialogue status, modernizing its customs and port infrastructure, and deepening bilateral ties capital by capital, Bangladesh can make itself indispensable to Southeast Asia’s economic future.

Faisal Mahmud is a Dhaka-based journalist.