In recent weeks, Japan halted South Korean equity firm MBK Partners’ acquisition of machine-tool manufacturer Makino Milling Machine on national security grounds.
Around the same time, the British government reportedly signaled discomfort with Bharti Enterprises’ plan to increase its stake in telecom giant British Telecom beyond a critical threshold.
Meanwhile, Dutch authorities blocked the takeover of a company linked to the Netherlands’ digital identity infrastructure.
Different countries, sectors, and investors. Yet these seemingly unrelated cases point to a common reality: National security is no longer confined to the realm of defense. It is increasingly shaping who can own, control, invest in and access the technologies and infrastructures that underpin the global economy.
Expanding boundaries of national security
What unites these episodes is not nationality, ideology or even sector. It is the growing tendency of governments to view economic assets through the lens of national security.
This raises a broader question: What exactly constitutes national security in the twenty-first century? During the Cold War, national security was largely defined by military capabilities and territorial defense. In the decades that followed, however, the concept expanded considerably. Today, it encompasses not only telecommunications and energy infrastructure but also semiconductors, artificial intelligence, industrial ecosystems, critical minerals and digital networks.
As economic competitiveness, technological leadership and geopolitical influence become increasingly intertwined, national security is no longer confined to protecting borders. It increasingly shapes who can own, control, invest in and access the technologies and infrastructures that underpin modern economies.
This broadening of national security reflects deeper changes in the global economy. As production networks, data systems, financial flows and technological innovation have become, increasingly, transnational, states have grown more conscious of the vulnerabilities embedded within them.
The Covid-19 pandemic exposed the risks associated with concentrated supply chains, while geopolitical tensions highlit the strategic significance of semiconductors, critical minerals, digital infrastructure and advanced technologies. Economic interdependence, once viewed primarily as a source of efficiency and prosperity, is increasingly also seen as a source of vulnerability and leverage.
National security is therefore concerned not merely with defending territory, but with safeguarding the economic and technological foundations upon which national power increasingly rests.
From strategic industries to strategic ecosystems
Japan’s decision to halt MBK Partners’ proposed acquisition of machine-tool manufacturer Makino Milling Machine may be a routine regulatory intervention. Yet the significance of the episode lies in what it reveals about the changing boundaries of national security. Machine tools are neither semiconductors nor AI platforms, yet Japanese authorities deemed the company sufficiently important to warrant national security scrutiny.
The case underscores a broader shift: Governments are increasingly extending national security concerns beyond traditional strategic industries to encompass the industrial ecosystems that underpin technological capability, manufacturing resilience and long-term economic competitiveness.
A similar logic is evident in both the United Kingdom’s reported reluctance to allow Bharti Enterprises to increase its stake in British Telecom beyond a critical threshold and the Netherlands’ decision to block the acquisition of a company linked to DigiD, the country’s digital identity infrastructure.
In neither case was the concern focused on a geopolitical adversary. Rather, both reflected growing unease over control of critical telecommunications and digital ecosystems that underpin economic activity, public services, citizen authentication and national resilience. Telecommunications networks and digital identity systems are no longer viewed merely as commercial assets; they constitute foundational infrastructure through which data flows, economic activity is coordinated, and state functions are performed.
As data and digital connectivity become increasingly central to economic and societal resilience, governments are extending national security considerations beyond traditional infrastructure to encompass the digital ecosystems upon which contemporary economies and states increasingly depend.
Many observers explain such developments primarily through the prism of US-China rivalry or rising economic nationalism. Concerns over control of critical infrastructure and strategic capabilities were sufficient to trigger scrutiny.
Equally significant is the expanding definition of what constitutes a strategic asset. The category now extends beyond traditional infrastructure to encompass the technological, industrial and digital ecosystems upon which modern economies increasingly depend. Governments are consequently drawing sharper distinctions between ordinary markets on the one hand and, on the other, strategic markets where questions of ownership, control and technological capability are increasingly viewed through the lens of national security.
China’s recent intervention in the proposed acquisition of the AI startup Manus points to the same underlying trend. Chinese authorities reportedly viewed the company not merely as a private firm but as part of a broader AI ecosystem shaped by years of state investment, talent development and technological advancement. The issue was not simply ownership of a company, but control over strategic capabilities embedded within a rapidly evolving technological ecosystem.
What connects these seemingly disparate cases is a shift in the object of protection. Governments increasingly seek to protect entire ecosystems of production, innovation, talent, infrastructure and data that generate long-term economic and technological advantage. Strategic power derives not merely from what a country produces, but from its ability to shape and sustain the ecosystems that enable such production.
The rise of security-conditioned globalization
As governments increasingly seek to protect strategic ecosystems, the distinction between economic and security policy is blurring. The post-Cold War era of globalization has acquired a new dimension, with governments increasingly distinguishing between ordinary and strategic markets.
While commercial considerations remain paramount in sectors such as retail and consumer goods, strategic markets – including semiconductors, telecommunications, AI, batteries and rare earths – are valued less for the products they generate than for the capabilities they enable.
As technological leadership, control over supply chains, access to data and the ability to shape standards become increasingly important sources of national power, ownership, and control in these sectors, they increasingly attract national security scrutiny.
The distinction reflects a growing recognition that economic power and national power are increasingly intertwined. Strategic markets are therefore defined less by the products they generate than by the capabilities they enable. Semiconductors power digital economies, telecommunications networks carry information, machine tools underpin advanced manufacturing and AI systems increasingly shape both economic and military competitiveness.
The growing overlap between economic and security considerations helps explain why governments are extending national security scrutiny far beyond traditional defense sectors.
The growing distinction between ordinary and strategic markets is increasingly reflected in government policy.
The United States has long relied on the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to screen foreign acquisitions on national security grounds, while China has developed its own investment-screening and export-control mechanisms. More recently, controversies surrounding TikTok, Nippon Steel’s proposed acquisition of US Steel, China’s restrictions on rare earth exports and investment reviews in countries such as Japan, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have fueled concerns that economic globalization is giving way to economic nationalism.
Yet, despite the growing prominence of national security considerations, firms remain deeply embedded in global production networks, technology ecosystems and international markets.
Ford’s partnership with China’s CATL, Apple’s continuing reliance on Chinese supply chains and Morocco’s emergence as an electric-vehicle battery hub demonstrate how Chinese capital, technology, and industrial know-how continue to integrate with global markets despite mounting geopolitical tensions.
The result is a paradoxical reality: States increasingly pursue strategic autonomy, yet they must do so amid deep interdependence. Rather than a world of complete decoupling, what is emerging is a more security-conditioned form of globalization, in which economic relationships remain extensive but are increasingly managed, screened and shaped by national security considerations.
The future of globalization will therefore depend less on whether markets remain open and more on which assets, technologies, infrastructures and ecosystems governments classify as strategic. The defining question for firms is no longer where opportunities exist, but whether governments will permit those opportunities to exist in the first place.
Globalization is not ending, but it is being reorganized around a new reality in which national security increasingly shapes the terms of economic openness. In this emerging landscape, strategic power derives not merely from asset ownership but from the ability to shape, sustain and control the ecosystems that generate technological and economic advantage.
