The most consequential Indo-Pacific development last week may not have been the speeches delivered at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.
More significant were the decisions announced days earlier at the Quad foreign ministers’ meeting in New Delhi, where India, Japan, Australia and the United States unveiled new initiatives on Pacific infrastructure like a port in Fiji, maritime surveillance and maritime domain awareness, critical mineral partnerships and more.
While military competition dominated discussions at the Shangri-La Dialogue, the Quad’s emphasis on Fiji pointed to a broader development across the Indo-Pacific.
Strategic competition is increasingly extending beyond military balances to encompass the infrastructure, logistics networks and maritime corridors that support trade, energy flows and connectivity.
The initiatives announced in New Delhi reflected this shift, underscoring the extent to which economic geography is once again becoming a central factor in regional power dynamics.
The focus on Fiji, alongside India’s Great Nicobar project in the eastern Indian Ocean, reflects a strategic logic that spans the Indo-Pacific from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific. This shift reflects changes in the structure of the Indo-Pacific economy itself.
According to UNCTAD, around 80% of global trade by volume moves by sea. Much of Asia’s growth depends on maritime routes stretching from the Persian Gulf through the Indian Ocean, the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea into the Pacific.
The economic importance of the South China Sea extends far beyond the region itself. Approximately one-third of global maritime trade, worth over US$ 3 trillion annually, passes through its sea lanes.
The waterway also carries more than 30% of global maritime crude oil trade and almost 40% of global liquefied natural gas shipments, making it one of the world’s most consequential energy transit routes.
As trade and supply chains have become increasingly concentrated around a relatively small number of maritime routes and chokepoints, infrastructure has acquired greater strategic significance.
Ports, logistics hubs, telecommunications systems and undersea cables are no longer viewed simply as commercial assets. They are assessed on resilience, access and economic security.
China’s growing economic footprint has accelerated this shift. Beijing is the largest trading partner for most economies in East and Southeast Asia. China has financed or constructed infrastructure projects across Asia, Africa, the Middle East and the Pacific through the Belt and Road Initiative.
Chinese firms have also developed commercial interests in ports, logistics facilities and telecommunications networks across several strategically important maritime regions.
For countries such as Australia, Japan and India, the concern is less the ownership of any individual project than the cumulative effect of expanding Chinese influence across the infrastructure and connectivity networks that underpin regional economies.
The Pacific Islands have become increasingly important within this context. For much of the post-Cold War period, the islands occupied a relatively marginal place in Indo-Pacific strategic thinking.
That assumption no longer holds. Chinese diplomatic engagement and infrastructure investment have expanded across Kiribati, the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and elsewhere.
The 2022 security agreement between China and the Solomon Islands reinforced concerns across the Indo-Pacific that economic engagement could gradually facilitate broader strategic access.
Geography explains much of the region’s importance. Although Pacific Island states possess relatively small populations, they collectively control vast Exclusive Economic Zones spanning millions of square kilometers of ocean.
These maritime spaces sit astride routes linking Asia, Oceania and the Americas and increasingly form part of the wider communications a nd logistics architecture of the Indo-Pacific.
The Pacific is vital to global digital connectivity. More than 95% of international data traffic travels through submarine cables. Several major cable systems linking North America, Asia and Oceania pass through or near Pacific Island territories.
As economic activity becomes increasingly dependent on digital infrastructure, concerns about connectivity and infrastructure security now extend well beyond ports and shipping routes.
This explains the significance of the Quad’s decision to support infrastructure development in Fiji. The initiative is significant for what it suggests about evolving strategic priorities across the Indo-Pacific.
By combining infrastructure support with maritime surveillance and maritime domain awareness programs, the Quad is seeking to strengthen connectivity and improve visibility across a region that is of importance to trade, communications and strategic access.
Similar considerations are increasingly shaping strategic thinking elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific. As attention shifts towards the security of critical maritime routes and the infrastructure that supports them, the importance of key chokepoints linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans has become more apparent.
This is reflected in India’s Great Nicobar project. Located near the western approaches to the Malacca Strait and adjacent to the Six Degree Channel, Great Nicobar occupies a position close to one of the world’s most important maritime corridors.
About 75% to 80% of China’s oil imports transit the Strait of Malacca, while the wider maritime system connecting the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea and the Pacific is central to the trade and energy security of major Asian economies, including China, Japan, South Korea and India.
Great Nicobar is significant because it strengthens India’s position within this wider maritime geography. Enhanced logistics infrastructure, port facilities and surveillance capabilities would improve India’s ability to monitor activity across the eastern Indian Ocean while reinforcing its role within emerging regional connectivity networks.
The development would also expand the logistical and operational support available for Indian naval deployments in the eastern Indian Ocean, a region that has assumed growing importance in New Delhi’s Indo-Pacific strategy.
Viewed together, Fiji and Great Nicobar indicate a broader change across the Indo-Pacific. The Quad is often discussed primarily as a response to China’s military rise. Yet its agenda increasingly extends beyond traditional security issues.
Critical minerals, undersea cables, supply-chain resilience, digital infrastructure and maritime domain awareness now occupy a central place in Quad discussions because they sit at the intersection of economic security and strategic competition.
The debates at Shangri-La focused largely on deterrence and military power. The significance of Fiji, Great Nicobar and the maritime corridors that connect them lies in their role within the infrastructure and connectivity networks through which trade, energy, data and influence increasingly flow.
It is where economic geography meets security and power dynamics.
Vivek Y Kelkar is a researcher and analyst focused on the intersection of geoeconomics, geopolitics and corporate strategy.