Not many years ago, Marine Corps strategists and the Commandant declared that long-range precision weapons and ubiquitous satellite surveillance had made amphibious operations too risky, if not obsolete.
Any amphibious fleet, the argument went, would be spotted and sunk.
The future of the Marine Corps, laid out in a scheme known as Force Design 2030 (FD-2030), would be small “sensor-missile” teams operating on remote islands and coastal areas, focused primarily on the Chinese threat.
New Littoral Combat Regiments would operate in that slice of geography where sea meets land — when more concentrated force was needed.
To fund FD-2030, the Marine Corps gutted — or “divested,” in the preferred whiz-kid jargon — perfectly capable hardware and Marines rather than adding the new mission to the existing force structure and daring Congress not to fund it.
The Commandant also signaled to the Navy that it really needn’t try too hard to deliver even the minimum number of amphibious ships it had pledged. Navy brass gladly obliged. The Tom Cruise character in the Top Gun films , tellingly, is a fighter pilot, not an amphib skipper. That tells you everything.
Fortunately, enough of the “old” Marine Corps still exists, along with enough functioning amphibious ships.
That especially matters now. CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper has requested Marines for the Persian Gulf to bolster Iran war forces. Notably, he didn’t ask for FD-2030 sensor-missile units or a Marine Littoral Regiment. Rather, he requested a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), the Marine Corps’ traditional bread and butter.
A MEU is roughly 2,000 Marines with their weapons, supporting arms, equipment and air assets, including 22 F-35s and helicopters. It arrives aboard an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), ideally comprised of three ships.
Together, the MEU-ARG is a self-contained air-sea-ground force with the freedom of maneuver that only the open ocean provides. One without the other is largely useless. Together, they can do things no other service can replicate on its own.
That’s why Admiral Cooper asked for the MEU. Two of them, in fact.
The war against Iran is largely and properly being fought through airpower, both land- and carrier-based, supplemented by long-range ground-launched missiles and rockets. But commanders sometimes want more options. There are problems that airpower and naval fires alone cannot solve, and sometimes troops ashore are the only answer.
The MEU gives Cooper the ability to land a modest-sized ground force from the sea — by air or amphibious vehicle — with supporting arms, F-35s operating ashore and their logistics sufficient to seize and even hold a piece of terrain.
Several potential targets have been mentioned. Kharg Island, through which roughly 90% of Iran’s oil exports flow, is one potential MEU mission. Airpower could degrade the infrastructure, but holding or controlling Iran’s oil infrastructure would likely require troops on the ground.
The Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunb islands in the Strait of Hormuz are another. Iran has fortified them, and neutralizing those positions is a prerequisite for keeping the strait open — precisely the kind of mission MEUs exist to execute.
Beyond direct action, a MEU, often compared to a Swiss Army knife, is a versatile instrument. It can rescue downed pilots, conduct VBSS (Visit, Board, Search and Seizure) operations to interdict or control shipping in the Persian Gulf and augment the combat air campaign with its F-35s. A commander never has enough aircraft.
Is a MEU big enough? Probably, for an island seizure or taking a limited piece of ground. But the Persian Gulf is a large theater, and two MEUs can only do so much.
Does redeploying the Japan-based 31st MEU to the Gulf weaken deterrence in East Asia? Somewhat, but it’s a calculated risk. The Persian Gulf is the active theater of operations, and that’s where the capability is needed now.
If China chooses to make its long-threatened move against Taiwan, Japanese territory or the Philippines, the presence or absence of one MEU is unlikely to be the deciding factor.
What matters more is the overall number of US naval and air forces in the region — and, critically, Chinese perceptions of American will, of both the Trump administration and the US writ large. The perceived will of Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Taiwan to defend themselves is no less important.
The Indo-Pacific is headed for trouble, but unless Beijing decides it’s time for World War III, the near-term risk is likely manageable — even without a MEU in the region.
More importantly, Admiral Cooper’s request for a MEU may serve as a useful reminder to Marine Corps leadership that amphibious forces are not as obsolete as they previously suggested.
Grant Newsham is a retired US Marine officer, former US diplomat and author of the book “When China Attacks: A Warning To America.”