Iran and Russia will likely sign a strategic partnership treaty in Moscow later this year, upgrading a partnership the sometimes allies, sometimes foes established in the early 2000s.
Though the two sides have extended the original agreement several times, both have recognized the need to renew it so that it better reflects contemporary global realities.
The war in Ukraine, the related deterioration of ties between Russia and the collective West and exacerbating tensions between the US and China have all impacted what were already complicated relations between Moscow and Tehran.
If Russia was historically always cautious not to provide sensitive technologies to the Islamic Republic, largely because of potential negative reactions from the West, the war in Ukraine has apparently shifted Russia’s perspective.
Moscow has pivoted in earnest to Asia and Iran has become a pivotal state in its geopolitical recalibration. As a likewise heavily sanctioned state and critical for Russia’s reach to the Indian Ocean and East Africa, Moscow increasingly sees Iran as a major partner.
The return of Donald Trump to the White House is unlikely to change the dynamic. Though some kind of accommodation between Moscow and Washington is indeed possible, the overall tense relations have limited room to shift.
Russia will press on with its alignment with the Islamic Republic. The latter, too, is expected to undergo greater pressure from the Trump administration, driving it to seek greater military and political cooperation with Moscow.
No major concrete details from the prospective strategic partnership treaty are publicly available. Yet, analysis of public statements by Iranian and Russian officials reveals a number of likely areas for enhanced bilateral cooperation.
The strategic partnership will inevitably underscore the two sides’ mutual opposition to the Western-led global order and seek to promote a more multipolar one. Iran and Russia both support non-Western initiatives like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
The agreement will also likely highlight areas for collaboration, including a new payment system to enable trade in national currencies—a key need as trade between the two countries has declined recently—and further development of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which connects Russia to Iranian ports and India.
Yet another and much more critical area will be bilateral military and strategic cooperation, as shown by Iran allegedly supplying short-range ballistic missiles and military drones to Russia. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov confirmed the treaty will include closer defense cooperation in late October.
Moscow and Tehran have also endeavored to collaborate on notions of regionalism in the South Caucasus, on which they both border and aspire to keep non-regional (mostly Western) players at bay.
This thinking is at the root of the 3+3 initiative, which Tehran and Russia jointly support. It is comprised of Turkey and three South Caucasus countries, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, though the latter has continuously refused to participate due to Russia’s occupation of 20% of its territory.
While the new Russo-Iranian agreement will certainly expand cooperation, it nevertheless is likely to stop short of forming a formal alliance, reflecting their complex relationship as both partners and competitors across the Middle East. Neither side needs or wants an official alliance with iron-clad commitments regarding mutual defense.
Instead, both seek expanded cooperation that gives enough room for maneuver. Indeed, the two countries are large enough not to narrow down their respective foreign policy directions. So far they have avoided geopolitical fixation on any single adversary or actor as this would limit their foreign policy options.
Despite the growing military collaboration, bilateral tensions persist. That’s been seen in Iran still awaiting delivery of Russia’s Su-35 fighter jets, a delay which may reflect Russia’s wish to balance relations with other Middle Eastern powers like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who oppose Iran’s influence and operations in the region.
Another point of friction lies in regional infrastructure. Russia recently voiced support for the Zangezur corridor, a proposed transport link between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan through Armenia’s Syunik province, which borders Iran.
However, Iran opposes this corridor, seeing it as a potential threat to its own regional influence and a challenge to its close relationship with Armenia.
Most significantly, perhaps, Russia is seemingly unwilling to go along with Iran in its worsening rivalry with Israel. Israel has always enjoyed a special relationship with Moscow and Iran remembers well how Russian troops stood aloof when Israeli planes bombed Iranian installations in Syria.
Russia has also been cautious about providing military support to Iran, mainly as a nod to its close ties with the Jewish state.
The invasion of Ukraine, as well as Israel’s military campaigns in Gaza and Lebanon, drove major shifts in Russia’s posture toward Israel. Differences have grown and Moscow has largely pursued a pro-Palestinian position.
Yet, even with this negative background, Russia is still unlikely to support Iran in any potential direct clash with Israel. Direct military participation is out of the question, and even though it is theoretically possible that Russia could provide air defense and aviation to Iran to help repel an attack, developing expertise in using them requires time (in case of the S-400 air defense system at least three months).
The Russo-Iranian relationship, rooted in mutual resistance to Western dominance, is pragmatic but simultaneously fraught with competition. Russia is wary of Iran’s efforts to diversify its foreign relations, particularly if Iran seeks to re-engage with the West.
Similarly, Iranian officials view Russia’s backing as partly opportunistic, noting Moscow’s change in stance regarding its nuclear program as it seeks to pressure the West amid the Ukraine conflict.
Despite these complexities, Iran and Russia are moving forward with a new strategic agreement, a framework that will allow room for both expanded cooperation and muted rivalry. The agreement will solidify their strategic partnership while preserving each country’s flexibility on the global stage.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a Silk Road scholar. Follow Emil Avdaliani on X at @emilavdaliani
They are allied enough to make the West squeal. Did anybody expect NATO to arm Ukraine and nobody to arm Russia? In that case, your worldview needs a firmware update.
So now Russia relies on NK and Iran for arms and soldiers? Hardly a superpower.