Bangladesh's ex-leader Sheikh Hasina faces the death penalty if she returns from exile. Image: YouTube Screengrab

The difference between returning home and being brought home is much more than semantics. For ousted Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheik Hasina, it could determine whether she returns as a convicted fugitive or as an ex-leader who negotiated the terms of her own comeback.

This should concern Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s government far more than the latest correspondence from a British law firm. Hasina, who fled Bangladesh in August 2024 amid a popular uprising against her 15-year rule, has reportedly sought a new Bangladeshi passport and a national identity card through London-based Matrix Chambers.

The request, communicated to the Bangladesh High Commission in New Delhi, has generated a predictable political controversy.

Her supporters see another opportunity to present the ousted prime minister as a victim of political persecution. Her opponents see an attempt to circumvent the consequences of a conviction for crimes against humanity. Both reactions risk giving the paperwork more importance than it deserves.

A passport is just a travel document, not an instrument of political rehabilitation. It cannot be a political bargaining chip over the return of a former head of government convicted of crimes against humanity committed during her final weeks in power.

Now, the question is not whether Hasina wants to return from exile in India. It is whether Bangladesh will insist that she return through the legal process already available to it. And the answer to that question should be unequivocal: extradition.

Graver than politics

The reason for the government to resist attempts to recast Hasina’s case as an ordinary political dispute is a no-brainer.

In February 2025, the United Nations Human Rights Office published its investigation into the crackdown on Bangladesh’s student-led uprising. Its findings were devastating. The report estimated that as many as 1,400 people were killed between July 15 and August 5, 2024, a period of just three weeks. Thousands more were injured. Children accounted for an estimated 12% to 13% of those killed.

Investigators found reasonable grounds to believe that the former government, its security agencies and violent elements associated with the Awami League had systematically committed serious human rights violations.

The report identified evidence of an official policy to suppress protesters through violence, raising concerns about crimes against humanity. It was not a verdict against Hasina, but its findings were independent of Bangladesh’s subsequent judicial proceedings.

Hasina and her Awami League have sought to portray the International Crimes Tribunal proceedings as political persecution. Their argument draws from concerns about due process, her trial in absentia and the death penalty verdict. Their concerns deserve scrutiny, but they do not erase the underlying crimes or the evidence gathered by international investigators.

On November 17, 2025, the tribunal sentenced Hasina to death for crimes against humanity. She has denied wrongdoing and rejected the legitimacy of the proceedings.

The Awami League’s political narrative asks Bangladeshis to view the conviction primarily through the familiar rivalry between two parties. Yet the killings were not simply another episode in that rivalry. They involved the state’s machinery being turned against people demanding political change.

A former prime minister does not acquire immunity from criminal accountability because her prosecution carries political consequences. Nor does a political dimension automatically invalidate a criminal case.

Who dictates the terms?

On November 13, Bangladesh National Party (BNP) Acting Secretary General Ruhul Kabir Rizvi identified the essential difference between voluntary return and extradition.

Speaking at a discussion in Dhaka, Rizvi argued that Hasina could not simply return through the ordinary process because she was a convicted person sought under an extradition treaty. He described passports and identity documents as secondary matters. Extradition, he said, was a legal process between two sovereign states.

Her supporters could present a return arranged according to Hasina’s preference and timetable as an act of defiance. The former prime minister would appear to have forced the government to accommodate her initiative. That perception would not change her legal status, but politics is not conducted solely through legal documents.

Lord Varys, the fictional master of political intelligence in Game of Thrones, offers a useful observation here: “Power resides where men believe it resides.” This insight is especially relevant for Bangladesh, where perceptions of authority have often mattered almost as much as authority itself.

Hasina governed for more than 15 consecutive years through a political system that increasingly concentrated power around her office. Her sudden removal demonstrated how quickly an apparently unassailable government could lose its authority. The BNP government should understand that lesson better than most.

Tarique Rahman came to power through the February 2026 election. His government’s legitimacy rests on that electoral mandate and its ability to exercise constitutional authority, not on granting concessions to an ousted predecessor.

It should therefore resist any arrangement that allows Hasina to appear to have negotiated her own return. That does not mean humiliating her, denying her lawful protections or treating an extradition request as a guarantee of India’s compliance. It means insisting that the legal process, rather than her wishes, determines what happens next.

Security concerns

There is also a domestic security consideration. The Awami League remains a political force with supporters across Bangladesh, even though its activities have been banned. A return portrayed as Hasina’s personal victory could energize its networks and sharpen tensions with the government.

So, the risk of organized unrest, intimidation or sabotage by violent elements is a legitimate concern for Rahman. An improvised return, particularly one surrounded by competing claims of victory and defeat, could unnecessarily pave the way for confrontation.

A formal extradition would offer a clearer chain of responsibility. India would make a sovereign decision on Bangladesh’s request, and the transfer would occur through established channels. Bangladeshi authorities would assume custody under an identifiable legal process.

That is preferable to a politically charged arrival negotiated through informal understandings.

For Rahman’s administration, the strongest position is also the simplest: do not turn a passport request into a political negotiation, and do not replace the established extradition process with an arrangement whose main benefit would be to rehabilitate Hasina’s political standing.

Bangladesh has asked India to hand over a convicted former prime minister. That request should remain the basis of its policy. Hasina may wish to decide when and how she comes home, but the government has no obligation to let her decide. The terms must be set by law, not by the person seeking to escape its consequences.

Faisal Mahmud is the managing editor of Daily Waadaa

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