Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s re-election on October 25 may have frustrated Donald Trump’s ambitions in Latin America, but the more consequential story lies beyond the ballot box on China.
Brazil’s relationship with Beijing is now so deeply embedded in its economy that even a president more sympathetic to Washington would struggle to unwind it. Political loyalties can change overnight, but trade routes, industrial investments and commercial dependencies cannot.
Lula secured 51.79% of valid votes against Flavio Bolsonaro’s 48.21%, according to Brazil’s electoral authority. His victory preserves a government committed to maintaining relations with competing global powers.
Nevertheless, the election exposed a deeper reality. Brazil’s economic relationship with Beijing is increasingly sustained by interests that extend well beyond presidential preferences.
Between January and September 2026, Brazilian exports to China reached US$84.7 billion, up 12% from a year earlier. China absorbed 29.75% of Brazil’s exports, compared with just 9.65% destined for the United States.
Meanwhile, exports to America declined 6.5%. For Brazilian producers, these figures represent customers, revenues and investments that cannot simply be redirected by diplomatic decree.
Nor is China merely purchasing Brazilian commodities. Chinese companies are increasingly involved in the country’s electricity networks, mining operations, automobile manufacturing and energy transition.
Consequently, the relationship is evolving from a conventional exchange of raw materials for manufactured goods into something more consequential: an economic partnership deeply woven into Brazil’s productive infrastructure.
That means Washington’s strategic preferences increasingly collide with Brazil’s commercial realities. American policymakers may regard Chinese influence in the Western Hemisphere as a geopolitical vulnerability.
Brazilian exporters, manufacturers and infrastructure operators, however, calculate their interests differently. For them, disengagement would require alternative markets, financing and technology, not simply a change in political allegiance.
Unbreakable relationship
China’s importance to Brazil begins with the extraordinary scale of its demand. Brazilian soybeans feed Chinese livestock, iron ore supports its steel industry, and crude oil supplies its refineries. These exchanges have created powerful domestic constituencies whose commercial interests transcend ideological divisions.
Indeed, Brazil’s dependence is not confined to the political left. Agribusiness, historically associated with conservative political forces, benefits enormously from Chinese demand. Mining companies and commodity exporters operate according to similarly pragmatic calculations. A government seeking to distance Brazil from Beijing would therefore confront resistance not only from China but also from powerful interests at home.
Bilateral trade reached approximately $143.3 billion in the first nine months of this year, generating a Brazilian surplus of $26.1 billion. That accounted for roughly 42% of Brazil’s overall merchandise trade surplus.
To be sure, the relationship has vulnerabilities. Brazil predominantly exports agricultural products, minerals and energy commodities while importing manufactured goods, machinery and increasingly sophisticated technologies.
This pattern generates substantial revenues but does not necessarily strengthen domestic technological capabilities. Indeed, commodity dependence can coexist with and even promote industrial stagnation.
The emerging lithium trade illustrates the dilemma. During January-September, Brazilian exports of spodumene, a lithium-bearing mineral, rose 339% in value to $172.3 million. China purchased approximately 97% of those exports.
Brazil possesses the resource, while China commands much of the downstream battery-processing and manufacturing ecosystem. The commercial opportunity is considerable, but so is the risk of remaining confined to the least technologically sophisticated stages of production.
Still, Brazil’s dependence should not be confused with helplessness. Brazil supplies commodities that Chinese industries need, and alternative markets exist for some of the products.
The real question is how quickly exporters could replace Chinese demand, at what price and with what consequences for employment and investment. Economic vulnerability depends not merely on the size of a relationship but on the cost of replacing it.
Investment as strategic infrastructure
According to the Brazil-China Business Council, Chinese investment in Brazil reached $6.1 billion in 2025, up 45% from the previous year. Brazil attracted 10.9% of Chinese overseas investment tracked by the council, making it the largest destination in its assessment. Crucially, the money was not concentrated exclusively in commodity extraction.
Electricity projects received approximately $1.79 billion, while mining attracted $1.76 billion. Automotive investment reached about $965 million. Chinese companies are consequently participating in sectors that shape Brazil’s future industrial capacity, particularly electricity infrastructure, electric vehicles and strategic minerals.
Still, Chinese investment is not automatically beneficial to Brazil. China’s factories may create jobs and introduce technology, but they also make Brazil reliant on imported components, limiting domestic value creation. Likewise, mining investment may increase exports without developing Brazilian processing capabilities.
Washington faces a corresponding challenge. If American policymakers want Brazil to reduce its exposure to China, trade restrictions and diplomatic pressure will likely accomplish little.
They must offer credible alternatives involving market access, financing, industrial cooperation and technology. Otherwise, Brazil would be expected to absorb the economic costs of advancing another country’s geopolitical objectives.
While Washington introduced additional tariffs on Brazilian products in July, both governments established a working group in September to explore a possible trade agreement.
Brazil has continued engaging the United States even as its commercial relationship with China expands, reflecting Brasilia’s effort to preserve economic options rather than accept an exclusive alignment.
Brazil’s real choice
Lula’s challenge, therefore, is not whether Brazil should choose Washington or Beijing. It is whether the country can transform relationships with both into greater productive independence.
Brazil’s Nova Indústria Brasil program provides one potential instrument. Initially backed by $300 billion real (US$55 billion) in planned financing, the initiative received an additional $70 billion real commitment in February 2026.
Its ambitions include industrial modernization, technological development and stronger domestic production chains, though clearly financing commitments alone won’t guarantee industrial transformation.
The relevant measures are domestic value added, productivity growth, technological learning, supplier development and the ability to export sophisticated products. Chinese investment should be assessed against these benchmarks, just as American or European investment should.
Diversification nevertheless remains essential. During the first half of 2026, Brazilian exports to India expanded by more than 88%, while sales to the European Union, Mexico and Singapore also increased. These developments suggest that alternative commercial relationships can grow alongside Chinese demand rather than replacing it outright.
Washington may try to influence Lula’s new government’s strategic calculations, but it cannot erase the commercial incentives sustaining relations with Beijing. Brazil’s strategic autonomy will be measured neither by its distance from Washington nor by its closeness to Beijing.
It will depend on whether the country can convert access to competing powers into domestic capabilities that neither power can monopolize or control.
Lula’s objective won’t be decoupling from China at America’s behest. Rather, it will be to make external dependence less costly, less concentrated and, above all, less able to dictate Brazil’s choices.
Ronny P Sasmita is a senior international affairs analyst at the Indonesia Strategic and Economic Action Institution, a Jakarta-based think tank. He holds a PhD from the University of Tokyo.
Regarding Bolsonaro. The guy is an American plant and CROOK. He is a swindler like Chump, Milei and Netanyahu. He is wanted on money laundering charges by Brazilian law enforcement. He escaped to the USA via Argentina, a plantation occupied by Jew convert Milei. Look who protects him so you understand what a SCAM Bolsonaro was and is.
Brazil’s place in BRICS is far more important to its future than grovelling to Zionism and fair weather friends like the USA. The trade is simply NOT worth it.