The Iran conflict has exposed a glaring blind spot in US war strategy. America can escalate in hours, but it can take years to rebuild the arsenal it consumes. Washington has begun addressing the arms-replenishment problem, a calculation it should have made before escalating.
The Pentagon’s recent awards reflect the intensity of the challenge. In the past few days, it has announced a US$24.4 billion contract for Raytheon to accelerate Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) production, after awarding $20.7 billion for AMRAAM missiles and a $58.6 billion Patriot deal with Lockheed Martin. Each is meant to replenish stocks depleted by the war, but signing the contracts does not put depleted missiles back in the arsenal.
The shortage is already showing on the battlefield. Commanders on US bases in the Middle East have reportedly begun letting some incoming Iranian missiles land when they are headed for unpopulated areas, saving scarce interceptors for missiles that could do real harm.
Yet in a recent Time magazine interview, President Donald Trump downplayed a Pentagon report on munitions shortages while acknowledging that some stocks are running low.
Independent estimates underscore the large-scale drawdown of high-value munitions. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the US stockpile of Patriot and THAAD interceptors had fallen to fewer than 827 and 278, respectively, by July 27.
The drain on the reserves started earlier. In the 12-day war of June 2025, US forces reportedly fired more than 150 THAAD interceptors and about 80 SM-3s to defend Israel from Iran’s incoming projectiles.
Washington recognized the replenishment challenge even before the Iran escalation. In January, the Pentagon and Lockheed Martin signed agreements to raise annual THAAD output from 96 to 400 and Patriot PAC-3 production from roughly 600 a year to 2,000 by the end of the decade.
But while money can be raised, borrowed or reallocated, factories, workers and supply chains don’t move as quickly. The manufacturing lead time of these interceptors ranges from 25 to 51 months, meaning they can’t be scaled up overnight. A Pentagon Inspector General report released in September found that the Iran war had exposed industrial bottlenecks, triggering a shortage of key munitions.
To be sure, the US military can still sustain the current Iran fight. Yet rapidly depleting munitions may weaken deterrence in other theaters. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that US forces have probably used between one-half and two-thirds of their missile-defense interceptor inventory since June 2025, and rebuilding it may take at least five years, even with increased production.
The shortage is already affecting Ukraine. Kyiv has reported an acute shortage of Patriot interceptors since the Iran war began. In August, President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Ukraine had two and a half times fewer interceptors than it had in 2025, while Russia fires twice as many ballistic missiles a month.
Washington has historically underestimated how long military commitments can last, straining its arsenal. The 2003 Iraq war was expected to produce a rapid victory, yet the US military commitment lasted far longer.
Just 11 days into the 2003 Iraq war, US forces were running critically low on some key weapons, having fired 700 of 1,200 Tomahawk cruise missiles and thousands of satellite-guided bombs. The Pentagon rushed to replenish stocks, but production couldn’t keep pace with wartime consumption.
Trump is doubling down on the same mistake, pursuing a swift, decisive victory while promising to end America’s past “forever wars.” He initially said the Iran war would last just a few weeks, but it is now in its eighth month.
Washington cannot claim it was blindsided. Although not in the specific context of interceptors, it had been warned about a lagging defense industrial base and inadequate munitions stocks since at least January 2023, with warnings that the US could not afford to wait until war began to address replenishment.
The Pentagon only moved earlier this year to expand production of PAC-3 and THAAD interceptors. Plainly, the US does not need to know exactly how long a war will last before deciding to act.
But the unexpectedly prolonged conflict’s impact on stockpiles, and the long time needed to rebuild them, is undermining US deterrence in other theaters and making Washington a less potent and reliable ally worldwide.
Azhar Azam is a geopolitical analyst with a focus on economy, climate change and international security. His work has been published in several global media outlets including Al Jazeera, Cambridge MENAF/Manara Magazine, Eurasia Review, South China Morning Post, Asia Times and Express Tribune.
Sleep with the Zionist dogs. Wake up and get fleas.
Suddenly you are critically low on weapons when your main strategy is pounding sand and playing whack a mole