US-Saudi F-35 fighter deal runs into a China-sized problem

A potential multi-billion-dollar transfer of advanced US stealth fighters to Saudi Arabia has thrust US Middle East policy into a delicate balancing act between regional deterrence, Israeli air superiority and rising geopolitical skepticism.

The US State Department approved a potential US$24.3 billion Foreign Military Sale (FMS) of 48 Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II fighter jets to Saudi Arabia, issuing a formal Congressional notification for a landmark transaction intended to bolster Saudi Arabia’s deterrence against recurring Iranian drone attacks and heightened combat with Yemen’s Houthi forces, multiple media outlets reported.

This possible transfer follows a November 2025 US-Saudi strategic defense pact that authorizes the latter to acquire F-35 stealth fighter jets directly from US manufacturers.

Under the proposed defense package, Saudi Arabia would acquire 48 conventional takeoff and landing stealth aircraft, 49 Pratt & Whitney F135 engines, precision navigation components, cryptographic devices and comprehensive logistical and weapons support to modernize its frontline air fleet.

While the Trump administration contends the procurement will reinforce partner interoperability without altering the Middle East’s regional balance of power, the initiative has faced immediate pushback from US legislators.

Skeptical US lawmakers warned that Saudi Arabia’s commercial and defense ties with China could expose sensitive US stealth aviation technology to Chinese intelligence exploitation, echoing past disputes that stalled similar arms proposals to the United Arab Emirates.

The transfer additionally tests the US’s statutory commitment to preserve Israel’s qualitative military edge, given Israel’s status as the region’s sole F-35 operator. US Congress now holds authority to review the agreement before prime defense contractors can negotiate final procurement contracts.

If the US F-35 sale to Saudi Arabia pushes through, it may enable the latter to operate more effectively in heavily defended airspace over Iran and Yemen, operational areas wherein older 4th-generation fighters such as F-15s were shot down.

Notable F-15 losses during the Iran war include the first US F-15 combat loss in April 2026 and a claimed Houthi shootdown of a Saudi Arabian F-15 over Yemen this month.

In an October 2025 Business Insider article, Royal Air Force (RAF) Director of Capabilities and Programs Air Vice Marshal James Beck stated that 5th-generation stealth fighters are now the baseline minimum and the entry requirement for any effort to control the skies against basic threats temporarily.

As The War Zone (TWZ) pointed out in April 2025, an eclectic mix of radar-guided surface-to-air missiles, repurposed air-to-air infrared-guided missiles, and loitering munitions pose serious threats through mobile “shoot-and-scoot” tactics paired with passive infrared seekers and electro-optical targeting that produce no telltale radar emissions before launch.

But even 5th-generation fighters such as the F-35 may not be invulnerable to such threats. In March 2026, a US F-35 was damaged by Iranian anti-aircraft fire, forcing it to make an emergency landing at an undisclosed US base.

To address the strategic balance, the US must also navigate statutory requirements. While the US sale of F-35s to Saudi Arabia may undermine Israel’s assured qualitative military superiority, Reuters reported in November 2025 that the aircraft supplied to Saudi Arabia will lack the advanced features of Israeli units.

Reuters says that Israel has special authorization to modify its F-35 aircraft, including integrating its own weapons and equipping them with radar-jamming systems.

In addition to those permissions, the report states the US is unlikely to sell Saudi Arabia advanced weapons such as the AIM-260 Joint Advanced Tactical Missile (JATM), which would likely be sold to Israel. Also, it states that the US may equip Saudi Arabia’s F-35s with an inferior software suite to keep them qualitatively behind those of Israel.

Simultaneously, technology security concerns remain paramount on Capitol Hill. As for China obtaining sensitive F-35 data via Saudi Arabia, Defense Security Asia notes in a November 2025 article that the close defense ties between the two countries, spanning ballistic missiles, drones and military cooperation with Pakistan as a proxy for the former, increase the risk of data leakage.

The report notes that China could access sensitive F-35 data through shared workshops, integrated production lines, or via Pakistani engineers rotated through Saudi Arabia’s facilities.

However, the question remains whether Saudi Arabia actually needs the F-35. John Ferrari and Dillon Prochniki mention in an April 2026 War on the Rocks article that while the F-35 performed brilliantly during short, pre-planned strikes against Iran, relying predominantly on the platform creates a brittle force unsuited for a protracted conflict.

Ferrari and Prochniki point out that the F-35’s heavy ground footprint, reliance on vulnerable forward bases, fragile aerial refueling requirements, and low mission-capable rates make it exceptionally difficult to sustain under sustained missile salvos.

They add that the F-35’s US$ 80 million-per-plane cost and low annual production ceilings mean combat losses cannot be easily replaced, necessitating an urgent pivot toward cheaper, attritable uncrewed systems. Still, the US sale of F-35s to Saudi Arabia may be driven more by political than by military considerations.

Authors such as Vali Nasr, in a September 2026 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) article, and Marc Lynch, in an August 2026 Foreign Affairs article, note that Gulf monarchies may have lost confidence in the US security umbrella, as Iranian strikes exposed the limits of US primacy and destroyed its basing architecture, leaving installations viewed as existential liabilities rather than defensive assets.

Furthermore, Azeema Cheema and Mohanad Hage Ali mention in an August 2026 Diwan article that Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, recognizing a deepening regional security vacuum, formed an autonomous defense pact – the Mecca Agreement – replacing traditional reliance on an unraveling US umbrella with collective deterrence and expanding indigenous military-industrial cooperation.

Amid that rupture with the US, the US decision to approve F-35 sales to Saudi Arabia may aim to ensure strategic alignment and secure obedience. While Saudi Arabia might gain access to cutting-edge fighter technology if it proceeds with its F-35 purchase, the US could quickly neutralize foreign-operated F-35s by cutting off access to proprietary sustainment and digital ecosystems.

Because the F-35 relies heavily on centralized US supply chains and contractor-operated maintenance for sealed critical components, fleets deprived of spare parts quickly face severe cannibalization and grounding.

Cutting an operator off from the centralized ALIS/ODIN cloud networks, which generate vital, US-compiled Mission Data Files for threat emitter routing and survivability, and from US satellite communications renders surviving airframes functionally degraded and highly vulnerable.

Ultimately, whether this multi-billion-dollar transaction materializes into a durable instrument of US leverage or accelerates Saudi Arabia’s sovereign pivot toward autonomous regional alliances will be pivotal in shaping the Middle East’s future security architecture.