When China’s Defense Minister Admiral Dong Jun visited Jakarta on August 21, he and Indonesia’s Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin agreed to deepen military cooperation.
At a joint press conference, Dong said Indonesia and China would work together against the “malicious intentions” of foreign powers. The two countries also agreed to expand defense cooperation.
The statement sounds straightforward. Two countries are working together to protect themselves from outside threats. But one word deserves closer attention: foreign. What exactly does it mean, and who decides?
The question matters because Indonesia is building relationships with both China and the United States. China increasingly sees Washington and its allies as trying to contain its rise.
Beijing often describes such pressure as interference by foreign forces. But Jakarta is not treating Washington as an enemy. Indonesia is strengthening its relationship with the US while also deepening ties with China.
In February, Indonesia and the United States signed the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade. Under the agreement, Indonesia made major commitments to open its market to US goods and reduce trade barriers.
The Indonesian government presented the deal as necessary to protect exports and jobs from US tariffs. Critics, however, argued that Indonesia had made significant concessions and that the agreement could reduce Jakarta’s room to make its own economic policies.
This creates an obvious question. If China is talking about resisting foreign powers and the United States is the implied target, where does Indonesia stand? Jakarta is cooperating with Beijing while also making important economic agreements with Washington. If the US is not the “foreign power” being discussed, then who is?
The problem becomes more complicated when we look at Indonesia’s domestic politics.
President Prabowo Subianto has repeatedly used the term “antek asing,” generally understood as a foreign agent, foreign puppet or someone serving foreign interests. Amnesty International reported in 2026 that Indonesian activists, journalists and civil society groups had been targeted by campaigns accusing them of being foreign agents.
Here, the meaning of “foreign” becomes politically important. A government has every right to investigate genuine foreign interference. Foreign governments can attempt to influence politics in other countries, and Indonesia has a legitimate interest in protecting its sovereignty.
But foreign influence, foreign interference and foreign control are not automatically the same thing. An Indonesian journalist can speak to foreign media without being a foreign agent.
An activist can work with an international organization without taking orders from another government. A student protest can receive international attention without being controlled from abroad.
This is why the phrase “antek asing” deserves scrutiny. The question should not be whether foreign influence is possible. It should be whether there is evidence that a particular Indonesian is actually acting on behalf of a foreign power.
Otherwise, the word can change the political debate. Instead of asking whether a critic’s argument is correct, people are encouraged to ask whose interests the critic serves. The focus moves from the substance of criticism to the loyalty of the person making it.
China provides an important comparison, although Indonesia and China have very different political systems. China is a one-party state ruled by the Chinese Communist Party, and its government regularly uses the language of foreign interference and “foreign forces” when discussing threats to national security, sovereignty and political stability.
Indonesia remains an electoral democracy, with competing political parties, elections, a critical press and civil society organizations. There is no basis for saying that Indonesia and China are creating a joint authoritarian system simply because they are expanding defense cooperation.
The more interesting question is about political language. In China, “foreign forces” can refer to governments or organizations that Beijing considers a threat. In Indonesia, “asing” can also be used against Indonesian citizens who are accused of serving foreign interests.
The contexts are different, but the political question is similar: who gets to define who is foreign?
That question is particularly important because Indonesia has its own history. During Suharto’s New Order, political opponents were sometimes accused of serving foreign interests or helping outside powers destabilize Indonesia. Such accusations could make political opposition appear to be a security threat rather than a normal part of political life.
Prabowo’s use of “antek asing” does not prove that Indonesia is returning to the New Order. Nor does cooperation with China prove that Jakarta is adopting Beijing’s political system. But the combination should make Indonesians more careful about how the word “foreign” is used.
The danger is not cooperation with China. Indonesia has every right to work with Beijing. It also has every right to work with Washington, Tokyo, Canberra or anyone else. In fact, maintaining relationships with competing powers can be part of Indonesia’s effort to protect its independence.
The danger comes when “foreign” becomes too broad. If Beijing means the US, it should say so. If Jakarta means a particular foreign government or organization, it should name it. And if an Indonesian citizen is accused of serving foreign interests, the government should provide evidence of the connection.
Otherwise, “foreign” risks becoming a political label rather than a clear description. Indonesia should therefore ask a simple question whenever the word appears in official political language: foreign to whom? Which country? Which organization? What action? What evidence?
That question is not anti-China or anti-America. It is a question of political clarity. Indonesia can cooperate with China without becoming China. It can cooperate with the US without becoming America. But it should be careful not to let the language of geopolitical competition become a way of treating domestic criticism as foreign influence.
The real test of sovereignty is not simply whether Indonesia can resist foreign powers. It is whether Indonesians remain free to disagree with their own government without being accused of becoming foreign themselves.
Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat is director of the China-Indonesia and MENA-Indonesia desks at the Center of Economic and Law Studies (CELIOS), a Jakarta-based think tank.
