Bangladesh’s J-10CE fighter plan stirs China dependence fears

Bangladesh’s planned J-10CE purchase could significantly strengthen its airpower while tying that capability more closely to Chinese weapons, support networks and supply chains.

This month, multiple media outlets reported that Bangladesh is moving toward one of its largest defense procurements in years, preparing to buy Chinese J-10CE fighter jets as part of an air force modernization drive that would deepen its ties with China, its biggest arms supplier.

A draft proposal has been sent to Bangladesh’s Finance Ministry and Armed Forces Division for final approval, with the package also covering attack helicopters, VIP transport helicopters and unmanned aerial systems; procurement could begin in the current fiscal year if funding is allocated or roll into the next budget cycle.

Bangladesh is considering 20 to 24 aircraft, with the cost rising from a base of US$62.7 million per jet to nearly $115 million once training, logistics, infrastructure and related expenses are included.

The J-10CE’s reported performance may have influenced Bangladesh’s choice in the May 2025 India-Pakistan conflict, when Pakistan said the aircraft helped shoot down Indian fighters, including Rafales, claims that remain disputed. Pakistan is the sole confirmed foreign operator of the export type.

Bangladesh’s prospective J-10CE acquisition would therefore do more than modernize its fighter fleet: realizing the aircraft’s full potential could pull the country deeper into China’s combat ecosystem, narrowing its tactical gap with India while increasing long-term operational dependence on Chinese support.

Previously, Asia Times reported that Bangladesh is planning to acquire China-Pakistan JF-17 Thunder Block III fighters to modernize its aging fleet of F-7s and MiG-29s, equipping them with beyond-visual-range missiles and advanced avionics.

The J-10 and JF-17 would occupy complementary roles. The heavier J-10 emphasizes air superiority, advanced radar and greater aerodynamic performance, while the lighter JF-17 offers a cheaper, easier-to-maintain multirole platform.

Together, they could give Bangladesh a high-low fighter mix, with J-10s assigned to more demanding air-superiority missions and JF-17s handling routine combat air patrol and strike duties.

Chinese fighters are a logical modernization option given their comparatively low cost, Bangladesh’s decades of experience operating Chinese equipment and established procurement ties with China.

Pakistan’s reported J-10CE performance against India in May 2025 may have depended as much on the wider combat network supporting the fighters as on the aircraft themselves. Pakistan operated the jets within a broader Chinese-origin ecosystem, meaning acquiring the J-10CE alone may not reproduce the capabilities demonstrated during the clashes.

During the clashes, Pakistan’s Chinese-made ground-based air defenses reportedly targeted Indian aircraft, while Pakistan’s China-made fighters launched missiles guided by a Chinese-origin airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft.

Dependence on that ecosystem also exposes buyers to platform reliability and supply-chain risks. For instance, JF-17 fighters supplied to Myanmar have reportedly suffered structural and technical issues, with the airframes vulnerable to damage during high-G maneuvers.

Additional alleged defects include maintenance and accuracy issues with the JF-17’s KLJ-7 Al radar and malfunctions in the aircraft’s weapon mission management computer, which hinder the type’s beyond-visual-range combat capability.

The JF-17s in Myanmar’s service also suffer from a lack of spare parts because Western sanctions on Myanmar have prevented Myanmar from obtaining the Western avionics and electronics installed in the type.

Over the past 20 years, China has provided Bangladesh with ships, fighter aircraft, tanks, and missile systems, accounting for 70% of the country’s arms purchases. But the strategic significance of those sales extends beyond the weapons themselves to the support architecture required to keep them operational.

High-end weapons systems depend on ongoing spare parts, maintenance, software updates, training, and access to suppliers over many years. These dependencies establish channels of influence for China that extend well beyond the initial transaction, aligning clients’ foreign policy, defense, and economic interests more closely with China’s own.

While these procurements cannot overturn India’s regional air superiority of 29 fighter squadrons, they significantly narrow Bangladesh’s tactical capability gap and bolster airspace patrolling.

Crucially, they complicate Indian defense planning in the vicinity of the vulnerable Siliguri Corridor, a roughly 20-kilometer-wide land corridor linking India’s northeastern states to the rest of the country. India may consequently have to devote greater planning attention and some additional resources to its eastern approaches, particularly during wider regional contingencies.

While India and Bangladesh have no active territorial disputes, relations have deteriorated since the August 2024 ouster of former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, whose close relationship with India became a source of resentment among some of her domestic opponents.

India has also strengthened its military posture around the Siliguri Corridor amid longstanding concerns about the vulnerability of the narrow land bridge linking the country’s northeast to the rest of the country.

China’s proximity via the Chumbi Valley already makes the corridor a sensitive planning problem and raises security concerns in Bangladesh, where nearby deployments may be seen as increasing Indian military pressure along the country’s northern frontier amid tense bilateral relations.

China may have found greater room to expand ties after Hasina’s ouster as Bangladesh sought more distance from India. For Bangladesh, closer relations with China offer another means of balancing Indian influence; for India, the same shift adds a Chinese dimension to an already sensitive eastern flank.

For Bangladesh, using China to offset perceived Indian dominance risks replacing one strategic constraint with another. While ending its longstanding dependence on Chinese arms is not feasible, Bangladesh could engage with alternative defense partners to reduce its heavy reliance on China.

For instance, Bangladesh has improved its defense relations with Turkey, with the two sides agreeing to hold annual 2+2 consultations between their foreign and defense ministers to elevate transactional military purchases to higher-level strategic dialogue. Aside from Turkey, Bangladesh has also signed an agreement with Japan facilitating the transfer of defense equipment.

Bangladesh’s fighter modernization could therefore expand its military options only up to the point at which deeper Chinese interoperability begins to constrain the strategic autonomy those capabilities are meant to preserve.