Myanmar junta leader Min Aung Hlaing has a legitimacy problem. Photo: Asia Times Files / AFP / Sefa Karacan / Anadolu Agency

In the span of 12 days, two councils were formed claiming to lead Myanmar toward peace and unity. They could not be more different — and the contrast between them is the clearest argument yet for why Washington and the international community must stop hedging and start acting.

On March 30, the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union known as the SCEF, was established by the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), Karen National Union (KNU), Karen National Progressive Party (KNPP), Chin National Front (CNF) and National Unity Government (NUG).

It adopted six codified political objectives, including abrogating the 2008 Constitution, placing all armed forces under civilian command, and establishing transitional justice mechanisms. Its three-pillar structure — states and ethnic revolutionary organizations, the people’s movement, and women — institutionalizes inclusion rather than leaving it to goodwill.

NUG Acting President Duwa Lashi La called it “a milestone of the Spring Revolution.”

On April 11, coup-maker Senior General Min Aung Hlaing signed Order No. 36/2026 creating the National Unity and Peacemaking Central Committee — the NSPCC — and named himself chairman. Of its 15 members, nine are individually sanctioned by the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, or Switzerland.

The chairman himself is sanctioned by all six and faces a warrant—filed in November 2024 and still unissued after 16 months.

One council was built from below, by the organizations that control or contest roughly 79% of Myanmar’s territory. The other was decreed from above by a man who cannot transit countries with ICC cooperation agreements and staffed with generals who cannot travel to the nations with which they are supposed to negotiate.

The day before forming his peace committee, Min Aung Hlaing delivered an 18-minute inauguration address to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw national-level bicameral legislature. Every major claim in it was false.

He repeated the allegation that Myanmar’s 2020 election was marred by fraud. The Asian Network for Free Elections, which deployed observers to 430 polling stations, found election day “peaceful and orderly.” The Carter Center assessed voting conduct positively in 94% of stations. Human Rights Watch called the military’s fraud allegation “unfounded.”

Min Aung Hlaing also declared the coup constitutional. However, the International Commission of Jurists documented at least four violations of Article 417: the president was arrested before any emergency declaration; electoral fraud does not constitute the armed seizure of sovereignty the provision contemplates; the civilian members of the National Defense and Security Council were detained; and parliament was physically prevented from convening.

He went on to proclaim the 2026 election “free, fair, and dignified.” Yet the National League for Democracy (NLD) — which won 82% of contested seats in 2020 — has been dissolved by force and did not contest. Parties holding more than 90% of 2020 seats were excluded.

The Election Protection Law criminalized criticism of the 2026 election, held in phases in December 2025 and January 2026, with penalties including death. A joint ANFREL/SAC-M report found voting occurred in only 265 of 330 townships — just 42% of Myanmar’s territory.

The EU called the elections “not free, fair, inclusive, or credible.” Even the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), notorious for its “non-interference” in its members’ internal affairs, did not recognize the polls.

Min Aung Hlaing pledged economic development. Yet, since his coup, gross domestic product (GDP) has fallen 13% below pre-pandemic levels. The kyat, the local currency, has collapsed 240%. Poverty has doubled to nearly 50%. Myanmar, meanwhile, has been blacklisted by the Financial Action Task Force for failing to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

What the general’s speech did not mention was 22,818 political prisoners6,764 civilians killed1,022 airstrikes on civilian targets3.58 million people displaced and 630,000 Rohingya classified as Stage 9: Extermination by Genocide Watch. Nor did he mention the ICC warrant hanging over his head.

This is the man who, the next morning, appointed himself chairman of a peace committee.

Sanctions roster with a letterhead

The NSPCC is not an anomaly. It is the culmination of a pattern visible across everybody Min Aung Hlaing has assembled since taking the oath. Of his cabinet, 13 of 30 Union Ministers, or 43%, are individually sanctioned. Four more face bloc-level restrictions, bringing total sanctions exposure to 57%.

His Union Consultative Council, announced on inauguration day, has six of 11 members individually sanctioned, or 55%. Officials ostensibly removed from the cabinet were simply repositioned. Nine of 15 NSPCC members, or 60% of the body, are individually sanctioned.

Each successive body concentrates more sanctioned figures than the last. The regime’s peace committee has the highest sanctions saturation of any institution Min Aung Hlaing has created.

Its vice-chairman is sanctioned by the EU and Canada. Its members include the new commander-in-chief, General Ye Win Oo, is sanctioned by five governments, and two ministers sanctioned by six governments each.

The NSPCC’s operational absurdity speaks for itself. Nine of its 15 members cannot travel to the EU, UK, Canada, Australia or Switzerland without risking asset freezes. The chairman cannot transit through countries with ICC cooperation agreements.

The committee cannot credibly interface with any Western-aligned mediator, any international peace mechanism or any donor government that enforces its own sanctions. The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement it is presumably meant to revive has been called a “scrap of paper” by six of its own signatories. The Transnational Institute assessed it “to most intents and purposes, defunct.”

The alternative exists

The junta has spent millions to convince Washington otherwise. US Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) filings show the DCI Group holds a US$3 million annual contract with Myanmar’s Ministry of Information.

A propaganda website — MyanmarDemocracyNow.com — appeared within hours of the April 3 election, describing it as a “peaceful transition of power.” Its footer carries the mandatory FARA disclosure.

The SCEF is precisely the credible, inclusive, federal opposition that skeptics have long demanded. It unites the major ethnic armed organizations with the NUG under a shared constitutional vision.

Its six objectives are codified and unambiguous. It represents the populations and territories the junta does not control — which, by the military’s own election data, is most of the country.

The BRAVE Burma Act passed the US House of Representatives unanimously and has been introduced in the US Senate with bipartisan sponsorship from senators Van Hollen, Young, McConnell, and Merkley.

The US Commission on Interreligious Freedom (USCIRF) has recommended Congress ban Countries of Particular Concern from hiring US lobbyists. Courts in Indonesia, Argentina and Timor-Leste have accepted or initiated genocide proceedings against Myanmar.

When Vietnam’s National Assembly elected To Lam as President on April 7, the US State Department sent congratulations the same day. When Min Aung Hlaing took his oath three days later, Washington sent nothing.

Japan — which halted all new official development aid after Myanmar’s 2020 coup — sent nothing. ASEAN did not recognize the inauguration; the Philippines has made clear Min Aung Hlaing will not receive political representation at the bloc’s May summit.

The question is no longer whether an alternative to the generals exists. Rather, it is whether Washington will recognize it before the paid lobbying machine succeeds in normalizing a regime that responds to international pressure not by reforming but by repackaging the same sanctioned officials into new institutional forms — each with a higher concentration of sanctioned individuals than the last.

James Shwe is a Myanmar American professional engineer and advocate for democracy in Myanmar who is affiliated with the Los Angeles Myanmar Movement.

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