The visit of Cheng Li-wun, chairwoman of the Kuomintang (KMT), Taiwan’s largest opposition party, to the People’s Republic of China arguably marked a historic moment in cross-strait relations. It was the first such visit by a KMT chair in a decade, and the meeting between Cheng and Chinese President Xi Jinping suggested a potential diplomatic thaw.
China also announced 10 incentive measures for Taiwan, including resuming tourist visits from Shanghai and Fujian Province to Taiwan, allowing Taiwanese television dramas to air on the mainland and facilitating food exports.
This diplomatic overture, however, is not driven by any domestic impulse toward reconciliation or reunification. Rather, it is a direct response to Washington’s growing indifference toward its Indo-Pacific allies.
Since his return to the Oval Office, US President Donald Trump has scaled back his reliance on the Quad as the primary security framework for constraining China in the Indo-Pacific.
Instead, Trump has prioritized weaponized interdependence in trade, technology, and advanced semiconductors as the means to counter China’s technological and industrial rise. This approach is evident in his preference for tariffs as a tool to economically coerce China — a strategy that has so far yielded limited results.
This American disengagement from its Indo-Pacific allies became most visible during the US-Israeli military campaign against Iran. The US relocated its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system from the Korean Peninsula to the Middle East to replenish lost batteries and interceptors. It also deployed thousands of marines and the USS Tripoli — an amphibious assault ship previously based in Japan — to the region.
This diversion of forces exacerbates the security concerns of American allies in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. A weakening US security umbrella means these allies can no longer take American security assurances for granted.
The fragility of American extended deterrence was further exposed when the US conspicuously failed to shield its Gulf allies from Iranian drone and missile strikes. Trump’s strategic priorities are compelling his Indo-Pacific allies to reorient their strategic direction and reduce tensions with China, increasingly aware that Washington may leave them without meaningful support.
This growing unreliability of American extended deterrence is palpably driving a Taiwanese strategic recalibration. Taiwanese politicians are becoming wary of American reassurances and increasingly view Taiwan as being cast in the role of the Indo-Pacific’s Ukraine — a recipient of weapons rather than a partner in a coherent strategy.
The US continues to supply billions of dollars’ worth of arms, sustaining its military-industrial complex while deepening the rift between Taiwan and the PRC.
The post-Covid divergences between Taiwan and the PRC were widened by deliberate choices in American foreign policy. The visit of then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan in August 2022 gravely aggravated Chinese security concerns and set back cross-strait relations significantly.
In December 2024, the Biden administration announced $571 million in military assistance to Taiwan, followed by the Trump administration’s approval of an $11 billion arms package in December 2025.
Such armament alone will not save Taiwan in the event of armed conflict; it will, however, guarantee massive casualties and destruction. Taiwan’s leaders are recognizing that, much as in Ukraine, American policymakers may eventually move on, leaving Taiwan to face China largely alone.
Trump’s overt indifference toward his Indo-Pacific partners — Taiwan above all — is eroding the credibility of the American security umbrella. The KMT chair’s visit to the PRC demonstrates that Taiwan recognizes the shifting global landscape and no longer wishes to serve as a pawn of American interests.
Taiwan’s rapprochement with the PRC is more than hedging; it reflects a shift in regional alignments and an exercise in adaptive realism. It is not merely political convergence but a strategic necessity — a move to step out from under the illusion of American security guarantees.
The KMT has historically championed Taiwan’s separate identity and, for decades, resisted the idea of reunification with mainland China. The recent overture signals a shift in the KMT leadership’s thinking — one that now prioritizes calculated accommodation over US-backed confrontation.
Taiwan’s drift toward the PRC is likely to continue as long as American indifference persists, raising the prospect of a historic improvement in cross-strait relations should the KMT ever return to power.
Hamza Zaman is an Assistant research associate at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Pakistan. He holds an M.Phil. degree in international relations from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.