India’s response to the unfolding crisis in the Strait of Hormuz has, so far, been restrained. That restraint was not accidental but reflected a conscious adherence to strategic autonomy at a time when the situation was still evolving, outcomes were uncertain, and premature alignment carried significant risks.
For weeks, New Delhi chose to stay engaged but unobtrusive, maintaining contact with all sides, avoiding public positioning and focusing on safeguarding core interests. Critics saw this as passivity. In reality, it was a calibrated response to a fluid and unpredictable geopolitical environment.
That phase may now be coming to an end. With the effective disruption of the Strait of Hormuz, the crisis has moved from a distant strategic concern to an immediate economic threat for India. What was once a contingency is now a live disruption. Shipping has slowed sharply, insurance costs have surged and global energy markets are under visible stress.
Both Iran and the United States share the responsibility for creating such a situation. Iran has sought to leverage the chokepoint by restricting access and raising transit costs. The US, through its military response and counter-measures, has contributed to an escalatory cycle that has made normal passage increasingly untenable.
The result is a virtual blockade environment, one that imposes costs not just on adversaries but holds the global economy to ransom.
Iran cannot simultaneously invoke civilizational bonds with India and contribute to a disruption that directly threatens India’s energy security. If those ties are meaningful, they must be reflected not in rhetoric, but in ensuring that countries like India are not collateral damage in a larger strategic contest.
What makes the crisis more complex is that it is no longer confined to regional geopolitics. With the US actively targeting Iranian oil flows, knowing well that 80% of which is absorbed by China, the disruption in Hormuz is increasingly entangled with great-power competition.
Between Iran’s chokepoint leverage and America’s economic squeeze, global energy markets are being pulled into a broader strategic contest. For countries like India, the implications are immediate, severe and real.
A substantial portion of India’s energy imports flows through Hormuz. Any sustained disruption translates directly into higher fuel prices, inflationary pressure, currency stress, and broader macroeconomic instability. Unlike the US, which, as a major energy producer, can absorb part of the shock, India faces the consequences far more directly.
This raises an unavoidable question: has India’s threshold for action been breached now? And if so, what can and should it do?
The answer is, at best, nuanced. India has certainly crossed the threshold of economic pain, but crossing the threshold for strategic intervention is a different matter.
Acting too early risks entanglement in a volatile conflict shaped by the unpredictable leaderships of the US and Iran, shifting objectives and, increasingly, great-power rivalry. On the other hand, acting too late risks economic damage that becomes progressively harder to manage.
The challenge for New Delhi, therefore, is not whether to act, but how to act without abandoning the very principle that has guided its foreign policy. Strategic autonomy does not mean inaction. It means retaining the ability to choose one’s level and mode of engagement. The task now is to translate that autonomy into targeted, interest-driven action.
The first priority must remain energy security. India will need to aggressively diversify sourcing, draw upon strategic reserves and negotiate alternative supply arrangements, even at higher cost. This is not a matter of diplomacy, but of economic necessity.
The second priority is maritime security. Without crossing into overt alignment, India can expand its naval presence in the Arabian Sea, enhance escort mechanisms for Indian shipping and coordinate quietly with other navies to ensure safe passage.
The third domain is calibrated diplomacy. This is not the moment for grand mediation. The risks of failure are too high, and the behavior of the principal actors and their endgames are too unpredictable.
Instead, India can focus on narrower, issue-based engagement: pushing for limited maritime de-escalation, advocating safe shipping corridors and using back-channel diplomacy to secure assurances where possible.
There is also space for a more proactive, if unconventional, role. India could explore a limited, multilateral maritime safety mechanism focused exclusively on commercial shipping through Hormuz.
France has begun spearheading a multilateral effort to secure commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and has reportedly invited India to participate.
What India should avoid is the temptation to respond to optics. Pakistan’s recent diplomatic visibility, while notable, does not alter the underlying balance of influence. Nor does it justify a shift toward high-visibility, high-risk engagement.
In a crisis of this nature, the ability to manage exposure matters more than the ability to command attention.
Raghu Gururaj is a retired Indian ambassador and former foreign service officer.
India will not come out well. It hasn’t behaved in a friendly manner with Iran. When the US blew up Iranian boat with trainee sailors, India did not express sympathy. Now Russia is not giving discounts when selling oil to India. India is showing its true colours- it’s more with the West. China, Russia and Iran will take note.