No other foreign nation maintains a larger military presence in Taiwan than Singapore. Approximately 3,000 Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) personnel are rotationally stationed on the island each year under Project Starlight, a bilateral defense agreement signed in 1975 between the two sies.
While rarely acknowledged by Singaporean officials, Project Starlight holds significant operational importance for the city-state and forms the crux of Singapore’s delicate cross-Strait policy.
Historically, Beijing has maintained silence on this unofficial defense relationship. Yet this was abandoned after the seizure of a dozen Terrex infantry carrier vehicles (ICVs) in 2016, which made mainland China’s dismay at such military cooperation clear.
Additionally, Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s anti-China rhetoric has led to further deterioration in cross-Strait relations, evidenced by the fact that aerospace incursions by Chinese warplanes reaching record levels, with over 2,000 sorties during the first 10 months of Lai’s administration.
If Singapore seeks to avoid the “disaster scenario” of choosing sides in a Taiwan conflict, it must confront and safeguard itself from the perils facing Singapore should China launch a surprise invasion what it sees as a “renegade province.”
Thousands of Singapore Armed Forces troops risk becoming bargaining chips if evacuation is blocked. Meanwhile, a US 7th Fleet intervention would likely call for Singapore’s logistical support, which in turn would almost inevitably draw People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strikes on the city-state.
Moreover, a Chinese blockade would disrupt as much as one-fifth of global maritime trade through the Taiwan Strait and severely cripple Singapore’s port traffic. To prevent such entrapment, Singapore must leverage its military ties with Taiwan in cross-Strait discussions help de-escalate China-Taiwan relations.
Retaining the stance of an idle observer only leaves the possibility of war on an upward trajectory and the island-nation even more vulnerable to devastation.
Singapore’s trump card
Project Starlight stands as a critical element in Singapore-Taiwan defense relations, offering a robust deterrent against sudden acts of aggression from the mainland — even if it does not match security assurances provided by the America’s Taiwan Relations Act.
A surprise invasion would risk jeopardizing Chinese relations with Singapore. That’s critical because the city-state is China’s largest cumulative source of foreign direct investment and a key financial center for Chinese businesses looking to establish international offices for expansion.
Any attack on Singaporean installations or personnel in Taiwan would give the US compelling justification to intervene, both to prevent unilateral Chinese reunification attempts and to shield a Major Security Cooperation Partner in Singapore — a nation that arguably shares the strongest defense relationship with the US in Southeast Asia.
Successive Taiwanese administrations have opted to continue leasing military facilities to the Singapore Armed Forces, and are likely aware of the deterrence factor accompanying its presence.
Singapore, too, has stood firmly behind its longstanding principle of cross-Strait engagement, sending troops to the island despite incentives and pressure from the mainland to abandon training programs.
However, such unyielding commitment to Project Starlight carries the risk of being perceived as unconditional. President Lai and the wider Democratic Progressive Party’s rhetoric on China cannot be ignored by Singapore if it seeks to minimize the risks borne by its soldiers amid tensions across the Strait.
The extent to which deteriorating ties between Beijing and Washington over trade will impact policy on the Taiwan Strait remains to be seen. Regardless, Lai’s unrelenting messaging has failed to pay dividends to the DPP.
The party lost its legislative majority in the 2024 general election, and its subsequent “great recall” campaign targeting 31 of 52 opposition KMT lawmakers—on grounds of alleged pro‑China leanings and obstruction of the DPP’s agenda—failed to unseat a single member of the Legislative Yuan.
Singapore’s transactional shift
Singapore needs to seize this moment of Taiwanese public uncertainty over Lai’s unaccomplished tenure, going farther than it did in 2004, when then incoming Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong visited the island. That visit only made clear the that city-state would not support Taiwanese independence and that peace in the Taiwan Strait was key to Singapore’s interests.
To truly secure Singapore’s regional interests, Taiwan’s government must be informed that further provocations will be treated as a threat to the safety of 3,000 Singaporean personnel across the island, and that withdrawal is not off the table as a consequence.
Negotiations should begin between Singapore and Taiwan over Lai’s pro-independence leanings – perhaps even at high levels similar to those in 2004 – to reflect Singapore’s serious commitment to stability in the Taiwan Strait.
The objective is clear: to cool cross-Strait tensions, Lai must adopt a more conciliatory tone toward China and abandon jingoistic and pro-independence rhetoric. For instance, his assertion that “Regardless of what name we choose to call our nation – the Republic of China; the Republic of China Taiwan, or Taiwan, we are an independent country” echoes messaging that alarmed Singapore even back in 2004.
Then-deputy premier Loong stated in his National Day Rally speech: “A move towards independence is not in Singapore’s interest. Neither is it in the region’s interest. If Taiwan goes for independence, Singapore will not recognize it. In fact, no Asian country is going to recognize it.”
Now as then, Singapore will not allow its soldiers to be caught in the crossfire of cross-Strait escalation and could continue at an increased pace its gradual defense exodus from Taiwan — where it once stationed 10,000 troops, a far cry from the current 3,000 — in favor of “safer” locations such as Brunei or Australia.
Assertiveness on this scale would be a novel characteristic in Singaporean foreign policy, but successful implementation would reap sizable rewards, steering away from conflict over Taiwan while protecting Singapore’s own interests.
Remaining neutral in rhetoric while thousands of Singapore Armed Forces soldiers face growing danger is no longer a viable strategy when inaction itself carries existential risk.
currently serving in the Singapore Armed Forces