America’s Venezuelan adventure has limited impact on Asia

The US abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and plans to confiscate Venezuelan oil revenues have rightly stimulated discussion about the consequences for Asia. Some of the conclusions from this discussion, however, are flawed.

The US has historically portrayed itself as a benign great power that promotes global rules that are beneficial not only to itself but also to the world as a whole. The Maduro operation and Trump’s emphasis on acquiring Venezuelan oil is of course harming America’s reputation in the Global South, including some countries in Asia. China’s diplomatic and propaganda arms are helping to make sure of that.

There is a danger of harm to America’s relationships with its liberal alliance partners as well. This, however, is more of an issue in Western Europe than in Asia. The Korean and Japanese governments are showing no signs that they will break from Washington over the Venezuela intervention. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi avoided direct criticism of the US over the incident, and other Japanese senior officials seemed mostly worried that it might weaken the international response against possible Chinese aggression in Asia.

Although led by the relatively liberal Democratic Party of Korea, and although many progressive Korean politicians were highly critical of Washington, South Korea’s government issued a neutral statement in which it “calls on all relevant stakeholders to make efforts to reduce tensions in the region.”

No sphere for you

The Venezuela intervention might appear to confirm a new US grand strategy of focusing on the Western Hemisphere and letting nature take its course in Europe and Asia. That would be excellent news for Moscow and Beijing, and would more than compensate for losing Venezuela as a client state and South American beachhead. 

But while the Venezuela operation confirms that the Trump Administration wants to strengthen US influence in the Western Hemisphere, it doesn’t necessarily indicate total victory of the “restrainers” (who want minimal US military involvement outside the hemisphere) over the “prioritizers” (who want to confront Chinese expansionism).

The recently published National Security Strategy says the US is still committed to preventing Chinese domination of Asia. It’s a step back from the objective of maintaining US hegemony, but not the total withdrawal Beijing wants to see.

The US and China each claims entitlement to a sphere of influence while refusing to accept the other’s claimed sphere of influence. In 2014 Xi Jinping famously said, “It is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia, and uphold the security of Asia.” US alliances, military bases, and security cooperation in China’s neighborhood are an affront to that vision.

Conversely, China is seeking naval bases among the Pacific island states, recently surprised Australia with military exercises in the Tasman Sea – and, until now, had a strong economic and political relationship with the Venezuelan government in America’s backyard. 

No green light

Many analysts argue that the abduction of Maduro and his wife was a violation of international law. It follows, arguably, that this act by the world’s most influential country, historically a major proponent of a “rules based” international order, gives a green light to countries such as Russia and China to flout global rules and norms in pursuit of their own interests. If so, Taiwan might be in even greater danger than before.

This argument overlooks the historical fact that Washington’s behavior in this case does not set a new precedent. The US carried out multiple military interventions in Central and South America during the previous century.

Moreover, this argument relies on the assumption that, prior to the snatching of Maduro, Russia and China were at least partly restrained from taking aggressive actions by international law. If there was any truth in that assumption, it’s difficult to see. 

Russia invaded Ukraine, a sovereign state, in 2022, and since then has murdered civilians, mistreated prisoners of war and kidnapped Ukrainian children. 

A court authorized by the United Nations specifically disavowed China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea in 2016 based on principles laid out in an international treaty to which Beijing is a signatory. The Chinese government rejected the court’s decision on the grounds that China’s claims supersede international law. Instead, Beijing has pushed its invalidated claims by ramming, looting, and water-cannoning the vessels of other claimants.

Any restraint exercised by China seems the result of Beijing’s desire to avoid alienating all of the Southeast Asian governments and provoking direct military intervention by the US.

China’s imposition of a National Security Law in Hong Kong in 2020 violated the 1984 Sino-British joint declaration, an international treaty registered with the United Nations. Beijing promised to maintain Hong Kong’s political system after the 1997 handover. Instead, China has dismantled civil liberties in Hong Kong, highlighted by the December conviction of pro-democracy publisher Jimmy Lai.

The post-handover argument that China would keep its commitment because of concern for its international reputation has collapsed.

Similarly, while Beijing has used lawfare as a tactic to support its agenda (such as the campaign to sell the bogus idea that UN Resolution 2758 requires all UN member countries at accept that Taiwan is part of the PRC), international law has done little or nothing to restrain the PRC’s own policy toward Taiwan.

China continues to threaten force against Taiwan and to carry out military harassment, cyberattacks, destruction of infrastructure, and economic coercion. Furthermore, Beijing argues that any potential war between the PRC and Taiwan is a domestic Chinese issue, not governed by international law.

In short, Moscow and Beijing have been doing what they wanted without waiting for the US to de-legitimize the rules of gentlemanly behavior in international politics.    

But Venezuela move also doesn’t deter China

Some analysts believe Trump’s demonstrated willingness to take decisive action will intimidate China, deterring it from moving militarily against Taiwan.

Alas, this is probably incorrect. The Venezuela operation shows, as did the bombing of Iran in June 2025 and the missile strikes against Syria during his first term, that Trump is willing to take sharp but limited military action against weak opponents. A major war against China, however, would be a completely different matter.

Trump has repeatedly expressed reticence about sending US forces to defend Taiwan. On top of this, the Trump Administration hopes to achieve a bilateral trade deal with China in 2026, giving Washington an incentive to avoid antagonizing Beijing over Taiwan.

If America were so unwise as to wade into a military quagmire in Venezuela, China would substantially benefit. As of this writing, this cannot be ruled out even though such an action would disillusion Trump’s MAGA support base, which thinks the US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan were disastrous.

On January 3 Trump said, “We’re going to have presence in Venezuela as it pertains to oil.” He added: “We’re not afraid of boots on the ground.” Even if the Pentagon limited the initial job of US soldiers to providing security for oil production crews, there would be danger of mission creep in a country with well-armed criminal gangs, a military still loyal to Maduro and Chavez and general resentfulness toward US imperialism.

The US intervention in Somalia in 1992-93 serves as a sobering example. What started as a mission to guard the distribution of food supplies devolved into a battle that in one day killed 18 American troops and hundreds of Somali fighters.

A serious and prolonged US military effort in Venezuela or elsewhere in Latin America (Secretary of State Marco Rubio has mentioned Cuba) would divert US resources away from Asia. It would occupy administrative bandwidth, leaving less for other regions such as Asia.

Equally importantly, a conflict in the Western Hemisphere that reinforced American war weariness would reduce the chances of a US president deciding to intervene in a cross-Strait or South China Sea war. Thus a Venezuela war would undermine deterrence against China.

China is not more likely to take aggressive action in its own neighborhood because global rule-breaking looks trendy. PRC policy has its own regional logic. 

Grabbing Maduro and his country’s oil does not equal US acquiescence to a PRC sphere of influence in Asia. Neither, however, will it necessarily strengthen deterrence against Chinese adventurism. The impact of the Venezuelan intervention is limited; it is only one of several new aspects of US foreign policy to which the region is adjusting.

Denny Roy is a senior research fellow at the East-West Center, Honolulu.