Xi Jinping’s in a race against time to secure his legacy in China

The Chinese military parade that had the world talking last week was more than just pageantry. It was a declaration that Chinese leader Xi Jinping sees himself in a race against time to secure his place in history.

For Xi, who has just turned 72, unification with Taiwan is not just a policy aim; it is the crown jewel that would elevate him above Mao Zedong and cement his reputation as the greatest leader in modern Chinese history.

The timing and staging of the parade underscored this urgency, a showcase of power before an audience of foreign leaders and cameras at a high-stakes anniversary event in Beijing.

Mao, the founder of the People’s Republic of China, unified the country under Communist rule, but left it poor and isolated.

Xi’s mission is to finish the job by formally ending the Chinese civil war that pitted the Communists against the Nationalists and annexing the island of Taiwan to lock in his place in the party pantheon.

But waiting is dangerous. Inside the Chinese Communist Party, loyalty is transactional and rivals constantly watch for weaknesses.

In 2012, for example, Bo Xilai, a rising star and once-close ally of Xi’s, suffered a dramatic and very public downfall. The scandal could easily have consumed Xi, but he turned it into an opportunity, using Bo’s downfall to cement his own rise.

That episode remains a cautionary tale in Beijing’s elite politics: power must never falter; momentum must never slip.

More than a decade later, Xi has removed or sidelined nearly every rival and maneuvered himself into a third term. However, he still governs with the urgency of someone who knows how quickly fortunes can turn.

US catching up on hypersonic missiles

Abroad, the strategic equation is also changing.

For years, Beijing enjoyed a headstart in hypersonic weapons, anti-ship missiles and industrial production. China’s air and advanced missile defense systems have been designed to threaten US carrier strike groups and complicate allied operations across East and North Asia.

But Washington may soon close the gap. The Pentagon requested nearly US$7 billion (A$10.6 billion) in hypersonic missile program funding in the fiscal year 2024–25, while private firms are accelerating innovation in reusable missile testbeds and propulsion.

The US Navy is repurposing Zumwalt-class destroyers for its Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic system, giving the navy its first maritime platform capable of hypersonic strike. Sea-based demonstrations of the new system are planned as soon as the program matures.

Every step narrows China’s military advantage.

US shipbuilding looking for revival, too

The industrial rivalry between China and the US is a similar story.

China currently dominates global commercial shipbuilding, a dual-use foundation that also supports naval expansion.

A recent analysis found that one Chinese shipbuilder alone built more ships by tonnage in 2024 than the entire US industry has produced since the Second World War. Foreign ship orders are underwriting this building capacity, which can rapidly pivot to naval platforms.

This edge has continued in 2025. Xi is counting on this industrial base to give China an edge in a future conflict over Taiwan.

However, US and allied investments in shipbuilding are starting to respond.

The Trump administration has set up a White House office dedicated to fixing US shipbuilding, while the Pentagon has requested US$47 billion (A$71 billion) for Navy ship construction in its annual budget.

Japan and South Korea, both major shipbuilders, have also added significant resources to their shipbuilding capacity in an acknowledgement of the changing power structures in East and North Asia. US politicians recently visited both countries to secure greater assistance in boosting US building capacity, too.

China is also getting older

More urgent still is the demographic clock. China’s population shrank by about two million in 2023, the second straight annual decline, as births fell to nine million, half the 2017 level.

The working-age cohort is shrinking, while the number of people over 60 years old is expected to rise to roughly a third of China’s population by the mid-2030s. This will be a major drag on growth and strain on social systems.

Demography is not destiny, but it compresses timelines for leaders who want to lock in strategic gains.

America’s competitive advantage

There is a final, often overlooked problem. The most efficient political warfare system of the modern era is capitalism – the engine of competition that rewards adaptation and punishes failure.

The US still possesses a uniquely deep capacity for “creative destruction” – it constantly churns through firms and ideas that power long-term growth and reinvention.

That dynamism is messy, decentralized and often uncomfortable. However, it remains America’s strategic ace: It can retool industries, scale breakthrough technologies and absorb shocks faster than any centrally directed system.

China can imitate many things, but it cannot easily replicate that market-driven ecosystem of risk capital, failure tolerance and rapid reallocation.

All of this explains why Xi wants the world to believe China’s rise is unstoppable and unification with Taiwan is inevitable.

But inevitability is fragile. Beijing’s “win without fighting” approach, which involves grey-zone coercion, economic leverage and an incremental “salami-slicing” approach to territorial claims in the South China Sea, has worked because it relies on patience and subtlety. The more Xi accelerates, the more he risks miscalculation.

A forced attempt to seize Taiwan would be the most dangerous gamble of his rule. If the People’s Liberation Army were to falter, the consequences would be severe: strategic humiliation abroad, political turbulence at home and a punctured narrative of inevitability that sustains party authority.

Sun Tzu’s greatest victory is the one won without fighting, but only when time favors patience. For Xi Jinping, time is not on his side.

Ian Langford is the executive director of Security & Defence PLuS and a professor at UNSW Sydney.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.