SCO, BRICS will only gradually transform the global order

The recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Leaders’ Summit in Tianjin drew renewed attention to this organization, which began as a forum for settling border disputes between China and former Soviet Republics but has since evolved into a hybrid security-economic group.

Nearly two dozen leaders attended the latest event, including Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who made his first visit to China in seven years. Non-Western media hailed the summit as an inflection point in the global systemic transition to multipolarity.

While the SCO seems more invigorated than ever – thanks in part to the nascent Sino-Indo rapprochement inadvertently encouraged by the United States – and BRICS has become a household name globally, both organizations are likely to transform global governance only gradually, not abruptly as some expect.

For one, they comprise highly diverse members who can realistically agree only on broad areas of cooperation. Even then, agreements are strictly voluntary and carry no legal binding.

What unites SCO and BRICS countries – many of which now overlap in memberships and partnerships – is a shared goal of breaking the West’s de facto monopoly over global governance so that everything becomes fairer for the “World Majority.”

To that end, they seek to accelerate financial multipolarity via BRICS so as to gain the leverage needed to implement reforms, while the SCO focuses on preventing future domestic instability scenarios that could threaten these long-term objectives.

Nevertheless, the BRICS Bank continues to comply with the West’s anti-Russian sanctions, largely due to most members’ complex economic interdependence with the West. This also explains their reluctance to accelerate de-dollarization efforts.

As for the SCO, its intelligence-sharing mechanisms are limited to unconventional threats, namely terrorism, separatism and extremism, and are hamstrung largely by the India-Pakistan rivalry. Meanwhile, sovereignty concerns among members prevent the organization from evolving into a Warsaw Pact-like alliance.

Despite these limitations, the World Majority is still working more closely together than ever to gradually transform global governance – an objective which has become especially urgent with Trump 2.0’s casual use of force (against Iran and as threatened against Venezuela) and tariff wars.

China may be central to these efforts, but that doesn’t mean that it will dominate them. Otherwise, proudly sovereign nations like India and Russia would not support such initiatives if they believed Beijing would unilaterally steer the agenda.

The processes underway will take considerable time to complete – perhaps even a generation or longer – largely due to the complex economic interdependence leading countries like China and India maintain with the West. Abruptly severing those ties would deal immense damage to their own interests.

Observers should therefore temper any wishful thinking of a rapid transition to full-blown multipolarity, lest they face deep disappointment and possibly despondence as a result.

Looking forward, the future of global governance will be shaped by the struggle between the West and the World Majority – with one seeking to preserve its de facto monopoly, and the other aiming to reform the system gradually back to its UN-centric roots, albeit with some changes.

Ultimately, neither maximalist vision may enter into force. However, alternative institutions centered on specific regions like the SCO vis-a-vis Eurasia and the African Union vis-à-vis Africa might gradually replace the UN in certain areas.

This article was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become an Andrew Korybko Newsletter subscriber here.