​NATO 5% defense pledge won’t make the Kremlin shake in its boots

NATO has sort of agreed to raise defense spending to 5% of Gross Domestic Product, although Spain has openly balked and has refused to do so.

This sort of NATO target does not require unanimous agreement because it isn’t mandatory. That means each NATO member will try to reach the goal, or not at all in the case of Spain, but there is no penalty if they do not.

NATO’s secretary general said that NATO will check on national defense contributions in 2029, or more than four years in the future. That should not make the Kremlin shake in its boots.

NATO also reaffirmed its commitment to collective defense, which is already agreed in the NATO Charter, mostly Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. President Trump, on board Air Force One on his way to the NATO meeting, said there are different ways to interpret Article 5, adding that it is up to the US President (and all the other NATO members) to decide for themselves (a) whether to respond and (b) how to respond to any attack on a NATO member.

One of the worries in the US and elsewhere is that a NATO member will provoke the Russians, leading to a declaration under Article 5. Trump’s big caveat, already part of the language of Article 5 in any case, was intended to make clear that Article 5 is subject to interpretation and is not an automatic obligation under the NATO Treaty.

Here is the key language:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

​Article 6 of the NATO Treaty says that an attack on a NATO member can include: an armed attack:

• on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
• on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

​Neither Article 5 nor Article 6 defines an attack as restricted to a nation-state, so a terrorist attack could be (and, in one case, was) interpreted under Article 6. When 9/11 happened in the United States, the US asked NATO to support it under Article 5. NATO dithered for some weeks, and finally sent some AWACS planes to fly around the US for no appreciable purpose. End of story. Other terrorist attacks in Europe have not led to any declarations under either article.

There is a good reason why Article 5 has not been declared. Imagine that Turkey declares it has been attacked by Iraq, supporting the Kurds. Would NATO join Turkey to fight the Kurds and Iraq? Not exactly.

In fact, the language of Article 6, which tries to define the scope of what is meant by an attack, is wonky in the extreme, and out of date to boot. It ought to be rewritten, but that is unlikely given the rumble of dissent and unhappiness within NATO itself.

Beyond the actual treaty language and the alleged obligations under it, the bigger question is whether the NATO alliance really will be able to boost defense spending meaningfully. The major issues are: (1) affordability; (2) industrial base; (3) manpower.

Right now there isn’t a single NATO country that has the budget for or the possibility of actually funding a 5%-of-GDP defense obligation. The big countries, Germany for example, or France, are in recession, and while the euro currency is still holding value, many think that it will soon crash simply because the economies supporting it are failing. It follows that 5% isn’t affordable if it is a real obligation – but if it is fake, as it probably is since the targets won’t be met, it hardly matters.

The second problem is the industrial base. While there are a few industrial stars in Europe, some of the big ones such as BAE in the UK and Airbus Industries in France (and elsewhere), either are making money elsewhere or have viable commercial businesses.

BAE does big business in the US where it has significant manufacturing. BAE Systems Inc., ​the US subsidiary, include​s the design, development, manufacturing, and support of a wide range of products, including armored combat vehicles, naval guns, and electronic warfare systems. The company also has a strong presence in shipbuilding and submarine manufacturing.

​Airbus Industries makes its money in the civil sector selling commercial aircraft. Other European companies, such as Siemens, also have strong commercial businesses.

None of these companies can really compete head to head with America’s behemoths such as Lockheed, General Dynamics and RTX (formerly Raytheon).

There are some successful consortia, most notably MBDA, but MBDA is an exception, not the rule. Beyond that, Europe’s defense businesses are not consolidated, are highly redundant, are extremely wasteful and expensive and produce products that aren’t too good.

In addition to these serious structural and operational issues, the rise of new technologies – such as artificial intelligence applied to military products and programs – is beyond European capabilities. Europe lacks a strong semiconductor industry, although there are some bright spots in semiconductor manufacturing equipment such as ASML (Advanced Semiconductor Materials Lithography)​ in the Netherlands.

Only one important European company, Leonardo, while it has a big US subsidiary (DRS Systems), has gone ahead and dumped its civil businesses in energy, railroads and even some defense operations (WASS torpedoes).

​Reforming and consolidating the European defense industrial base is, for the most part, unlikely in the short term and, for political reasons impossible overall, since each nation’s security is often a higher priority than collective defense and any consolidation and reform will cost jobs. As Europe’s defense sector is highly unionized, and unions play an even bigger political role than in the United States, chopping off jobs and closing plants is not likely to happen anytime soon.

Finally there is the troubling issue of manpower, both for the military services and for industry. Europe’s armies are badly understaffed and not many volunteers are lining up to fill the gaps, even if finance becomes available to support them.

Germany is seriously considering conscription to fill the black hole of empty army brigades, but that is a politically explosive proposition and unlikely to happen (if the current government hopes to get reelected, or even remain in office for its full term).

Britain’s army is smaller than it was at the time of the American Revolution, and less deployable. A close look at the troops is worrisome: they do not look very fit or capable, even on parade.

Much of the equipment armed forces have in Europe is old and poorly maintained, adding to the manpower problem since skilled people are needed to keep the old stuff going. The worst problem is in land armies, but naval capabilities are also limited. Air forces are slightly better, but air operations eat up a lot of skilled manpower.

Unfortunately, NATO did not ask a serious question at the latest summit and continued to kick the can down the road when it comes to costly and fruitless adventures such as Ukraine. Some of NATO’s best hardware is being turned into scrap in Ukraine and is unlikely to be replaced quickly. What this means is that much of the initial 5% increase is going to be spent replacing what has been handed over to the Ukrainians, not on strengthening NATO.

The NATO summit did not address when or whether the Germans will replace their lost Leopards, their expensive air defense systems and the other equipment consumed on Ukraine’s battlefield.

Ukraine is a fight that is outside of Article 5 or Article 6 of the NATO Treaty. It is part of NATO’s ambitious expansion program, and it is looking more and more like a lost cause. The serious question that NATO has sidestepped in the latest confab at the Hague is whether it can rein in NATO expansion and return NATO to a true collective defense system protecting its members.

It is obvious that NATO cannot afford Ukraine and needs time to restructure and rebuild the alliance’s self-defense capabilities. Continued expansion will leave a huge gap and invite conflict with Russia, which perhaps some want, but it is a huge risk. Meanwhile the Russians have expanded their offensive in Ukraine, causing great anxiety without any real answers.

Stephen Bryen is a special correspondent to Asia Times and former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. This article, which originally appeared on his Substack newsletter Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission.