Taiwan must act before China decides its fate

Taiwan has no time to wait. If it does, China will decide its future.

Taiwan must act economically, diplomatically and militarily to ensure its survival. The world will not defend a passive Taiwan, but it will rally behind one that proves its strategic value. The key to this is seizing the initiative.

Sun Tzu’s principle, “Opportunities multiply as they are seized,” explains why Taiwan must dictate its terms of engagement before Beijing does. China is working relentlessly to weaken Taiwan’s global position – economically through its semiconductor ambitions, diplomatically through coercion and militarily through intimidation.

If Taiwan remains reactive, its leverage will erode. By acting first, Taiwan can lock in alliances, reinforce its economic indispensability and deter aggression.

Double-edged chip sword

For decades, Taiwan’s semiconductor industry has been its greatest asset—the so-called “Silicon Shield.” The world depends on TSMC, and that should, in theory, deter Beijing from military aggression. But this shield is not as invulnerable as many assume.

China is pouring billions into semiconductor self-sufficiency. The more Beijing succeeds, the less Taiwan’s chip dominance matters. Meanwhile, TSMC’s expansion abroad, especially in the United States, raises a serious question: if the technology leaves Taiwan, will the US and its allies still have a reason to defend it?

Taiwan must act before its strategic edge fades. Keeping next-generation semiconductor research and development firmly anchored in Taiwan is crucial to maintaining its global technological leadership.

While expanding global partnerships for production can reinforce alliances, Taiwan must ensure that the heart of innovation remains within its borders. Foreign investment in Taiwan’s high-tech sector should be encouraged to maintain its central role in global supply chains.

At the same time, the government must implement tighter controls on technology transfers to prevent China from accelerating its semiconductor independence. If Taiwan loses control over its chip industry, it risks becoming strategically irrelevant in the eyes of the world.

Taiwan cannot take American support for granted. The United States is its strongest ally, but Washington’s commitment depends on political shifts.

For instance, in his Senate confirmation hearing on March 4, Elbridge Colby, the nominee for undersecretary of defense for policy, said that while Taiwan was very important, it was not an “existential” interest to the US.

That raises crucial questions about where the American defense perimeter lies under the Trump 2.0 administration.

If Taiwan becomes less strategically vital, the US may reconsider its level of involvement. Taiwan should embed itself deeper into American economic and security interests to ensure its continued importance.

Encouraging US technology giants to invest directly in Taiwan would make Taiwan’s stability an American business priority. Expanding military-industrial cooperation, including co-developing advanced weapons systems with US defense manufacturers, would further deepen ties.

Integrating Taiwan into US security frameworks through regular joint exercises, intelligence-sharing and cybersecurity collaborations would make Taiwan an essential partner rather than an optional ally.

Strengthening regional alliances

Taiwan cannot rely solely on the United States. Regional alliances are just as critical. Japan and South Korea face growing threats from China and North Korea, making them natural security partners.

Strengthening military and intelligence cooperation with these countries would reinforce Taiwan’s security position in East Asia. A trilateral missile defense system between Taiwan, Japan and South Korea would send a clear signal to Beijing that any aggression against Taiwan would trigger a regional response.

India is another key partner that Taiwan must cultivate. As China’s primary regional competitor, India shares Taiwan’s concerns about Beijing’s expanding influence. A Taiwan-India semiconductor partnership would serve both nations by countering China’s technological ambitions while deepening economic ties.

Europe, which is seeking to reduce its reliance on Chinese technology, should also be engaged. Taiwan must position itself as a key alternative to China in Europe’s semiconductor supply chain, offering itself as a trusted partner in the EU’s push for technological independence.

Some argue that Taiwan should avoid direct confrontation to avoid provoking Beijing. This is a dangerous assumption. China is already working to undermine Taiwan, regardless of Taipei’s actions. The real risk is inaction and allowing Beijing to dictate the pace of escalation.

Others warn that Taiwan’s economic reliance on China is too great to risk confrontation. While China remains Taiwan’s largest trading partner, economic dependence is also a vulnerability. Taiwan must gradually reduce its reliance on China while expanding trade with democratic partners that have a shared interest in maintaining Taiwan’s sovereignty.

Risks of waiting

The greatest risk is doing nothing. If Taiwan hesitates, China will continue to weaken its global leverage through economic coercion and diplomatic isolation. Taiwan’s semiconductor dominance will erode, making it less strategically vital to its allies. The world may stop seeing Taiwan as worth defending.

A proactive Taiwan can prevent these outcomes by securing alliances, reinforcing its economic indispensability and strengthening its deterrence capabilities. The longer Taiwan waits, the more it risks losing its ability to shape its own future.

Sun Tzu had it right: “Opportunities multiply as they are seized.” The world will not fight for a passive victim, but it will rally behind a nation that proves it is indispensable. The time for Taiwan to act is now.

Tang Meng Kit is a graduate of the MSc in International Relations program at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. His research interests encompass cross-Strait relations, Taiwanese politics and policy issues, as well as aerospace technology. He currently works as an aerospace engineer.