Ukraine War: Europe, we can do this

Is Donald Trump proposing a capitulation to Russia or isn’t he? The messages concerning the war in Ukraine have been as mixed and confusing as ever, whether the source is President Trump himself in Washington or his Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Vice President J.D. Vance traveling in Europe and following the novel alliance-management technique of insulting your friends at every opportunity.

Whatever the reality, two things are clear:

• Nothing can or will be settled until negotiations actually begin between the victim, Ukraine, and the invader, Russia – so pre-emptive panic, outrage or despair are pointless.
• If Europe wants to protect its own security in the long term it will have to be a bold, ambitious and strong partner for Ukraine both immediately and in the future.

This is not a new revelation. European leaders must work out how best to protect their nations’ interests in a world in which their post-war partnership with the United States is at best in suspension, at worst destroyed.

This means that flattering Donald Trump or offering concessions to him is not just a waste of time but counter-productive. Europe needs to show strength, not sycophancy, to both of the dictatorial bullies it is faced with: Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin.

Of course, Europe is divided. But it always is, which is why the European Union is necessary, and why even the EU often must work through coalitions of the willing rather than a full consensus.

The EU has been divided throughout the war in Ukraine and yet has achieved a great deal. According to the Ukraine Support Tracker compiled by Germany’s Kiel Institute, between January 2022 and end-December 2024 European countries and institutions provided €132 billion worth of military, humanitarian and financial support to Ukraine (compared with €114 billion from the United States). A further €115 billion of future support has already been pledged.

Ukrainian officials and experts are sober about their country’s situation. If America were to withdraw its support and Russia were to refuse to end its aggression, Ukraine could and would continue to fight. It would most probably continue to lose land, but only in the same slow way as during last year. Its main handicap would be the loss of long-range American weapons systems with which to attack Russia’s supply lines and weapons stocks – but it has, anyway, not had enough to make a big difference.

The Ukrainians also sound sober about the conditions required to achieve a ceasefire deal: they know they would have to accept Russia’s existing occupation of roughly 20% of their territory, including Crimea, and that they have no chance of being accepted as a member of NATO for at least as long as Trump is in the White House.

But, quite reasonably, they are not willing to cede any more territory, and not willing to accept any restrictions on their sovereignty and independence. And to make any deal sustainable, they want their partners to provide credible security guarantees to deter a future Russian invasion.

This is not a popular thing to say so close to Germany’s February 23 national elections, but the infamous phrase of then-Chancellor Angela Merkel from 2015 (referring to a wave of immigration from Syria) is now apt for Ukraine: “Wir schaffen das” – We can do this.

Europe really can do this, by which is meant that it can step up and provide Ukraine with the help it needs to bolster its negotiating position and to preserve its independence and security.

What it can do, first, is to pledge to continue to supply Ukraine with weapons and financial support if it needs to carry on fighting and if the Americans provide no further help.

European countries’ own stocks of ammunition and weapons are too low for them to make a transformational difference in the war, but their supplies would be sufficient to make a Ukrainian threat of fighting on without the United States plausible.

Let’s not forget that the biggest block on providing long-range weapons last year was not America but Germany’s refusal to supply its Taurus missiles. A new chancellor and government should take a bolder approach to protecting European security.

During peace negotiations, the biggest favor Europe can provide is to promise to send forces to Ukraine to guarantee its long-term security.

A common myth is that these forces need to be so huge that European armies could not possibly supply them. The reality is that peacekeeping forces can be small at first and be built up over time – for if there really is a deal, the threat of immediate Russian attack would be small.

It would be possible to build an initial force consisting of 5,000 soldiers from each of Italy, Germany, Britain, Sweden, Denmark, France and Poland, for example, and to use those countries’ air forces to enforce “no-fly zones” of the sort that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was asking for in 2022.

As European defense spending grows — which this week’s proposal by Ursula von der Leyen to exempt defense “investment” from the fiscal constraints of the euro-area’s “stability pact” would assist — those forces based in Ukraine can be increased, subject to Russia’s conduct.

If a ceasefire is agreed, the rebuilding of Ukraine’s devastated towns can begin, and it will be costly. However, the ceasefire would also produce a rapid improvement in Ukraine’s economy and capital can be attracted from all around the world, so this need not be thought of simply as a cost to the EU taxpayer. In the end, the tragic truth of post-conflict reconstruction is that it can be profitable, at least if the conflict is truly over.

Europe can make these pledges and take on these responsibilities without making them sound like concessions to Trump: they are desirable in their own terms. And they will give Europe leverage in other aspects of the now-hostile transAtlantic relationship.

In all aspects of the relationship, it will be vital to show strength. The appropriate response to Trump’s 25% tariffs on steel and aluminium imports from Europe is to respond with identical tariffs on imports from America. He says he also wants to impose something he calls “reciprocal tariffs.” In that case, the EU should match every tariff America imposes with an identical one on something the US protects, of which there is plenty.

The status quo is that America’s and Europe’s average tariffs on imported non-agricultural goods are roughly similar, at 4-5%, with both providing high levels of protection for agriculture in differing ways.] 

The biggest attack is likely to come on the Digital Services Act (DSA), the means through which the EU seeks to regulate the big online platforms such as Facebook, Google, TikTok and X.

The attack will be big because these platforms are owned by the billionaires around Trump, led by Elon Musk, who would like him to use leverage over tariffs and Ukraine to force the EU to abandon the DSA. To do so would be a disaster for Europe. A bully like Trump responds only to strength. Wir Schaffen Das, Europe: we can do this.

Formerly editor-in-chief of The Economist, Bill Emmott is currently chairman of the Japan Society of the UK, the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the International Trade Institute.

This English original of an article first published in Italian by La Stampa can be found on his Substack, Bill Emmott’s Global View. It is republished with permission.