China building monster barges to overrun Taiwan’s shores

China’s latest fleet of special-purpose amphibious barges is rewriting the playbook for a potential Taiwan invasion, raising the stakes in the cross-strait standoff with bold new tactics and high-stakes challenges for the self-governing island’s defenders.

This month, Naval News reported that China is rapidly constructing a fleet of special-purpose barges, potentially for amphibious assaults on Taiwan. According to the report, five such vessels with unusually long road bridges extending from their bows, enabling the offloading of tanks and heavy equipment directly onto Taiwanese roads, have been observed at Guangzhou Shipyard.

Naval News notes that these barges, reminiscent of the Mulberry Harbors used during the Allied invasion of Normandy in World War II, are designed to reach coastal roads or hard surfaces beyond beaches, possibly making previously unsuitable landing sites viable. Construction of the barges, which began with a prototype in 2022, has accelerated recently, raising concerns about China’s intentions.

Naval News suggests that these vessels are tailored for military use, given their size and design, which far exceed civilian requirements. The report says the barges’ ability to dock with China’s large fleet of roll-on/roll-off (RoRo) ferries, built to carry military vehicles, further underscores their potential role in a Taiwan invasion.

The report notes that this development complicates Taiwan’s defense strategy, allowing China to select new landing sites and bypass heavily defended beaches and ports.

In October 2023, Asia Times mentioned that China’s amphibious sealift capabilities face significant limitations, complicating a potential invasion of Taiwan. As of December 2024, China had four Type 075 landing helicopter assault (LHA) ships and nine landing platform docks (LPD), with more Type 76 LHAs on the horizon.

While the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) amphibious assault ships could carry 21,000 troops – the equivalent of one heavy brigade during its initial landing, where Taiwan may have as many as 1,200 tanks waiting – the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has the capacity to put only half that number ashore.

However, using RoRo ferries to support an amphibious assault could bolster China’s sealift capacity.

Following decapitation strikes on Taiwan’s leadership, China may have to put 300,000-400,000 troops ashore to seize the island quickly. However, should those decapitation strikes fail, China may have to send 2 million soldiers, including police and paramilitary forces, across the Taiwan Strait to ensure a three-to-one or five-to-one numerical superiority against defending Taiwanese troops.

In the 2024 book “Chinese Amphibious Warfare: Prospects for a Cross-Strait Invasion,” Ian Easton highlights the centrality of Taiwan’s ports in China’s plans for a potential invasion.

Easton says the PLA regards Taiwan’s ports as pivotal for sustaining large-scale operations due to their capacity to handle heavy equipment, reinforcements and logistics, which beachheads and airports cannot adequately support. He says PLA forces risk being isolated and overwhelmed by Taiwanese counterattacks without capturing and exploiting these facilities.

Conversely, Easton says Taiwan’s defense strategy prioritizes transforming its ports into fortified strongholds, incorporating interlocking firing networks, underground bunkers and coastal artillery.

He mentions Taiwan’s defensive tactics include deploying anti-tank and anti-airborne units, mining waterways and potentially sabotaging infrastructure to deny access. He notes that PLA strategies propose integrated port-seizure operations involving amphibious landings, air assaults and commando raids to minimize damage to port facilities and ensure their operational use.

Further, in a July 2021 Project 2049 report, Easton says that Taichung is the most probable port target due to its extensive modern facilities, relatively light urban surroundings and accessibility via nearby beaches and river deltas.

However, he says Taichung would likely be well-defended. He also mentions that Kaohsiung, Zuoying, Taipei and Anping are likely targets because of their strategic importance, although their dense urban environments and surrounding defensive positions present challenges.

Easton mentions that Keelung, Suao, Hualien and Makung could be targeted but are lesser-priority targets due to unfavorable terrain and strong defenses.

While Easton identifies 14 suitable landing beaches for a Chinese invasion—nine in the north and five in the south—Newsweek reported in December 2023 that cautious Taiwanese defense planners had identified more than two dozen sites.

Such a situation presents Taiwan and the US with a defensive conundrum. In a March 2022 article for the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI), Charlemagne McHaffie stresses the need for Taiwan to develop a comprehensive, multi-layered strategy to repel a potential Chinese invasion, emphasizing mobile defense as an indispensable component. McHaffie emphasizes unified command, air, naval and ground forces coordination, and a robust doctrine tailored to resist amphibious operations.

However, he points out that naval and coastal defenses, while effective in delaying and attriting enemy forces, have historically failed to prevent landfall when the attacker holds naval superiority, as China does against Taiwan. He says mobile mechanized forces must complement shoreline defenses to counter any initial beachhead.

McHaffie points out that calls for Taiwan to adopt an asymmetric strategy, relying on guerrilla warfare and prolonging conflict to secure US intervention, hinge precariously on an ambiguous US commitment.

He says this strategy’s dependence on external aid raises significant risks under the current policy of strategic ambiguity. Consequently, he says Taiwan’s defense strategy will likely prioritize capabilities for independent victory, including mechanized counterattacks to destroy Chinese beachheads.

Taiwan can also mount limited strikes on the Chinese mainland. Asia Times mentioned that Taiwan’s long-range missiles, including the Ching Tien hypersonic cruise missile, significantly advance the island’s defense strategy. They enable precise long-range strikes on critical Chinese infrastructure and military installations, such as staging areas for an amphibious assault.

With ranges extending beyond 2,000 kilometers, these missiles can target key sites such as liquid natural gas terminals, oil ports and nuclear power plants, potentially inflicting substantial damage.

Taiwan’s development of these advanced weapons underscores its strategic pivot toward more mobile and resilient defense systems amid escalating tensions with China.

However, the deployment of such missiles could provoke severe consequences, including the risk of escalating conflicts and potential nuclear retaliation from China. Striking the homeland of a nuclear-armed state could damage international norms and alienate allies, complicating global support.

Additionally, such strikes might be used by China’s leadership to rally domestic support for an invasion of Taiwan, potentially leading to a protracted conflict.

McHaffie says this situation leaves the US with two options: openly committing to Taiwan’s defense to encourage asymmetric strategies or funding the robust conventional defenses Taiwan requires to repel an invasion and secure time for potential US intervention.

He warns that failure to act risks leaving Taiwan vulnerable, necessitating costly US counteroffensives against a nuclear-armed China or abandoning Taiwan altogether.