The US Navy’s amphibious fleet is sinking under the weight of failing ships, missed missions and mounting maintenance backlogs, threatening its combat readiness and strategic edge against China’s rising maritime power.
This month, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report mentioning that the US Navy’s amphibious warfare fleet faces significant maintenance challenges, jeopardizing its operational readiness and ability to support US Marine Corps missions.
Half of the US Navy’s 32 amphibious ships are in poor condition, with many not on track to meet their expected service lives due to deferred maintenance and aging systems, the GAO report said.
It adds that the US Navy’s decision to cancel maintenance for ships slated for divestment has exacerbated these issues, leaving critical systems like diesel engines in disrepair.
The GAO report also says the US Navy and Marine Corps have yet to agree on a specific number of ships that should be available for operations and training, further complicating maintenance planning.
The report highlights that the US Navy’s current plans do not support maintaining the statutory requirement of a 31-ship fleet by the 2030s without significant investments in service life extensions, estimated at up to US$1 billion per ship.
The GAO recommends that the US Navy use metrics to define amphibious ship availability goals and update its maintenance policy to prevent premature cancellation of essential maintenance. Without these changes, the Navy risks continued operational disruptions and reduced readiness for critical missions, it said.
On the specific problems the US amphibious warfare fleet faces, The War Zone reported this month that the USS Boxer (LHD-4) was unavailable for deployment, preventing the full deployment of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit and its F-35 fighter aircraft.
Similarly, it also reports the USS America (LHA-6) Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) operated without its full complement of ships, missing critical exercises and leaving strategic presence gaps.
The War Zone report states that the 2020 USS Bonhomme Richard’s (LHD-6) destruction due to a port fire further reduced fleet capacity. It also says that 71% of amphibious ship maintenance periods were extended from 2010 to 2021, costing nearly 29 years in lost training and deployment time.
Furthermore, the report states aging vessels like the 35-year-old USS Wasp (LHD-1) face obsolescence issues, such as difficulties sourcing parts for outdated steam propulsion systems.
It adds that even newer ships, like the USS Fort Lauderdale (LPD-28), encounter equipment failures, including high failure rates of critical systems like the knuckle boom crane and mechanical arms for launching boats.
The War Zone says these maintenance issues have led to early retirements of some ships and a backlog of deferred maintenance, challenging the US Navy’s statutory requirement to maintain a fleet of at least 31 amphibious ships.
Asia Times reported in April 2024 that the US Navy’s 2024 budget proposal to decommission three Whidbey-class dock landing ships, despite their incomplete service life, underscores the maintenance resource shortfall.
This decision aims to reallocate US$3 billion to more urgent needs and free up sailors for other deployments. However, the legal requirement to maintain a fleet of 31 amphibious warfare ships complicates decommissioning without replacements.
The shortage has forced the US Marine Corps to repurpose other ships, like the Expeditionary Sea Base and Expeditionary Fast Transport, which lack essential amphibious warfare capabilities.
The US Marine Corps Force Design 2030 and the development of the Light Amphibious Warship aim to address modern threats, but these smaller ships face limitations in self-defense and cost-effectiveness.
Steve Yeadon mentions in a 2020 article for the Journal of Advanced Military Studies that the traditional US force structure of 38 amphibious warfare ships, essential for Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB) and forward-deployed Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU), is no longer feasible under new strategic priorities.
Yeadon says that calls for smaller, more numerous and risk-tolerant vessels to support distributed operations amid near-peer threats respond to the vulnerability of large, concentrated forces to precision-guided munitions.
He adds that training shortfalls are another critical issue, as the lack of available ships, MEBs and Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) to conduct large-scale amphibious assault training undermines readiness for high-intensity warfare.
Yeadon points out that US shipbuilding constraints have compounded the problem. Current amphibious warfare ship construction timelines—ranging from 51 to 63 months—are further strained by limited shipyard capacity and supplier constraints, making rapid wartime replacements unlikely.
He also says competing shipbuilding priorities, such as Columbia-class submarines and next-generation surface combatants, further complicate funding for amphibious warfare ship procurement.
Yeadon cautions that insufficient amphibious warfare ships and US maritime forces risk diminished capacity for amphibious assaults, distributed operations and crisis response, jeopardizing strategic flexibility in conflicts with peer adversaries like China or Russia.
Contrasting sharply with the US’ declining amphibious warfare capabilities, Jennifer Rice mentions in the 2024 book “Chinese Amphibious Warfare: Prospects for a Cross-Strait Invasion” that the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) is modernizing its amphibious fleet to support missions beyond Taiwan, reflecting a shift in China’s strategic priorities.
Rice says the PLAN’s current fleet includes eight amphibious transport docks (LPD), two landing helicopter assault (LHA) ships, 30 tank landing ships (LST), 20 medium landing ships (LSM) and numerous smaller landing craft.
She notes that while larger amphibious vessels like LPDs and LHAs are better suited for overseas deployments, China’s immense shipbuilding capacity allows for a rapid surge in production if necessary.
Underscoring that point, China now has the world’s largest navy, with a shipbuilding capacity 230 times larger than the US’s. This gap means that for every oceangoing ship the US builds, China can make 359 in a year.
Rice says China’s balanced force design approach highlights its dual pursuit of global power projection and regional dominance in the Taiwan Strait. She notes that its recent modernization efforts align with the PLA’s broader strategy to enhance its capacity for a Taiwan invasion.
According to Rice, this strategy includes leveraging civilian vessels for logistics and amphibious landings, underscoring China’s military-civil fusion doctrine. Rice notes civilian roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ferries have participated in amphibious exercises, signaling China’s ability to mobilize commercial assets for military operations.
More demands for money from the IMC ?
Maybe this is a good thing. The Marine Corps is fixated on the WW2 experience–island hopping across the Pacific. In today’s world, an amphibious force would be detected and destroyed (you know, missiles and things). The Corps should rethink its role in the world.