After Saturday’s parliamentary session in Seoul, when critics of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yol came within five votes of the number needed to impeach him, the main opposition Democratic Party (DP) pledged to persist with its impeachment efforts while the ruling People Power Party floated alternative strategies to navigate the ongoing crisis.
What comes next, and how will this situation shape the broader domestic and international political landscape? To explore these questions, Asia Times spoke late Saturday with Song Young-gil, leader of the Sonamu Party and a former senior lawmaker from the Democratic Party. Song was also the mayor of Incheon and led the DP from 2021 to 2022.
Q: The motion to impeach Yoon failed. Why?
A: First, within the People Power Party, there remains a deep-seated trauma from the impeachment of former conservative President Park Geun-hye. Many lawmakers fear that if President Yoon falls, the entire conservative camp could collapse alongside him. Additionally, they are determined to block any scenario in which liberal opposition leader Lee Jae-myung could ascend to power following Yoon’s potential ouster. Viewing the current crisis through a partisan and political lens, the PPP perceives the impeachment motion as an existential threat.
[The PPP leader] Han Dong-hoon’s opposition to impeachment is perplexing, though, particularly since he was targeted for arrest under Yoon’s martial law. His ambiguous stance underscores his lack of political acumen and gravitas. The so-called Han Dong-hoon faction is not blindly loyal to him, especially as he isn’t even a member of the National Assembly. Instead, they appear to be assessing the broader political landscape. Han’s inability to articulate a clear position or inspire confidence cements his reputation as a politician devoid of leadership.
Why do you think President Yoon declared martial law?
The core issue, I believe, lies in the ongoing parliamentary efforts to seek a special counsel probe against Kim Keon-hee, the first lady. To shield his wife, Yoon issued an emergency martial law declaration, effectively creating a “bulletproof” defense. Beyond this immediate motive, it reflects Yoon’s consistent approach since taking office — branding leftists as anti-state forces and suppressing political dissent.
Yoon’s latest gambit, however, does not appear to be a spontaneous decision but rather a premeditated act. Yoon recently appointed his close confidant and high school alumnus, Kim Young-hyun [Kim then resigned on December 4], as minister of defense and established a private network comprising Yoon’s key allies, including Interior and Safety Minister Lee Sang-min [he resigned on December 8] and Counterintelligence Commander Yeo In-hyung [he was dismissed on December 6)] This group played a pivotal role in facilitating the declaration of martial law on Tuesday.
Does Yoon’s act constitute insurrection?
South Korea’s legislative branch is legally untouchable, even under martial law. While a martial law decree can place the executive and judiciary under its command, the National Assembly retains its autonomy. South Korean law explicitly ensures legislative oversight in such situations. Article 4 of the Martial Law Act mandates that the president notify the National Assembly immediately after declaring martial law. If the Assembly is not in session, the president must seek a parliamentary session to deliberate on the declaration without delay.
Under Yoon’s directive, these legal safeguards were blatantly disregarded. Not only did the military barricade the National Assembly to block lawmakers’ entry, but armed soldiers forced their way into the main building, attempting to arrest politicians. The marital law command also breached the building housing the National Election Commission, an autonomous institution. Such actions represent a flagrant violation of constitutional order and amount to a clear act of insurrection.
The opposition is determined to pursue impeachment until it succeeds. Will it work?
A special investigation headquarters has been established to probe President Yoon’s martial law declaration. The headquarters must swiftly summon key figures and uncover further details about the events of this week. For example, broadcaster MBC recently reported that the Yoon administration may have attempted to provoke a limited war by striking North Korean targets in retaliation for the regime’s trash-filled balloon attacks. If this is substantiated, it would constitute a serious felony, tantamount to treason, which could pave the way for the president’s removal under Article 84 of the Constitution.
In the case of former President Park, an investigation into her many scandals was conducted before the impeachment bill was voted on. Given the ongoing investigations against Yoon, impeachment would become more viable if the evidence supports such a course. [President Yoon has now been named a suspect in the December 3 insurrection case].
You talked about the need to dismantle Yoon’s “prosecutorial state.” Can you explain?
By staffing government agencies, the ruling party and the presidential office with a pro-Yoon prosecutorial clique, Yoon has effectively created a “republic of prosecutors.” This faction, operating under his guidance, has undermined South Korea’s democratic norms by using its power to shield the president and his family from criminal liability, suppress press freedom and silence opposition and dissent. I have long argued that, even if the Yoon administration falls, little will change as long as Han Dong-hoon, with his equally prosecutorial mindset, remains the leader of the ruling party. What is urgently needed along with Yoon’s ouster is a fundamental overhaul of our prosecutorial system.
Washington claimed to be caught off guard and had no prior notice of Tuesday’s event.
We welcome Washington reaffirming that the foundation of the South Korea-US alliance is democracy, which is crucial. However, as a sovereign nation, South Korea has no obligation to give prior notice, regardless of the legitimacy of the martial law.
You recently met with the Russian Ambassador to South Korea. Can you share what was discussed?
First, I emphasized that the use of nuclear weapons should never be considered under any circumstances. Second, I expressed that heightened military cooperation with Russia and North Korea should not lead to escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula. I also stressed the importance of a swift resolution to the war in Ukraine.
How do you assess President Yoon’s policy on the Ukraine war?

First, Yoon’s rationale for supporting Ukraine is rooted in Cold War-era rhetoric: a battle between communism and democracy. However, Russia is no longer a communist state. It’s essentially a democratic republic, the Russian Federation, which former President Yeltsin defended against a communist coup. Putin has inherited that legacy, and Russia’s political landscape has moved beyond the communist ideology.
Second, Ukrainians are ethnically closely related to Russians, and historically, Crimea was transferred to Ukraine as a gift by former Soviet leader Krushchev. Furthermore, the port of Sevastopol in Crimea is the headquarters of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. As such, Ukraine’s situation differs significantly from that of the Baltic states — Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — or the Scandinavian countries.
Third, from Russia’s perspective, NATO’s eastward expansion, despite the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and promises from Washington not to expand, is a significant security concern. Moscow has repeatedly stated that Ukraine’s potential NATO membership is a redline, but these concerns have been largely ignored, with the US welcoming Ukraine’s entry. If we consider Russia’s position, it mirrors Washington’s obstinate rejection of Soviet missiles in Cuba.
Of course, I publicly criticized Russia when the war broke out in 2022, and I even made a small personal donation to Ukraine. But in diplomacy, it’s crucial to listen to all parties involved.

How should the policy change?
South Korea should maintain diplomatic relations with both Kyiv and Moscow and focus on bringing an end to the conflict rather than taking sides and advocating for an extended war. As a country that shares a border with Russia, how can South Korea afford to make Russia an enemy?
South Korea already struggles to manage the complexities of dealing with North Korea on its own and relies on cooperation with the US military and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces. Making Russia an adversary, therefore, is not a prudent course of action and should be avoided in favor of a more balanced and sound foreign policy.
Kenji Yoshida is a translator and Seoul-based correspondent for JAPAN Forward.
