Don’t let Putin make the Ukraine war rules

On September 22, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in the US for a week of activities including a meeting with US President Joe Biden and Vice President and presidential candidate Kamala Harris. Zelensky has said he will present his “plan for victory” in the Ukraine war.   

A particular but important issue is whether Washington will assent to Zelensky’s desire to use Western-supplied missiles for strikes inside Russia. So far, the US government only prohibits Ukraine from aiming the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), which has a range of up to 190 miles, against military targets in Russia itself. 

The US also has the authority to block Ukraine from firing Storm Shadow cruise missiles, made by a UK-French consortium, into Russia because they contain US-made components. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer has reportedly lobbied Biden to loosen the restrictions.

Biden said on September 22 that he had not yet made a decision on the issue. He is skittish about possibly provoking Russian President Vladimir Putin into a direct conflict with the US or its European allies. 

On September 12, Putin again stoked this fear, saying on Russian TV that if Western countries let Ukraine use their missiles to strike targets within Russia, “it would mean that NATO countries . . . are at war with Russia,” which he said would “change the very nature of the conflict,” a hint at using his nuclear weapons. 

Some non-Russian commentators have bought this line. For example, an op-ed published on September 14 in Asia Times (and originally here) by Stephen Bryen, a former senior US Defense Department official, echos and amplifies Putin. 

Bryen argues that NATO is “declaring war” on Russia, tantamount to starting “World War III.”  He believes that the US government “wants to fire missiles into Russia” because Biden administration leaders “know that their Ukraine policy is a disaster.”

A more sober and balanced analysis is needed. Authoritarian leaders such as Putin have unreciprocated access to the free press in liberal democratic countries. They use it both to threaten consequences and, over time, to weaken the will to resist, not just within Ukraine but especially among those NATO and other democracies assisting Ukraine. 

With good reason, Putin believes that the democratic partners supporting Ukraine will eventually tire of the expense, allowing him to dictate a settlement on his terms. At the same time, he has less to worry about at home thanks to draconian measures to punish criticism of Russian policy or military performance. 

In fact, Russia’s Ukraine policy has clearly been a disaster, while US policy has been largely successful. With the addition of Sweden and Finland, NATO is now larger than before Putin’s aggression and has a much longer land border with Russia.  It is more unified and is spending much more on defense. 

Russia has paid enormously for the war and not simply in human lives and limbs or ships at the bottom of the Black Sea. It has lost access to technologies and markets, especially in Europe.  Foreign purchases of Russian arms have tanked. 

While the rich elites close to Putin had their yachts and other foreign assets confiscated, even ordinary Russians have limited travel opportunities outside Russia and higher-priced goods at home compared to before. Many of the best educated have fled the country. Putin himself is a wanted man for violations of international law.

Putin surely would not have launched the February 2022 invasion if he had any real understanding of what he was getting into. A much smaller country has humiliated Russia, fighting it to almost a standstill, so it is in Putin’s interest to attribute his failure to a powerful alliance of alleged US “proxies” and “puppets” arrayed against Russia. He knows that’s a half-truth at best.

It is hard to imagine that the famously cautious President Biden will suddenly change course and plunge into World War III. If he allows Ukraine greater freedom in the use of weapons, it will certainly come with conditions to ensure that use is confined to critical military targets. This is also in Ukraine’s interests since using a single ATACMS missile costs US$850,000, while a Storm Shadow costs US$1 million.

The intent of the US and its allies is to help Ukraine defend itself and avoid direct war with Russia, a reason why there are so many complaints about Biden’s “excessive caution.”  Washington sought to build as large a coalition as possible to help Ukraine and to keep the focus on Russia as the aggressor and Ukraine as the defender. 

But it has been a very different approach than in Korea in 1950 or in Kuwait in 1991, where the US took the lead and its own and allied forces fought the enemy that had violated international norms. The norm against aggression is rooted in the UN Charter principles of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. 

Even China takes the formal position that this should be the first point of any Ukrainian settlement. China, however, should walk the walk in light of its own history as the victim of Japanese aggression. In 1933, the UN’s predecessor, the League of Nations, tried to invoke the theory of collective security and voted to condemn Japan. Tokyo’s response was to withdraw from the League and continue the aggression.

In the current case, the UN General Assembly voted 141 to 5 to condemn the Russian attack and demand that it withdraw its troops from Ukraine. There were also 35 abstentions, including some very important Asian countries that didn’t want to take sides. Like the Japanese in 1933, the Russians simply ignored the vote. Moreover, they rattled the nuclear threat against anyone who might directly interfere.

But has Russia shown any sign of wanting World War III? Putin’s original aggression was obviously wrong-headed, and his further digging in through formal annexations of Ukrainian territory has compounded this. 

But Putin studiously tries to avoid any kinetic contact with NATO forces and has repeatedly acquiesced to actions that he previously warned could result in Russia’s use of nuclear weapons. Examples include the US agreeing to Ukraine’s request for F-16s and defensive Patriot missiles. 

Missile strikes in parts of Russia near Ukraine would not so dramatically alter the war as to make Putin’s nuclear threat credible. The US already routinely provides Ukraine with military intelligence, including satellite data for targeting Russian forces or military infrastructure. 

The Ukrainians have been striking targets inside Russia with drones, often more distant than the 190-mile range of the ATACMS. And, most notably, Ukrainian forces recently occupied a small enclave in Russia, an incursion that galvanized a surprisingly weak Russian reaction.

The fact that Putin has bluffed before about using nuclear weapons does not prove he has no red lines. It is realistic to believe that he could resort to tactical nukes if desperate to protect his leadership over Russia. 

But toppling him is neither a Ukrainian nor a NATO objective, and extending the limit of missile strikes to 190 miles from Ukrainian-held territory presents no new danger to Putin’s political position.

Rather, such missile attacks would force the Russians to move key military staging areas further from Ukraine. That is a step toward forcing a negotiated settlement but not a reason to unleash nuclear war.

Helping Ukraine fight better will get us closer to a just peace than will accommodating Putin’s bluffs. But this is not enough.  A serious international diplomatic initiative based on close coordination with Ukraine is also needed. 

As the actual belligerents, neither Kiev nor Moscow is in a position to convene such an initiative. A coalition of third parties, including but not limited to NATO, is needed. The purpose would be a settlement based on Ukraine’s pre-2014 territorial integrity, which Russia solemnly agreed to in 1994.  

That principle would not preclude various assurances regarding Russian access to ports and the treatment of ethnic Russians in Ukraine, the protection of whom the Ukrainian constitution already guarantees. It should be possible to reach a peace deal in which both Ukraine and Russia can declare their objectives met.

This will take time, and Western powers may have to do even more short of physical involvement to establish a proper negotiating environment. But given the weakness of democracies in supporting long wars, they need to prove that they are serious about achieving a peaceful settlement based on the established norms of the international system.

And that they are willing to undertake not just military but also diplomatic leadership toward this end.

Charles Morrison is senior fellow and president emeritus, East-West Center; Denny Roy is senior fellow, East-West Center.