Sino-Hungarian relations and Orbán’s travels

On May 8, 2024, Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Budapest, Hungary, for a two-day state visit at the invitation of Hungarian President Tamás Sulyok and Prime Minister to celebrate 75 years of Sino-Hungarian relations. 

To help shed light on relations between Hungary and China, I sat down and spoke with Dr. Levente Horváth, the founding Director of the Eurasia Center of the John von Neumann University in Hungary. Horvath is a China expert and fluent in Mandarin Chinese. The Eurasia Center’s research focuses on geopolitical, economic, and social developments and trends across Eurasia. Horváth oversees the Center’s multifaceted research activities, exchange programs, and conferences ,which are designed to contribute to a better understanding of ideas and factors that lead to economic development and greater Eurasian connectivity and integration. 

His new book – Chinese Geopolitical Thinking: The Belt and Road Initiative from a Chinese Perspective – presents a nuanced (and unorthodox) interpretation of the ideas that motivate China’s foreign policy, including its much-bruited Belt and Road. He challenges Western narratives about China in that myth-busting volume.

The interview was in two parts, beginning in Budapest following Xi’s meetings with Orbán. Since that portion of the interview took place prior to Orbán’s recent high visibility “peace missions” to Kiev, Moscow, Beijing and Washington, we spoke again, continuing the interview as I sought to try to better understand Orbán’s motivations in seeking an end to the war between Ukraine and Russia in the face of Brussels’s unhappy reaction to his trips. Here is the pieced-together interview:

Q: It has been all over the news that Orbán seeks a diplomatic solution – so he says – to the war between Ukraine and Russia. He is on a “Peace Mission.” Can you shed light on his motivations? What keeps him going despite the harsh criticism from Brussels? 

Horváth: Let me first be clear, I do not speak for Orbán. In my opinion, multiple factors explain Orbán’s initiative. I list those factors not necessarily in order of importance. Orbán, who is a skilled politician and diplomat, is motivated by the following considerations: 

• Orbán does not see that Brussels is interested in peace and he reminds everyone that NATO started as an alliance for peace, but “today, instead of peace, [NATO’s] agenda is the pursuit of war; instead of a defensive, it is an offensive [alliance].” He must therefore step in. Peace for Europe is the most important and pressing matter today.
• Europe doesn’t feel safe, and Orbán wants to do something about that. He wants to stop the devastation and suffering in Ukraine and keep the war from spreading to Europe. 
• Orbán sees that the consequences of this war have negatively hit Hungary’s economic development and competitiveness. In other words, the war has led to economic hardships for many and even led to a certain form of deindustrialization. Peace is the best way to stop the process of European deindustrialization and stabilize the economies of Europe. 
• Orbán believes that without dialogue and diplomacy, peace is not possible. When no one in Europe seems to be interested in peace, then Orbán must step up to the plate.
• Orbán believes that Putin is not insane but rather rational. Orbán a few days ago said that Putin”is a more than 100% rational person. When he negotiates, when he starts to explain his point, when he makes proposals, saying yes or no, he is super-rational,” Orbán believes, as reported by Switzerland’s Die Weltwoche.

For these reasons, I believe, Orbán, as president of the Council of the European Union, has undertaken this peace mission – as he calls it. If peace is the objective, diplomats need to understand what Ukraine, Russia, China, Türkiye and NATO are thinking. That is the first step for a political settlement.

Tragically, many in Brussels and Washington, measuring from their statements and actions, are dead set against Orbán’s peace mission. This is not only foolish but dangerous for all of Europe. 

Orbán continues to plow forward. Notwithstanding all the opposition from Brussels, Orbán and President Erdogan of Türkiye just met in Washington during NATO’s summit. Orbán is undeterred. Whether Orbán and President Biden will meet is unclear. I would, on the other hand, bet that Orbán will meet with former President Trump while in Washington. If that happens, Brussels’ foreign policy establishment will be irritated but Orbán won’t care because he is more interested in peace than in what Washington, London and Brussels think. 

Piedra: Orbán and Xi met in Budapest in early May this year. One important result of their meetings was that they elevated their bi-lateral relations to an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership” – those are Orbán’s words. Please elaborate.

Horváth: In a word, the healthy state of Hungarian-Chinese relations today is the fruit of years of hard diplomatic work, which has withstood the test of time. We have embarked on a “Golden Voyage,” as President Xi recently said. You see, back in 2010, Hungary announced its “Opening to the East” policy. The idea was to broaden and diversify the scope of our international relations. Over the past 14 years, Hungary has worked to strengthen its relations with Asian countries because the Hungarian government early on realized that the state of the world economy was rapidly changing. And so, in the face of these economic and geopolitical transformations, Budapest’s foreign policy not only focused on China but began to actively engage with other countries across Asia. 

Regarding relations with China, I have to mention that this year Hungary and the People’s Republic of China celebrate the 75th anniversary since establishing diplomatic relations. During Chinese President Xi’s visit in May, both sides stressed that relations between the two countries never have been stronger. By raising the level of strategic cooperation higher than ever before, Hungary has entered China’s inner circle of strategic partners – which I see as positive. I think the consequences of this partnership will be clear: All five pillars of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative – policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people exchanges – will continue to expand and deepen Hungarian-Chinese relations, notwithstanding a very complex global geo-political setting. 

At a joint news conference in Budapest, Orbán lauded the “continuous, uninterrupted friendship” between Hungary and China over the past decades. 

Piedra: But how did Hungary get to where it is today in its relations with China? 

Horváth: Hungarian and Chinese leaders recognize that for relations to be fruitful they must be based on mutual respect and the principle of non-interference in the other’s domestic politics. They must also be unburdened by or free of disputes of an ideological nature. As a general rule, this approach to bilateral engagement is an important cornerstone of Hungarian foreign policy, which helps explain why Sino-Hungarian relations are excellent. 

Moreover, based on our experience, we do not see the Belt and Road Initiative as a threat to our strategic autonomy as a sovereign nation. While we understand that Hungary takes heat from some EU bureaucrats for wanting to develop close relations with China, we don’t care too much what Brussels thinks. They can say whatever they want.

If you hadn’t noticed, Hungary’s meetings with President Xi in Budapest were extremely cordial and not designed “to make up for lost time,” so to speak, which perhaps has been the case with some other countries in the EU. Why? Because Brussels’s relations with China have been strained; they only have themselves to blame.  Hungary does not hurl insults at China. 

Piedra: Despite their insults and confrontational language, EU countries continue to deal with China.  

Horváth  Countries in the EU can’t get away from the fact that China is the second largest economy in the world and, by some projections, its GDP will surpass that of the US within the next decade. As such, the leaderships of some European countries see China’s importance on the world stage, although it is difficult for them to admit this at times. They continue to visit Beijing in order to strengthen economic ties and cooperation. In this sense, reality trumps ideology. So, EU countries cannot completely delink from China despite the rhetoric. 

So once again, despite all the hype or scare tactics from Brussels, Western countries maintain economic relations with Beijing. Our relations, I must say, are very good. This is because  Hungary is pursuing a policy of engagement that is positive and constructive. Besides, we are a sovereign and independent nation that will not succumb to pressure from Brussels. 

Piedra: Can you explain why Brussels, London and Washington are not happy with enhanced Sino-Hungarian cooperations? 

Horváth  To be sure, you must ask them. But, yes, the evidence would suggest that Brussels, London, and Washington are not happy with Sino-Hungarian cooperation. This is evident from the fact that they seem to subordinate their economic ties to ideology which is manifest from their regular lecturing and political criticism of China (and Hungary). Brussels should, in my opinion, focus on economic connectivity and integration rather than try to de-risk their economies from China’s economy. To pursue policies that aim to limit China’s influence in Europe, in my opinion, will not serve the interests of Europe. On this matter, in contrast, Orbán has been very smart and farsighted. 

At the same time, Western countries are afraid of losing their historic preeminent status in world. But the times are changing. The Western dominated unipolar world order is moving towards multipolarity – where the traditional Western powers will no longer, so it would seem, be able to dictate policies to other countries. The Western powers will need to collaborate and find common ground with other world leaders in order to maintain good relations with other countries. 

Hungary, unlike most other European countries, does not support decoupling from China, as I said earlier. That upsets Brussels. Rather Hungary seeks to enjoy the full economic benefits of cooperation with China – and with other Asian countries. We are a pragmatic people which at times means that we will not follow the herd or automatically answer to unelected bureaucrats in Brussels.

So, I think it is possible to say that Brussels, London and Washington are not happy with enhanced Sino-Hungarian cooperations because we have good relations with China which flies in the face of their political and ideological views which blind them to the upside of constructive diplomatic and economic relations. 

Piedra: You have stated in your book Chinese Geopolitical Thinking that “the Atlantic Era is coming to an end; the era of Eurasia has begun, in which China is playing an increasingly important role.” That is a powerful claim. If your assessment is correct, do you think that Western Sinologists and Atlanticists will reconsider their views on how to manage relations with Beijing?

Horváth  By the beginning of the 21st century, China – and Asia more broadly speaking – had regained its dominant role in the world economy. According to the IMF, Asia will contribute roughly 60% of global economic growth this year. The center of gravity of the world economy is shifting; it has moved 8,300 km eastwards in forty years – from Europe to Asia. Today Asia is again the center of gravity of the world economy. 

In addition to its economic prowess, China is an increasingly dominant force in world politics, being seen as a steadily more attractive ally for countries in the Global South, compared with the United States and EU. The rise of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization are testament to this view. 

In this sense, Western Sinologists need to keep up with developments in China and must learn to assess and understand China’s foreign policy thinking and role in the world according to current realities. What do I mean? Western traditional terminology used in geopolitics can neither describe nor understand China’s strategic thinking. 

Moreover, the Western-dominated unipolar world order – a legacy of WWII and a colonial way of thinking – is changing into a multipolar world order where there will be several new important countries from Asia, such as Indonesia and India, and other continents, Brazil, and South Africa.

And yes, I think Western leaders should change their attitudes towards Asian countries, which are no longer their colonies, especially since they increasingly manifest political and economic independence and strategic autonomy in a new multipolar world order. It is safe to say that the “Atlantic Era” [defining] the single dominant center of power since the 15^th century is coming to a close. And this is very hard for Atlanticists to accept – which in part explains the heightened levels of conflict in the world today. Hungary, for its part, will only work toward peace. In this sense, Hungary is keen on promoting peace between Russia and Ukraine and wants to work with China towards this end.

Piedra: In a related sense, you have said that a “new world order” is taking shape, and that China will play a significant role in its formation. What do you mean by “new world order”? Given your understanding, how do you see this “new world order” unfolding over the next few years? 

Horváth  The decades after the Cold War saw the emergence of an American-led, unipolar world order. China’s resurgence as a global power is changing our understanding of the status quo ante. [With] the return of China on the world stage, I think it is safe to say that international platforms that are not Western, such as the BRICS or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, are gaining strength across the globe. To ignore this fact would be foolish.

Piedra: Let me stop you. But doesn’t China wants to be a hegemon?

Horváth: It is important to understand that, contrary to much of the thinking among Western elites, China is not seeking to replace the United States as the global hegemon. China does not seek to be a hegemon. Based on the evidence, China does not want to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries but operates according to the rules laid down by the United Nations. 

That having been said, China believes that the Western elites, as hegemonic rulers, change the rules of international relations whenever it suits their own interests. Chinese President Xi has repeatedly stressed that the world is big enough for both the Chinese and US economies to grow together. He wants a multipolar world order that will be beneficial to all. 

In contrast, Washington, with its Western ways of looking at things, sees China as a challenger and even as an existential threat. The US’s foreign policy, in fact, is based on zero-sum considerations – a  principle where there are only winners and losers. Western elites think that China wants to grow at the expense of the United States. This is not true, based on my understanding. 

Piedra: Most Western think tanks would not agree with you. 

Horváth  China maintains a win-win philosophy in foreign policy, whereby cooperation and building mutually beneficial alliances are paramount for success. Increasing its geopolitical influence around the world is not done at the expense of the global community. The countries of the Global South, working with China, also want to gain a stronger position in the changing world order that heretofore has been dominated by the Global North. This transformation appears to be inevitable, especially given the demographic picture: the West needs to realize that the 800 million people in the Western “world” pale in comparison with the 7.2 billion in the non-Western world.

Piedra: China is mysterious to most Westerners, including to many academics, who see the world through the simplistic lens of “good” vs “evil” in the conduct of foreign affairs. You have argued that Chinese geo-political thinking is more nuanced. In other words, present-day China is more the product of 5,000 years of Chinese history and pedagogy than it is of messianic Marxism-Leninism, an ideology that is unprecedented in Chinese history, dates only to 1949 and is now running on fumes. Can you elaborate on your interpretation of Chinese foreign policy and how the West might better engage with Beijing? 

Horváth  Beijing’s reform and opening-up policy of 1978 laid the foundations for China’s rise. Since the 1980s, the pace of China’s development in the areas of infrastructure (railways, roads, river and seaports and air transport) has been unprecedented, even unimaginable for Western countries. Since 1978, China has been striving to regain what it sees as its rightful place in the world economy. 

I would like to highlight a few aspects of Chinese thinking. Ancient Chinese strategists wrote in their works that a country must prepare for war and know an enemy thoroughly while appearing weak in the process. This does not mean that China wants to wage war, but China has prepared itself economically and is studying its potential adversaries. In the foreign policy space, China has studied the West thoroughly in order to understand its predominant ways and habits. Interestingly, unlike the West, China has remained modest in its ambitions and does not seeking to take the lead on the world stage. 

Piedra: Here again, few in the West will agree with you.

Horváth The West judges Chinese thinking through the lens of its own historical, social, and political developments. The West’s analytical approach is a mistake, in my view, because China has developed in a completely different context over the past 5,000 years – it does not see development, I must again stress, as a product of geo-political dominance or hegemony, which is mostly a Western way of thinking. Western terminology cannot be applied uniformly or simplistically to Chinese thinking – especially in international relations. 

Piedra: Taking over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union, do you expect  that Orbán will be able to improve China-EU relations, especially in the area of trade and investments? Or do you think that the leadership class in Brussels, London and Washington will be able to thwart Orbán in his effort to bring common sense back to internation relations? 

Horváth  To begin with, I’d like to quote Orbán in order to get a sense of Orbán’s thinking: “Progressive liberals will stop at nothing to defend their positions of power. Our adversaries sit in the seats of power, at the head of institutions, and – instead of serving the common good – plot how to get rid of us. This is the situation in which we must win in 2024. And we will.”

Hungary [has held] the presidency of the Council of the EU, despite the European Parliament’s earlier efforts – lobbying against and even bad mouthing us – to postpone the Hungarian presidency. Brussels is constantly looking for ways to tie Hungary’s hands. To achieve its objectives, Brussels, for example, has sought to manipulate the rule of law (technical and procedural) to take away Hungary’s voting rights in the Council. Moreover, Brussel’s demands to abolish consensus decision-making are also at the heart of Hungary’s refusal to veto joint decisions. 

While Hungary is the president of the Council of the European Union, Orbán would like to act as a mediator and peacemaker in matters concerning the conflict in Eastern Europe and relations with China, seeking compromises and advancing Eurasian integration between Europe and East Asia, especially with China. 

Javier M Piedra is a financial consultant and specialist in international development. During the Trump administration he was deputy assistant administrator for South and Central Asia at USAID.