Fret not Delhi, Dhaka’s surely not in Beijing’s orb

For decades, Sino-Indian competition for sway over Bangladesh has been a hard-driving force in South Asia’s geopolitics. As a neighbor of India and a littoral state of the Indian Ocean, Bangladesh has often been embroiled in the rivalry, and accordingly, both Beijing and New Delhi have sought to expand their influence over the nation, often at the other’s expense.

Since the late 1950s, Bangladesh, known as East Pakistan between 1947 and 1971, has been a geopolitical battleground between the dragon (China) and the elephant (India). During this period, Pakistan developed close ties with China and thus East Pakistan was in the Chinese orbit.

However, after Bangladesh’s independence in 1971, the country’s foreign policy was based on the maxim “friendship to all, malice towards none,” and adopted a non-aligned, non-confrontational and positively neutral foreign policy. The country has thus maintained pragmatic and cooperative relations with both India and China, carefully balancing and navigating their strategic competition.

Even so, several Indian analysts have expressed concerns about the possible integration of Bangladesh into China’s sphere of influence. However, this is an utter misinterpretation of Dhaka’s foreign policy and thus it is necessary to address the allegation from a balanced and objective point of view.

First, Bangladesh is an independent and sovereign state, and accordingly, it is fully entitled to conduct its foreign affairs without external interference under customary international law.

Legally and morally, Bangladesh has complete freedom of action over its foreign policy as long as its policies do not violate the provisions of the United Nations (UN) Charter. Bangladesh has the right to develop partnerships with any country, including China, and no other country has the legal right to interfere in the process.

While Bangladesh is entitled to complete foreign policy autonomy, it is understandable that India would strive to maximize its security and thus view Chinese involvement in its immediate neighborhood with certain concern. However, New Delhi should realize that Dhaka’s partnership with Beijing is not directed against any other state, including India.

Bangladesh is exclusively concerned with its internal development and its partnership with China aims at fulfilling its own developmental needs. The Indians should also remember that Dhaka has repeatedly demonstrated its good-neighborliness towards New Delhi by taking into account India’s security concerns.

For instance, Dhaka has closed the bases of northeast Indian insurgents in its border areas, extradited northeast Indian rebel leaders to India and refrained from implementing the Chinese-backed deep seaport project in the Sonadia Island.

Indian analysts often identify particular Chinese projects and initiatives as potential threats to Indian interests. These include the potential provision of US$5 billion in Chinese loans, Chinese-backed infrastructure projects, the acquisition of Chinese military equipment for the Bangladesh Armed Forces, the construction of a Chinese-financed submarine base in southern Bangladesh and the scheduled Sino-Bangladeshi military exercise.

Upon close inspection, it is clear that none of these projects and initiatives are directed against India or detrimental to Indian security or other interests.

First, Bangladesh is seeking a $5 billion loan (at an interest rate of 1%) from China for budgetary support and the purchase of raw materials. This does not affect Indian interests in any way. In fact, Dhaka is seeking this loan from Beijing because China is the only state that is willing to provide Bangladesh with the loan at such a low interest rate.

If India had been willing to provide a $5 billion loan to Bangladesh at a 1% interest rate, Dhaka would likely have been happy to take India’s credit. While some analysts may express concern that Bangladesh is falling into a Chinese “debt trap”, other foreign analysts opine that Dhaka has decades of experience in managing foreign loans and so the risk is minimal.

Second, some Indian analysts are concerned that China is developing infrastructure in Bangladesh close to the Siliguri Corridor and these might be used against India. These concerns, too, are unfounded. It should be remembered that Bangladesh is an “India-locked” state and among 64 Bangladesh districts, 30 share borders with India.

Obviously, Bangladesh has every right to develop infrastructure in all of its border districts and it reserves the right to determine which country would invest in such infrastructure projects. Moreover, none of the projects that China is implementing in the districts of Bangladesh near the Indian border are military-oriented.

Moreover, China does not have the right to station troops or military equipment on Bangladeshi territory, and upon the completion of these projects, these infrastructures would be controlled by Bangladeshis, not the Chinese.

Furthermore, no treaty has been signed between Bangladesh and China on the use of Bangladeshi territory by Chinese troops in wartime. Accordingly, in case of a war between China and India, China would not be able to use these infrastructures.

What is more, since the Siliguri Corridor does not provide India with adequate access to its northeastern territories, Bangladesh has demonstrated goodwill toward India by providing the latter with transit and transshipment facilities.

Other Indian analysts are concerned about China’s $1 billion investment in the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project. It should be noted, however, that the Indian-implemented Teesta Barrage Project has created a serious water crisis in Bangladesh, and Dhaka’s efforts to resolve the issue diplomatically has met with failure.

However, the river holds substantial economic significance for five districts in northern Bangladesh containing 22 electoral constituencies and more than 10 million citizens. The restoration of the river is thus a significant internal political issue on which numerous local politicians’ careers depend. This project, in no sense whatsoever, represents a threat to Indian interests.

Third, China has been Bangladesh’s largest source of military equipment since the late 1970s, primarily because of the low cost, ease of maintenance and relative efficiency of Chinese weapons. This, in itself, does not pose any threat to India.

Bangladesh also imports weapons from a number of other states including Russia, Turkey, the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, France and Serbia, and is currently looking to further diversify its sources of arms. Moreover, Bangladesh has expressed its desire to procure some military equipment from India.

Fourth, China has financed the construction of the BNS Sheikh Hasina, the first submarine base for the Bangladesh Navy at Cox’s Bazar with the capacity to host six submarines and eight warships. China has financed the project because Bangladesh has purchased two Ming-class submarines from China and is likely to acquire more naval vessels from the country.

The construction of the base and acquisition of submarines is part of Bangladesh’s “Forces Goal 2030”and the transformation of the Bangladesh Navy into a so-called 3D force. This is crucial to ensuring Bangladesh’s maritime security and again is in no way a threat to India, both because Bangladesh has no aggressive intentions toward any of its neighbors and because India possesses a far larger submarine fleet.

While China has financed the construction of the base, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) will not have access to the base. Moreover, Bangladesh opted for Chinese submarines because of their low price. Before turning to China, Bangladesh had reportedly negotiated with India and Russia for the acquisition of submarines.

Interestingly, India did not sell submarines to Bangladesh but later sold a Kilo-class submarine to Myanmar. Hence, Bangladesh’s acquisition of Chinese submarines and China’s financing of a Bangladeshi submarine base are purely commercial transactions unrelated to India.

Finally, the prospective Sino-Bangladeshi joint military exercise is a logical extension of the already existing defense partnership between the two states and does not pose any credible threat to India. Bangladesh regularly participates in joint military exercises with India, the US and the UK, and conducting similar exercises with China is its sovereign prerogative.

Last but not least, the Indian media has implied that Bangladesh’s positions on Tibet, Taiwan and the South China Sea is a result of Chinese coercion. Nothing is further from the truth, however.

India itself recognizes Tibet as part of China and adheres to the “One China” policy, so it is illogical to suggest that Bangladesh does the same owing to Chinese coercion. Regarding the disputes in the South China Sea, Bangladesh does not have any significant stake in the disputed region. Accordingly, its Indo-Pacific Outlook suggests ensuring peace and prosperity throughout the region.

A careful and balanced analysis of Bangladesh’s foreign policy shows Dhaka aims at maximizing its internal development through foreign policy initiatives while preserving its independence and sovereignty from external influence.

As ever, Dhaka does not have any interest or intention of antagonizing any other state, not least neighboring India. Bangladesh is in the embrace of neither the dragon nor the elephant but rather is willing to build and maintain constructive partnerships with both.

Md Himel Rahman is a Dhaka-based freelance analyst on international and strategic affairs. His articles have been published in The Interpreter, The Diplomat, South Asian Voices, The Geopolitics, Eurasia Review, The Daily Star, The Daily Observer, Dhaka Tribune, and other platforms.