In an unprecedented move with big regional implications, US President Joe Biden hosted a trilateral summit with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio.
According to the post-summit joint statement, this first-ever trilateral discussed cooperation in economic growth, emerging technologies, clean energy, supply chains, climate cooperation and, most importantly, strengthening the existing alliances between the US and its two Asian security partners.
Alongside the leaders’ meeting, the first trilateral commerce and industry ministers’ meeting was also held and seems to have focussed on US-Japan support for making the Philippines an upper middle-income country and combatting China’s economic coercion.
The summit should be seen in the context of China’s increasingly hostile behavior and gray zone tactics in the South China Sea and the incessant maritime harassment the Philippines is facing from the Peoples’ Liberation Army-Navy and its maritime militia.
The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force’s first-ever participation in the recent US-Philippines exercise in the South China Sea is also consistent with the trilateral summit’s announcement.
The US-Japan-Philippines trilateral is part of the emerging trend of minilateral arrangements in the Indo-Pacific region that have emerged over the past decade.
These include the Quad (launched in 2007, revived in 2017), AUKUS (Australia, UK, US) trilateral (2021), Colombo Security Conclave, (initiated in 2011; revived in 2020), TDIO (Trilateral Dialogue on the Indian Ocean, 2013), India-France-Australia Trilateral Dialogue (2021), JAI (Japan-Australia-India trilateral, 2015), the 2004 Malacca Straits Patrol (2008), and Eye-in-the-Sky, among others.
What makes this trilateral particularly noteworthy is that it brings together the US (a super power), Japan (a regional power) and the Philippines (a small power) together. This bucks the trend of other minilaterals that to date have focussed either on maintaining regional security equilibrium, acting as a security provider or establishing an issues-based localized presence.
It is also a part of the wider trend where rising, middle and small powers are demonstrating new willingness to shoulder security responsibilities that have traditionally been handled by superpowers.
While the idea of launching a trilateral minilateral initiative is not new, a growing sense of urgency in view of China’s hostile actions against the Philippines in the South China Sea seems to have propelled Manila, Tokyo and Washington to bring this initiative to fruition.
A track two strategic dialogue in Tokyo in September 2022 laid the groundwork for security experts and practitioners to discuss among others “ways in which the security triangle could be operationalized in a time of conflict.” On the ground, this cooperation, particularly in the maritime security domain, has considerable potential.
Another emerging noteworthy trend is that most of these initiatives are directly or indirectly linked to China and have a direct bearing on Southeast Asian security. AUKUS, Quad, Eye in the Sky, the Malacca Patrol and JAI (Japan, Australia, India) are all directly linked to the region’s security, which has become an epicenter for great power competition.
China’s determination to emphasize its unrecognized sea claims and the Philippines’ increasingly confident stance to defend its claimed territory has already sparked several naval incidents. The most recent was on March 4 when Chinese vessels collided with Philippine ones in a disputed South China Sea area, leaving four Filipino crew injured.
Despite the clear gap between China and the Philippines’ naval capabilities, Manila’s actions are being driven by Marcos Jr’s determination to carry out his duty of protecting national sovereignty.
They may also be driven by ASEAN’s failure to address the issue (ASEAN leaders have consistently failed to make a joint statement addressing the South China Sea disputes), and the growing support from the US and others around the region including Australia, India and Japan – the other three Quad members.
Defense cooperation is being established with all the Quad members and assistance is being provided in terms of policy development, capacity-building and joint patrols. India has also provided military hardware to the Philippines, such as the BrahMos ground missile system. Of the three, Japan has gone furthest in lending support and both sides are working on a deal that would allow the deployment of military forces on each other’s soil.
Likewise facing maritime insecurities vis-a-vis China close to home, Japan has ramped up its defense strategies. Last year, China and Japan’s coast guards were locked in a confrontation in waters around the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea, where Chinese government vessels spotted in the contiguous zone hit a record high.
For the US, the trilateral with Japan and the Philippines represents another effort to address China’s increasingly assertive actions in the region while keeping the strategic status quo intact.
The strategic advantage of the US-Japan-Philippines trilateral lies in its proximity to potential flashpoints, namely the South China Sea and Taiwan. The fact that several of the Philippine military bases that Manila has recently opened to the US are close to these disputed areas cannot be overlooked.
In fact, the Camilo Osias Naval Base in Sta Ana, Cagayan, and Lal-lo Airport in Cagayan, both located at the northernmost part of Luzon, are approximately 500 kilometers from Kaoshiung, Taiwan, which some speculate could be used to supply Taiwanese forces in the event of a Chinese invasion.
But transforming this trilateral into a more integrated grouping will be easier said than done due to the partners’ different priorities. While the US, Japan, Australia and the Philippines conducted their first full-scale exercise in the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone on April 7, Manila cannot be expected to conduct freedom of navigation exercises across the region or project itself as one of the region’s net security providers.
The sustainability of such minilateral arrangements depends on various factors, not least US domestic politics and the region’s evolving geopolitical landscape. The US has shown resolve, albeit flippantly under certain leaders, in honoring its security commitments to its regional allies and upholding a rules-based order in South China Sea waters, which it defines as a global common.
The US is now in election mode and should Donald Trump successfully win the presidency, different policies and priorities may emerge. That’s raising concerns in Japan and Taiwan and could have implications for the Philippines.
In such uncertain times, the Philippines and others need to engage with other Asian powers in various shapes and forms, meaning more minilaterals may be in store.
Dr Rahul Mishra is Senior Research Fellow at the German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance, Thammasat University, Thailand, and Associate Professor at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He tweets @rahulmishr_
Peter Brian M. Wang leads the economics subcentre at the National Institute of Public Administration (INTAN), Malaysia. He writes for local and international publications and recently contributed to the book “Contesting Malaysia’s Integration into the World Economy.” He tweets @PBMWang