US President Joe Biden talks with India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the opening of the G-20 Summit in Nusa Dua on the Indonesian resort island of Bali on November 15, 2022. Photo: Twitter Screengrab

The Ukraine-Russia war and Hamas-Israel conflict have both significantly altered India’s strategic and security calculations.

The upheavals have in many ways contradicted the predictions and assessments of many Indian strategists, plunging India into a precarious situation calling for a serious reevaluation of its foreign policy priorities.

One immediate repercussion of the conflicts is the heightened vulnerability India faces along its northern border and the Indian Ocean regions, including from potential Chinese kinetic actions in the strategic areas where India acts and operates mainly in isolation from partners and allies.

There is a noticeable and worrying absence of publicly available consolidated documents outlining the foreign policy strategies and implementations of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government.

To be sure, certain insights into India’s foreign policy priorities and trajectory can be gleaned from the various interviews, speeches and writings of External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar.

As India approaches the 2024 Lok Sabha election, Jaishankar’s recently released book “Why Bharat Matters” serves as a valuable resource for understanding some of Modi’s foreign policy shifts since 2014.

The book encapsulates Modi’s changed foreign policy stance and aims to broaden popular support for his government by emphasizing India’s supposedly enhanced power, posture, intent, and strength during his decade-long tenure.

It also underscores the importance of sustaining India’s rising global standing, a not-so-subtle call for continued popular support for Modi and his BJP at the upcoming general election.

One notable aspect of Jaishankar’s book is India’s decision to forge, for the first time, a strategic partnership with the West in general and the US in particular, marking a significant departure from past foreign policy approaches.

This strategic shift is attributed to the undeniable dominance of the US in current and future global affairs. Jaishankar emphasizes that regardless of how countries view the US – as an ally, competitor, neutral party, or undecided – none can afford to be indifferent to American influence.

Moreover, Jaishankar delves into the geopolitical dynamics surrounding China, noting that while Beijing has benefitted from historical shifts it cannot fully compensate for the partial void left by the US in contemporary global affairs.

The US’s extensive reach and impact on the international order remains unparalleled, influencing India’s strategic calculations and partnerships, the chief diplomat writes.

Jaishankar opines that India’s often vexed relationship with China, characterized by longstanding border disputes, a full-scale war in 1962 and now occasional but sometimes fiery skirmishes, adds a layer of complexity to its foreign policy considerations.

The loss of 20 Indian soldiers in clashes with Chinese troops in the Galwan Valley in June 2020 underscored the importance of securing India’s borders. Jaishankar emphasizes India’s national prerogative to engage with the US strategically to ensure peace and tranquility along its borders in the book.

Jaishanker also notes that one significant aspect of India’s evolving foreign policy is its burgeoning partnership with the US in the Indian Ocean rimland.

This partnership is solidified through foundational agreements such as the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) in 2020, the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2018, the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016 and the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in 2002.

These agreements designated India as a US defense partner while participation in initiatives like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) security partnership has further enhanced India’s global standing, particularly in terms of securing its borders against China and ensuring maritime security in the Indian Ocean.

But recent geopolitical events, notably the Ukraine-Russia war and the Hamas-Israel conflict, have introduced new challenges and vulnerabilities.

India relies heavily on Russian arms and ammunition, which account for about 65% of its arms imports. The domestic arms industry also depends significantly on Russian technology and materials. However, in the current situation, Russia faces challenges in maintaining that level of support for India.

Russia’s shortfall of arms and ammunition due to the war with Ukraine makes it difficult for Moscow to maintain steady supplies to India. Indeed, Russia has resorted to importing war logistics from Iran to sustain battlefield supplies, including drones, making it almost impossible for Russia to provide immediate or medium-term support to India.

Economically, Russia’s extensive trade partnership with China, which reached US$240 billion in 2023 and is projected to grow to $300 billion in 2024, widely outweighs its trade with India, which stood at about $65 billion in 2023.

Russia is thus unlikely to choose India over China in any conflict scenario due to Moscow’s deep and deepening economic ties to Beijing, for fear of potential political repercussions. Moreover, Russia and China are collectively working to advance multipolar global governance, further aligning their strategic interests.

India’s strategic partners, including the US and its NATO allies, may not be able to supply arms and ammunition to India due to their engagements in the Ukraine war and contingent supplies for Israel.

While Israel supplies arms to India under a defense cooperation agreement, the Gaza war would likewise limit its ability to support India with arms and ammunition in a conflict scenario where New Delhi needed to import armaments.

Additionally, India’s changing stance in the Hamas-Israel conflict, particularly Modi’s alignment with Israel based on his personal bonhomie with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, has alienated India in the Global South.

The Global South, including the Arab world and many Muslim nations, is now more likely to support China due to India’s perceived shift toward the West and abandonment of the world’s poor nations at global fora.

The geopolitical dynamics have significantly affected India’s global standing. Modi’s retreat from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Kampala summit in January 2024 signified India’s clear new alignment with the West and away from the Global South.

The consequences of that perceived shift are yet to be seen or felt but could be significant for India’s standing and security in the months and years ahead.

The author tweets at @BhimBhurtel

Bhim Bhurtel teaches Development Economics and Global Political Economy in the Master's program at Nepal Open University. He was the executive director of the Nepal South Asia Center (2009-14), a Kathmandu-based South Asian development think-tank. Bhurtel can be reached at bhim.bhurtel@gmail.com.

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1 Comment

  1. India has always been a backstabbing, white wannabe country. India choosing to be a tool of the west should be expected and not come as a suprise, if BRICS will ever amount to anything they need to expel India that wetern trojan horse with immediate effect.