“No better friend, No worse enemy.”
That’s the US Marine Corps’ self-image.
But if you want Marines to really hate you, just question their new plan, Force Design 2030 (FD 2030).
And if you’re a former Marine they’ll hate you even more.
General David Berger, then the corps’ commandant, introduced FD 2030 in 2019. He aimed to make the Marine Corps a more mobile force, operating in smaller ‘low-signature’ units in austere coastal locations and using long range missiles to dominate the nearby sea – thus facilitating broader naval campaigns.
The plan had China in mind.
To this writer at least, the plan was a breath of fresh air.
The Marine Corps was finally paying attention to the Asia-Pacific – and to China in particular. Until then, everything was the “sandbox” – Iraq and Afghanistan. Asia was a backwater.
Even worse, call China an adversary and the courtiers at Headquarters Marine Corps would come after you.
Indeed, at the Marine Corps’ Pacific headquarters some staff officers downplayed the China threat. The Marines even squandered opportunities to establish a presence in certain regional countries.
The Marines needed some new thinking.
The commandant’s plan was such and used regional geography – archipelagos and islands – to make life difficult for the People’s Liberation Army. The Marines were moving away from the narrow mindset of large amphibious units operating from large fixed bases, which offered easy targets for Chinese missiles.
This was good. And overdue.
However, there were a few questions that nobody could quite answer:
Where to put the small detached missile units?
Obviously important, but this hadn’t been figured out.
How to hide the units?
It was said they would be small and “low-signature” and would move around. But missile batteries are not small. And Westerners stand out. Once spotted, the Marines might be running for their lives.
How to supply the units?
Forage for chickens and lizards? There was talk of building 35 light amphibious ships. They presumably were not invisible. And one Marine General noted they’d be pulled back in the event things got dangerous – since they couldn’t take a hit.
Substitute unmanned aerial vehicles or aircraft?
These issues should have been resolved before rolling out FD 2030. If the designers missed these, what else did they miss?
The plan was now making one feel like John the Apostle. “It was in my mouth sweet as honey: and [soon after] I had eaten it, my belly was bitter.” (Revelations 10:10)
Divest to invest
In order to implement FD 2030 and obtain necessary hardware the Marine Corps considerably reduced its infantry, aircraft, and artillery – and eliminated its tanks and even its bridging equipment (helpful for getting across rivers) that one still finds on even the modern battlefield.
In other words, FD 2030 was not an add-on to existing Marine Corps capabilities that were still useful in many situations. Instead, the Marines would give up capability.
They called it “divest to invest.”
This seems akin to a carpenter tossing tools out of his tool box that he knows he’ll need.
But this was the price to pay for revamping the Marine Corps.
One heard different justifications – centered on money and/or the changing nature of warfare.
The money saved by shedding hardware and capability would be used for buying long range rockets and other expenses associated with FD 2030.
A tough decision, but purse strings are tight in Washington.
Divesting to save money to spend on FD 2030 is a noble gesture – but nobody much cares.
Trying to game Congressional spending is a fool’s errand. Instead, spend what you have prudently and do your job well. And if you need more money – make the case.
Another justification for “divest to invest” was that the discarded hardware won’t be missed since warfare has changed. Tanks, ‘tubed’ artillery and aircraft are neither needed nor survivable, it was said.
Moreover, amphibious assaults were declared obsolete.
This all could be true.
But it presumes remarkable clairvoyance about future conflicts. If you have that you ought to also be able to make a bundle on sports betting and the stock market.
The lessons of Ukraine do demonstrate that shore-launched long-range missiles can close off large stretches of ocean. But tanks and regular artillery are still in demand – by both sides.
Warfare perhaps hasn’t yet changed as much as FD 2030 proponents claim. And the Marines should have hedged their bets.
Say this – and after being called an idiot – you’d hear that the Marine Corps still has enough firepower left over to take on any and all enemies.
And in the case of tanks and bridging equipment, if they should be needed the US Army will provide them.
Really.
We don’t do windows
The shift to FD 2030 implicitly declared that the Marines won’t conduct extended land combat operations or fighting on any large scale – since they don’t want to.
Bringing to mind a prickly housekeeper who doesn’t “do windows or work past five,” the Marine Corps decided it would only fight as it wanted – rather than in any clime and place and whenever the nation calls its “911 Force.”
General Berger might have asked the American public.
Unless our enemies cooperate and fight as we hope they will, FD 2030 has left gaps that will need to be covered.
If the Marines won’t do it, give the missions to the US Army.
A needed change gone too far?
The Marines needed change. But they gave up too much for FD 2030.
As one friend noted:
I sometimes wonder if the proponents are placing too much emphasis on innovation and too little on the traditional blocking and tackling skills, so to speak.
Another observer added:
To cut out three divisions worth of supporting arms, replace combat power with renamed “Littoral” regiments – and burden them with the single operational concept of a better uniformed Houthi rocket squad reenacting the Wake Island defense – appallingly poor judgment. At the same time, to allow Marine air wings to wither – leaving the same number of squadrons but with fewer aircraft in each (calls to mind “ghost soldiers” in a developing country) – who is this supposed to fool?
But we’re told such concerns with FD 2030 are misinformed or wrong.
This cocksureness is familiar, and troubling.
The FD 2030 acolytes have an answer for everything.
They tout having thoroughly wargamed and modeled the plan.
So did Robert McNamara’s whiz-kids who had victory in the Vietnam War down to a mathematical certainty. But not quite, as it turned out.
And recall the lead up to the 2008 financial collapse. The bankers had algorithms that eliminated all risk. If you challenged them you just didn’t get it.
Nowadays, question FD 2030 and stand by for ad hominem attack.
One venomous attack on retired Marine generals opposing FD 2030, sneeringly called them “the grandparents” interfering with the parents in raising the grandchildren and they should shut up.
The gentleman making this attack had championed the US Navy’s much derided littoral combat ship early on. Having helped foist that disaster on the Navy and the nation, a little circumspection might have been in order.
A role for Congress?
FD 2030 proponents point to Congressional support for the plan. But getting certain Congressmen and staffers on board was perhaps not so hard. It rarely is.
But after lobbying by plan skeptics – some in Congress are having second thoughts about FD 2030.
The 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) calls for an independent, formal review of FD 2030.
The acolytes are resisting – responding with the equivalent of a Greta Thunberg “How DARE you?”
But shouldn’t they welcome it? It would presumably confirm the plan’s soundness.
Ironically, if FD 2030’s creators – a relatively small, select group and seemingly sworn to secrecy – had solicited input more widely they could have avoided much pain and also produced a better plan.
But since it’s Marines we’re talking about, you kind of knew hubris would get them in trouble. Getting them out of it won’t be so easy.