As the US debates establishing an independent Cyber Force, China has made its functional equivalent, the People’s Liberation Army-Strategic Support Force (PLA-SSF), a cornerstone of its military modernization program.
This month, the US think tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) released a report calling for the creation of a US Cyber Force to improve national cyber warfare capabilities.
The study highlights the need to address personnel shortages and inefficiencies within the current military structure that hinder the effective recruitment, training, promotion and retention of cyber talent.
The FDD report draws parallels between the establishment of the US Cyber Force with the US Space Force and US Air Force. It notes that all three initiatives were driven by the need to adapt to evolving warfare domains, namely air, space and cyberspace.
The US Cyber Command (US CYBERCOM) is facing a qualified personnel shortage due to the fragmented operational approach of the US Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. The report includes a study drawing on 75 interviews that highlights the grim state of cyber force readiness due to recruitment issues and promotion systems ill-designed for cyberspace operations.
The FDD report recommends establishing the US Cyber Force as an independent service, similar to the US Space Force model. It argues that a dedicated cyber-service is the only solution to overcome the systemic issues plaguing the US’s cyber defense capabilities. Alternative proposals focus on addressing cyber personnel shortages in the military without establishing an independent new force.
In a May 2021 War on the Rocks article, David Barno and Nora Bensahel argue that while cyberspace plays an essential role in the US military and society, despite its importance, the country’s cyber defense, deterrence and offensive capabilities lack coordination and require the creation of a unified Cyber Force.
A September 2023 report by the US Cyberspace Solarium Commission (CSC) states that China and Russia have conducted espionage operations targeting the US government and key industries by embedding malware in critical infrastructure, potentially facilitating future malicious activities. Additionally, it notes that criminal groups have expanded their activities in ransomware and cyber theft, posing significant threats to both public and private sectors.
The CSC report states that the implementation of its recommendations from a previous 2020 report has been fragmented, with only around 70% of them being implemented or nearing implementation. Those recommendations aim to reform the US government’s cyberspace structure, strengthen norms and non-military tools, enhance cybersecurity, work with the private sector and preserve cyberspace as a military asset.
As with the FDD report, Barno and Bensahel contend that a US Cyber Force would promote innovation and flexibility in formulating cyber warfare strategies, technologies and doctrines. They liken it to the formation of the US Air Force, which was necessary to fully harness the potential of air power in military operations.
They also mention that creating a US Cyber Force could benefit the military by effectively recruiting and training cyber experts from a more diverse talent pool. Barno and Bensahel note this could also lead to the development of specialized career paths and training programs better suited to the unique requirements of cyber operations.
Others argue the existing US CYBERCOM structure may suffice with a significant overhaul and that the creation of a US Cyber Force could result in inefficiencies. In an August 2021 War on the Rocks article, Jason Blessing argues that extensive military reorganization can lead to inefficiency and demoralization.
Blessing argues against the notion that cyberspace is independent of sea, air, land and space domains, emphasizing its complex intersections and interdependencies with other operating environments.
He says that the US Cyber Command is currently fit to integrate digital with kinetic capabilities, that the US should focus on achieving greater effectiveness with the existing force and that establishing a new service would waste time, energy and money.
Jaspreet Gill mentions in a September 2023 Breaking Defense article that a separate cyber service may pose challenges in understanding the warfighting needs of military services that perform various missions enabled by technologies particular to those mission sets.
Gill notes that the US Department of Defense (DOD) is studying the challenges of managing cyber operations as a career field that spans multiple services to determine whether to fix the existing system or adopt a new one.
Blessing and Gill concur that having a separate US Cyber Force could lead to difficulties integrating cyber operations with traditional military functions, as cyber operations often complement and improve existing capabilities, with a separate US Cyber Force resulting in coordination and operational efficiency challenges.
Moreover, Blessing points out the potential redundancy of having US CYBERCOM alongside a US Cyber Force, particularly regarding command structure, operational focus and resource allocation.
While the US debates whether to establish an independent cyber force, China envisions more prominent roles for its PLA-SSF.
In an article this month for the South China Morning Post (SCMP), Amber Wang notes that the Chinese PLA-SSF has a broader range of responsibilities that include space, cyber, electromagnetic and psychological warfare capabilities, as well as providing intelligence support to all military branches and assisting in joint operations.
Wang says that the PLA-SSF is heavily integrated with civilian technological innovation, particularly in AI development, to enhance China’s military capabilities. She notes this integration is central to the PLA’s modernization and “intelligent warfare” strategies to future-proof the force.
Wang states that the PLA-SSF’s development reflects China’s response to complex geopolitical challenges and its pursuit of asymmetrical advantages over potential adversaries.
She notes that the PLA-SSF’s activities in support of military drills around Taiwan and advancements in space and cyber capabilities could have significant implications for Indo-Pacific regional dynamics.
However, she points out that the PLA-SSF’s Achilles heel may be its reliance on high-tech equipment, particularly high-end AI chips subject to US export controls.