India’s latest Agni-5 test cements its place in the elite circle of global powers with Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology, a significant step in improving nuclear deterrence vis-a-vis China and Pakistan.
This month, multiple media outlets reported that India has successfully completed the first flight test of its Agni-5 MIRV missile. This milestone propels India into the elite group of nuclear powers with MIRV technology, including the US, UK, France, China, Russia and Pakistan.
The test was conducted on Abdul Kalam Island in the Bay of Bengal, off India’s northeast coast. While India did not disclose the number of MIRVs involved in the Agni-5 test, it is believed to carry anywhere between two to more than a dozen warheads.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi hailed the launch of the solid-fuel, canister-launched Agni-5 missile, part of the Agni series named after the Sanskrit word for “fire,” as a proud moment for the nation. Defense Minister Rajnath Singh and Home Minister Amit Shah highlighted the test’s contribution to Modi’s vision of a self-reliant India.
The solid fuel, canister-launched Agni-5 has a range of over 5,000 kilometers, allowing it to target regions deep within the territories of potential adversaries like China and Pakistan.
The capability is particularly significant given the ongoing border tensions with China and India’s strategic rivalry and tensions with Pakistan, underscoring the missile’s role in national security and deterrence.
Integrating MIRV technology into India’s missile arsenal will alter the region’s strategic balance by enhancing the survivability of its nuclear forces, complicating adversaries’ missile defense calculations and underlining India’s no-first-use nuclear policy with a credible second-strike capability.
China’s evolving missile defenses and Pakistan’s pursuit of MIRV technology made it urgent for India to expedite its MIRV missile program.
In a May 2016 Stimson Center report, Rajesh Basrur and Jaganath Sankaran mention that both perceived external threats from China and internal imperatives have driven India’s MIRV program.
Basrur and Sankaran note that India’s MIRV program aims to ensure its security against China’s improving military capabilities, including China’s own MIRV and ballistic missile defense (BMD) advancements.
They say that while proponents argue for MIRVs to penetrate Chinese BMD systems, skeptics question the escalation risks and the implications for crisis stability in a region already fraught with nuclear rivalries.
MIRV missiles are “use it or lose it,” as placing numerous nuclear warheads on one missile makes it more vulnerable to a first strike that destroys a substantial portion of a nation’s second-strike capability.
Basrur and Sankaran add that the debate over India’s MIRV capabilities is complicated by its longstanding nuclear policy, characterized by restraint and a declared no-first-use stance.
They also delve into the domestic drivers behind India’s MIRV program, including the interplay between civilian oversight of India’s nuclear weapons program and arguments against a minimalist nuclear deterrence posture.
However, they caution that technological development often outpaces strategic doctrinal clarity, leading to advancements like MIRVs that may not fully align with India’s minimalist nuclear doctrine.
Still, India faces strategic constraints in strengthening its nuclear deterrent posture vis-a-vis China. Those constraints include the two sides’ economic interdependence, India’s desire to be a leader in the so-called “Global South” and China’s relative political and economic advantages.
Asia Times noted in December 2022 that India’s close economic ties with China, participation in multilateral initiatives led by China such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and involvement in China-led military exercises all may restrain India’s flexibility and nuclear posturing.
Asia Times reported in October 2022 that China is confident that its authoritarian system of governance is superior to India’s democracy and that its military technology advantage will consistently stay a decade ahead of India.
In November 2023, Asia Times reported that Pakistan conducted its second test launch of the Ababeel MRBM, which like the Agni-5 is likewise designed to carry MIRVs, in October of that year at the Sakhi Sarwar range in Punjab province.
The test launch, conducted to confirm various design and technical parameters and assess the performance of different subsystems, reportedly brought Pakistan closer to being able to penetrate India’s new missile defense system.
India’s Agni-5 may still have to overcome reliability concerns before it is fielded. Its MIRV capability will raise questions about the effectiveness of India’s nuclear warheads and its capacity to produce enough fissile material for a MIRV nuclear arsenal.
Frank O’Donnell and Harsh Pant note in a 2014 article in the peer-reviewed Asian Survey Journal that India’s MIRV-capable Agni-5 and its successor Agni-6 will create demand for more sophisticated and smaller warheads. O’Donnell and Pant point out that Indian scientists’ hyperbolic capability claims may have eroded the credibility of India’s missile development and broader nuclear program.
While the recent Agni-5 test may have partly dispelled those doubts, Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda note in a July 2022 Bulletin of Atomic Scientists article that while the Agni-5 has been tested eight times previously, more testing may be required before the missile reaches operational capability.
Ashley Tellis notes in the 2022 book Striking Asymmetries: Nuclear Transitions in South Asia that India’s nuclear warheads’ small yields are the most significant constraint on its arsenal. Tellis says that enlarging India’s inventory with more low-yield warheads would do little to address the deficiency.
India’s slow fissile material production, despite having an extensive nuclear infrastructure, owes to the fact that its nuclear capabilities are focused more on power generation than nuclear weapons production.
Despite that, Tellis says India can increase the production of weapons-grade plutonium in its civilian nuclear power plants and most likely has done so in the past. She says that India maintains a surge production capability in case an international Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty is concluded.