Myanmar’s auto-destruct military regime has produced another data point of desperation by invoking an unused conscription law, fueling alarm that men aged between 18 and 35 and women between 18 and 27 could be called up for duty for anywhere between two to five years.
The State Administration Council (SAC) Notification No 27/2024 issued on February 10 brought the law into force immediately and marked the first time Myanmar has used conscription. Like everything it does, the SAC is following an incoherent plan that is little more than making it up as you go along.
The People’s Military Service Law (2010) was one of those “sleeper” laws of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) junta, among many others, along with the ultimate legal weapon: the 2008 Constitution that served to “justify” the 2021 coup.
The conscription law was always one of those military insurance policies established before the 2010 election and the beginning of the so-called “transition” to “discipline-flourishing democracy.”
It raised concern at the time, especially as Myanmar was reviled for having so many child soldiers, but it was lost in the rising optimism of the democratic transition. The military then had the National League for Democracy (NLD) government to thank for retaining a repressive legal apparatus and refusing to reform or repeal legislation – including the military conscription law – from the books when it gained power in 2016.
But conscription wasn’t necessary for that period as recruitment levels for officers and ranks appeared to be stable. The multiple conflicts that persisted during the past 14 years did actually produce considerable battlefield casualties for the Myanmar army, especially in fighting in Kachin state between 2011 to 2013 and in Rakhine state between 2018-2020, when thousands were killed in combat.
Invoking the conscription law now is clear evidence the military regime is facing a serious personnel shortage from battlefield losses over the past three years. The losses have been especially dramatic over the last three months in multiple battles following the surprise Operation 1027 insurgent offensive in northern Shan State and the remarkable recent spectacle of Myanmar army and police units fleeing into Bangladesh and India to escape the Arakan Army (AA).
Fundamentally, this conscription drive is about manpower and the urgent need to replenish frontline infantry units. The regime must realize it is facing defeat on multiple fronts and has dwindling public support even from its base: the wider Myanmar population has despised the army since the coup and the extreme brutality inflicted on civilians.
There won’t be a long line of volunteers to prop up a fundamentally illegitimate junta, which is why the regime is resorting to press-ganging the hapless into its ranks. But just how effective could this all be?
The only relatively stable and pacified areas in Myanmar are the Irrawaddy Delta, with a large population, and the central zone cities such as Yangon, Mandalay, Meiktila and Bago. But how will communities there react to able-bodied men and women being forced into the military?
And how will civilians who may despise the military but have not supported active armed resistance feel when their young people, and likely civilians of all ages, are essentially enslaved for military service?
It could trigger further urban uprisings and compel attacks against recruitment centers and regime officials involved in the call-up. How many people will the SAC seek to force into service and risk sparking further social unrest?
The Myanmar army doubtless has the bureaucratic capacity to enforce a system like this, from its surveillance capacity on the civilian population and its still formidable network of bases, training facilities and support personnel. And it can doubtless equip and arm them, though almost certainly with low-quality gear.
Yet this is an army that for many years relied on a nucleus of infantry units indoctrinated into the ethos of the military as national savior and for whom the civilian population was a natural resource to be plundered for labor.
A slave-master worldview is deeply rooted in Myanmar’s military culture. Forced service or labor, human shielding, child soldier use, atrocity demining, and sexual violence are the hallmarks of this objectification.
But it is important to consider that the Myanmar military has never before had to rely on conscription because people joined willingly, either for power, prestige or even opportunities for sadistic behavior. There are likely still many inside the military who believe they have a right to subjugate the country and force weaker people into service for that end.
The military has overwhelming firepower but is losing soldiers on the ground where it counts. As a strategy to cling to power, the SAC is clearly relying on airstrikes and artillery to punish armed groups and target civilians to demoralize them.
But how effective is this in the long term if your ground troops are poorly trained, devoid of morale and purpose, and either deserting at the first chance they get or “fragging” any officer they encounter?
Another possibility is that the conscription drive could compel many more young people to join the revolutionary forces. Many may make the decision that it’s better to fight against the military than be forced into the army and be on the losing side.
There are probably better odds of survival in an EAO or well-established and supported anti-coup People’s Defense Force (PDF). The military service law has injected even greater uncertainty into an already volatile conflict.
There is already an exodus from Myanmar of young people seeking employment and educational opportunities in neighboring countries. This new development could compel even more to seek a way out. The conscription system, like so much of SAC-ruled Myanmar, will be riven with corruption, with people likely trying to find ways to pay their way out of service.
Everything from getting a passport renewed to basic paperwork involves incessant bribery in military-run Myanmar: avoiding military service will be the same. The senior military leadership understands well that desperation drives many illicit economies and is doubtless hoping that the social offshoots of compulsory military service will ensnare many officials into interlocking profit-seeking and other survival strategies. The military is the apex predator of Myanmar’s pyramid of corruption.
But there is also a double standard at play in the outcry over the conscription law in sight of the widespread and long-standing forced conscription by many non-state armed groups.
Just days before the SAC notification, the rebel Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) confirmed that it would invoke conscription for both men and women aged between 18-35 in areas under its administration – although with some caveats and criteria, such as only recruiting women if there are three daughters in one family and households with two sons are exempt if one son is disabled or a Buddhist monk.
Forced recruitment by multiple armed groups in northern Shan state has been a persistent practice for decades. In the years preceding the coup, it compelled many families to send military-age (15-40) boys and girls outside of rural areas, either to towns like Kyaukme or to nunneries as far away as Mandalay.
It has also acted as a trigger for inter-ethnic tensions when young people from one community are forcibly recruited by an ethnic armed organization (EAO) from another. In northern Shan state, the practice fueled antagonism and mistrust between the Shan, Ta’ang and Kachin communities well before the coup. Forced conscription by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) is also widespread and rife with repressive practices.
There is no doubt that the Myanmar military is taking a beating across the country, one it cannot simply walk away from. Yet many observers predicted the punishment they were taking two years ago spelled the regime’s imminent collapse.
That still hasn’t happened and whether it will is still in question. The residual strength of the military system, the network of personnel and bases and access to equipment and regular supplies, as well as the asymmetric trump card of airpower, suggests a consolidation of power in the heartland could be their survival strategy.
This may just prolong the coup regime’s terminal decline. But it could indicate that the SAC’s protracted endgame could be even more bloody, brutal and destructive than it already has been.
This conscription law announcement should not be seen simply as a cry of desperation but rather a pronouncement of psychotic resolve to take the entire country down with them. This isn’t an indication of imminent collapse but a clear warning that the conflict could consume the entire country with even greater savagery than it has so far.
David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst working on conflict, humanitarian and human rights issues on Myanmar